Rainey v. Nelson, s. 40738
| Decision Date | 26 January 1972 |
| Docket Number | 40739,Nos. 40738,s. 40738 |
| Citation | 257 So.2d 538 |
| Parties | Charles E. RAINEY et al., Appellants, v. Florine NELSON, Appellee (two cases). |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Richard L. Stewart, County Atty., and Stephen Nall, Asst. County Atty., for appellants.
Tomas R. Moore, Clearwater, for appellee.
This cause is before us on direct appeal from a final judgment of the Circuit Court of Pinellas County declaring Fla.Stat. § 193.461, F.S.A. (formerly 193.201) unconstitutional on its face. Fla.Const. art. V, § 4(2), F.S.A. We reverse.
In 1969 appellee filed an application with the Agricultural Zoning Board of Pinellas County for agricultural zoning of her property located within the county, under § 193.461. After public hearing the application was denied. Appellee's 1970 application was likewise denied, whereupon appellee filed a complaint for injunction and other relief against both denials in the circuit court. The trial court ultimately entered a final judgment declaring subsection 4(b) of § 193.461 unconstitutional on its face and ordering that appellee's property be designated as agricultural for ad valorem tax purposes for the years 1969 and 1970. This appeal followed.
The sole question before this Court is the constitutionality vel non of § 193.461. It is undisputed that (1) the property in question is being used for agricultural purposes, and (2) there is contiguous urban development on two or more sides.
That portion of the statute in question reads as follows:
'(2) The county agricultural zoning board, in order to promote and assist a more orderly growth and expansion of urban and metropolitan areas, shall on an annual basis zone all lands within the county as either agricultural or nonagricultural.
'(4) (b) The board may also reclassify lands zoned as agricultural as nonagricultural when there is contiguous urban or metropolitan development on two or more sides and when the board finds that the continued use of such lands for agricultural purposes will act as a deterrent to the timely and orderly expansion of the community.'
The statute sets up a scheme whereby lands used primarily for agricultural purposes are given a special tax break. This special treatment is authorized by Fla.Const. art. VII, § 4(a):
'Agricultural land or land used exclusively for non-commercial recreational purposes may be classified by general law and assessed solely on the basis of character or use.'
Pursuant to this constitutional provision and under the authority of the general police power of the state, the Legislature chose to enact a system whereby the conflicting agricultural and urban interests would be balanced to assure an orderly development of the community. This exercise of power is challenged as a denial of due process.
This Court recently held in Patheco v. Pacheco, 246 So.2d 778 (Fla.1971), that since there was no common law 'right' to alimony, the legislative denial of alimony to an adulterous wife was not a deprivation of a Property right. Likewise, in the present case there is no deprivation of a property right in denying special tax treatment to this property owner since there is no 'right' to the special treatment in the first instance. The only potential constitutional question here involves an equal protection issue, which can only be satisfied upon the showing of a valid exercise of the state's police power. Whether equal protection has been denied must necessarily depend on whether the legislative classification is reasonably expedient for the protection of the public safety, welfare, health or morals. Eelbeck Milling Co. v. Mayo, 86 So.2d 438 (Fla.1956); Larson v. Lesser, 106 So.2d 188 (Fla.1958).
The police power of a state:
'. . . embraces its whole system of internal regulation, by which the State seeks not only to preserve the public order and to prevent offenses against the State, but also to establish for the intercourse of citizen with citizen those rules of good manners and good neighborhood which are calculated to prevent a conflict of rights, and to insure to each the uninterrupted enjoyment...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ryan v. Ryan
...26 N.Y.2d 28, 308 N.Y.S.2d 347, 256 N.E.2d 513 (N.Y.Ct.App.1970); Fearon v. Treanor, 272 N.Y. 268, 5 N.E.2d 815 (1936).7 Rainey v. Nelson, 257 So.2d 538 (Fla.1972); Seaboard Air Line Railroad Company v. Jackson, 235 So.2d 298 (Fla.1970).8 Sahler v. Sahler, 154 Fla. 206, 17 So.2d 105 (1944);......
-
Bass v. General Development Corp.
...based upon its character or use, no similar restriction governs the criteria according to which such land is classified. In Rainey v. Nelson, 257 So.2d 538 (Fla.1972), we sustained a legislative enactment which classifies land as nonagricultural according to criteria completely unrelated to......
-
Straughn v. K & K Land Management, Inc.
...which constitutes an exception to the general constitutional mandate of full valuation for tax purposes. As we said in Rainey v. Nelson, 257 So.2d 538, 539 (Fla.1972), '(T)here is no deprivation of a property right in denying special tax treatment to this property owner since there is no 'r......
-
Harbor Ventures, Inc. v. Hutches
...any right in the owner to receive the preferential treatment. Its denial does not violate any personal or property right. Rainey v. Nelson, 257 So.2d 538 (Fla.1972). Therefore the issue is whether the legislative enactment and the classification it establishes are rationally related to some......