Railway Co. v. Ryan

• Decision Date: 21 May 1892
• Citation: 19 S.W. 839,56 Ark. 245
• Parties: RAILWAY COMPANY v. RYAN
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

19 S.W. 839

56 Ark. 245

RAILWAY COMPANY v. RYAN

Supreme Court of Arkansas

May 21, 1892

APPEAL from Crawford Circuit Court, HUGH F. THOMASON, Judge.

This is an action by William Ryan against the St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Co., to recover the penalty prescribed by the act of April 4, 1887, for an overcharge in a passenger fare. The answer set up substantially the same defenses made in Railway Company v. Gill, in 54 Ark. 101. The evidence showed that the overcharge was made by defendant's ticket agent, contrary to defendant's express orders. The cause was tried by the court sitting as a jury, and the following findings of fact and declaration of law were made, viz:

"The court finds that said Wm. Ryan, on October 11th, 1887 applied to J. W. Riley, the regular agent of defendant at Lilly Station, for a ticket to Mountainberg, a distance of twelve miles; that the agent, Riley, furnished him the ticket, and charged and received therefor, sixty cents, which is in excess of the amount allowed by law, and that plaintiff did not carry more baggage than he is allowed by law to carry free of charge upon a first-class ticket. The court also finds hat defendant is a corporation doing business under the laws of Arkansas, and that its road is more than seventy-five miles in length.

"The court declares the law to be that where the agent acts within the scope of his authority, his principal is bound, although the principal may not have authorized the agent to so act and that the agent is responsible to his employer for any violation of instructions given him, whether the same be general or special."

Judgment was rendered for plaintiff in the sum of $ 50, and a further sum of $ 10 was taxed as an attorney's fee. Defendant has appealed.

Affirmed.

E. D Kenna and Adjel Sherwood, with B. R. Davidson, for appellant.

1. It was error to refuse to allow appellant to show that three cents a mile was an unjust and unreasonable rate. Const. U.S. 5 amdt.; ib. 14 amdt.; 134 U.S. 418, 467, 48; 116 id. 331.

2. The act is unconstitutional and void. Cases supra.

3. Riley was a special agent--a mere station agent--he had no authority to demand excessive fares, and his unauthorized acts do not bind the company, 11 East, 43; 10 Met. 259; 4 Gray, 16; 49 Mich. 333; 55 N.Y. 93; 1 Moody & Mal 433; 2 Cromp. & Jer. 494; 6 F. 175; 70 Mo. 632; 9 Pet. 607, 627-8-9. The acts of Riley were outside of the line of his employment 130 U.S. 416; 10 C. B. 665; 70 Mo. 672; 20 Mo.App. 632; 2 Exch. L. R. 267; 9 F. 139.

OPINION

HEMINGWAY, J.

It is conceded that Riley was the agent of the railway company duly authorized to sell the ticket which Ryan claims to have bought, and to charge for it lawful fare. But the company insists: (1) that no ticket was in fact sold; and (2) that if it was sold, the charge of excessive fare was unauthorized, and was therefore the individual act of Riley and not the act of the company.

Upon the first point there is proof sufficient in law to warrant a finding against the company, and we can not disturb the verdict unless it appears that the act was that of Riley for which the company was not chargeable.

Riley was employed for the express purpose of selling tickets and collecting fare for the company; and in making the sale to Ryan he was doing that part of the company's business that he was put there to transact. The penal act was no departure from the company's business, or doing an independent wrong for the personal ends of Riley; it consisted alone in the improper manner in which he transacted the company's business expressly committed to him. As we understand the law, the master is liable for the penal acts of his agent, done within the scope of his authority and in executing the master's business. Mechem on Agency, sec. 745; Story, Ag. sec. 308; George v. Gobey, 128 Mass. 289; Wallace v. Merrimack &c. Co. 134 Mass. 95; Peterson v. Knoble, 35 Wis. 80; Kreiter v. Nichols, 28 Mich. 496; Isaacs v. Railroad Co. 47 N.Y. 122; Mott v. Consumers' Ice Co., 73 N.Y. 543.

It follows therefore that the company is liable in this case.

The appellant cites many cases in which it was held that acts complained of were the individual acts of the servant for which the master was not chargeable. We have carefully examined them, and in their light reached the conclusion announced. Some of them are criminal cases, in which a different rule for determining the master's liability obtains. Com. v. Nichols, 10 Met. 259; People v. Parks, 49 Mich. 333, 13 N.W 618-Others are cases...