Rainbolt v. Everett, E

• Decision Date: 06 October 1982
• Docket Number: No. E,E
• Citation: 639 S.W.2d 532,6 Ark.App. 204
• Parties: Carolyn RAINBOLT, Appellant, v. William F. EVERETT, Director of Labor, and First National Bank, Appellees. 82-99.
• Court: Arkansas Court of Appeals

Page 532

639 S.W.2d 532

6 Ark.App. 204

Carolyn RAINBOLT, Appellant, v. William F. EVERETT, Director of Labor, and First National Bank, Appellees.

No. E 82-99.

Court of Appeals of Arkansas.

Oct. 6, 1982.

David R. Goodson, Paragould, for appellant.

William F. Everett, Director of Labor, by Thelma Lorenzo, Little Rock, for appellees.

COOPER, Judge.

This is the second time that this case has been before us. In the first case, Rainbolt v. Everett, 3 Ark.App. 48, 621 S.W.2d 877 (1981), the appellant appealed from a finding that she voluntarily quit her last employment in order to accompany her spouse to a new place of residence but did not immediately enter the new labor market and become available for suitable work. We reversed the Board of Review's decision, holding that the "Employment Security Division may be estopped to deny that appellant made an immediate entry into the labor market because of the apparent representations of its agent". However, consistent with the procedure used by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Foote's Dixie Dandy, Inc. v. McHenry, 270 Ark. 816, 607 S.W.2d 323 (1980), we remanded the case in order to allow the State the opportunity to present evidence in order to rebut appellant's estoppel defense. The reason that we allowed the State the opportunity to present additional evidence was because this was the first case in which the doctrine of estoppel had been applied to the State where a claimant was seeking unemployment benefits. The State was justified in the lower proceeding in relying solely on the theory that estoppel could not be applied to the State, and therefore there was no reason for the State to present evidence to contradict appellant's estoppel defense.

On remand, three issues remained open. They were estoppel, registration and reporting requirements, and whether the appellant had been doing those things which a reasonably prudent individual would be expected to do to secure employment. The reason that last two issues were left open was because the Appeal Tribunal and the Board of Review had no reason to consider these issues, since they denied unemployment benefits on another ground. Apparently, these are two issues which may be considered by the Appeal Tribunal even if it reverses the Agency's original grounds for disqualification. ¹ See, Teegarden v. Director, Ark. Employment Sec., 267 Ark. 893, 591 S.W.2d 675 (Ark.App.1979).

After this case was remanded, the Appeal Tribunal conducted a hearing, at which the State produced Mr. Keith Johnson and elicited testimony from him regarding the facts giving rise to appellant's estoppel defense. Mr. Johnson testified that he did not remember any conversation with appellant at her initial interview. Mr. Johnson testified that his standard procedure was to set a date for appellant to return in order to view a film concerning her unemployment benefits and to give her literature regarding her unemployment benefits, if he had the literature.

The Board of Review, after reviewing the testimony at the second hearing, discussed Mr. Johnson's testimony in its findings of fact and conclusions of law section of its opinion. Then the Board said:

The Court of Appeals stated that the sole question involved is whether this claimant immediately entered the labor market. The Board must find that she never left the area in question since her move only involved a distance of 20 to 21 miles. The Paragould job market is considered to be part of the job market included in the Jonesboro area. It is further noted that in the reply from the employer on 501.3 Notice of Claim Filed Form that "Employee quit of own accord indicating unwillingness to drive distance of approximately 22...