Rainey v. Patton
| Decision Date | 15 August 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 12-3796,12-3796 |
| Parties | SHANYA RAINEY; ANTWAN ROLAND, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JEFF PATTON, In his individual capacity; BRANDON GOFF, In his individual capacity, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs Shanya Rainey and Antwan Roland appeal the magistrate judge's grant of summary judgment in favor of Officers Jeff Patton and Brandon Goff in this civil rights action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. For the reasons set forth below, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings.
This case arises out of a traffic stop in Cheviot, Ohio, on September 23, 2010. Prior to the stop, Officers Patton and Goff had responded to a domestic call at Rainey's apartment. Although a physical altercation had not occurred, Rainey and her boyfriend were arguing continuously, and she requested that the officers escort the boyfriend from her residence. Rainey also left the apartment and was pulled over moments later by Patton for failing to yield to oncoming traffic. Rainey testified at her deposition that Patton then forced her to exit the car and get on the ground;pointed his firearm at her face while yelling at her to do so; and eventually retrieved his canine from the vehicle1 and brought it over to where she was lying on the ground. The canine then bit her. Roland, who happened to be riding his scooter nearby, saw the dog bite Rainey and watched Patton and Goff place her under arrest. The officers directed Roland to leave. After Roland refused, Goff cited him for disorderly conduct. An Ohio municipal court acquitted Roland after a bench trial.
Rainey and Roland subsequently filed this § 1983 action against Patton and Goff, claiming excessive force, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. The parties consented to the magistrate judge's jurisdiction. Following discovery, Patton and Goff filed a motion for summary judgment, which the magistrate judge granted. As to Rainey's excessive force claim, the magistrate judge determined that Patton's actions were reasonable under the circumstances because Rainey admitted that she did not immediately pull her vehicle over after Patton turned on his cruiser lights; did not immediately comply with Patton's instruction to lie on the ground and put her cell phone down; and attempted to use the cell phone during the stop. The magistrate judge found that this "evasive behavior" and failure to obey orders would "lead a reasonable officer to conclude that [she] was evading arrest and/or posed [a] threat to . . . Patton's safety." The magistrate judge also distinguished excessive force cases involving police dogs where qualified immunity had been denied because they "involved an intentional commanded deployment of the canine by the Officer handler and/or involved allegations of inadequate canine training." The magistrate judge found the"undisputed evidence" established that Patton did not command the dog to bite Rainey. This timely appeal followed.
We review de novo the magistrate judge's decision to grant summary judgment. Brooks v. Rothe, 577 F.3d 701, 705 (6th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Barker v. Goodrich, 649 F.3d 428, 432 (6th Cir. 2011).
The magistrate judge granted summary judgment in favor of Patton and Goff on qualified-immunity grounds. Qualified immunity shields an officer from § 1983 liability unless "the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right," and "the right was clearly established" such that "it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201-02 (2001), abrogated in part by Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009). In order to prevail, a plaintiff "must establish that the defendant acted knowingly or intentionally to violate his or her constitutional rights, such that mere negligence or recklessness is insufficient." Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 373 (6th Cir. 1999).
We begin with Rainey's excessive force claim. "A seizure must occur before an excessive force claim is cognizable under the Fourth Amendment." Dunigan v. Noble, 390 F.3d 486, 492 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 844-45 & n.7 (1998)). Raineyalleges that Patton "intentionally releas[ed] his police dog onto her," in order to effectuate an unlawful seizure. "A seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment . . . 'requires an intentional acquisition of physical control.'" Id. (quoting Brower v. Inyo Cnty., 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989)). In other words, the Fourth Amendment is implicated "only when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied." Brower, 489 U.S. at 597. This court has applied the Fourth Amendment intent requirement to excessive force claims involving police dogs. See Neal v. Melton, 453 F. App'x 572, 577 (6th Cir. 2011); Dunigan, 390 F.3d at 492. However, "claims involving proof of a defendant's intent seldom lend themselves to summary disposition" and "rarely will be supported by direct evidence of such intent." Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512, 525 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Walker v. Davis, 643 F. Supp. 2d 921, 928-29 (W.D. Ky. 2009) ().
The magistrate judge, as well as the defendants, put weight on the fact that Patton did not give the dog any type of verbal command,2 and that Rainey's non-expert testimony alleging that Patton did, in fact, "command" the dog to bite her cannot be used to create a genuine issue of material fact. Although Rainey's affidavit contends that the release of the choke chain "mostcertainly was a command to the dog to attack" under the circumstances,3 her deposition testimony more clearly states that Patton "let the chain go, he loosened up on the chain because [the dog] was like barking and . . . he was choking hisself [sic] barking at me and the officer let him go a little bit and that's when he bit me because he was that close to me with the dog." Patton admits that he brought the dog just two feet away from Rainey while she was on the ground. While Rainey turned her head just before she was bitten, her testimony indicates that she could hear the dog straining against the chain, and could also hear the chain loosened right before the bite.
Construing the testimony in the light most favorable to her, Rainey is alleging that while Patton was yelling at her, he brought an agitated dog over, placed it in extremely close proximity to her, and intentionally loosened the choke chain that was keeping the dog from reaching her. Roland also testified that he saw Patton release the choke chain, and while his assertion of knowledge as to what this meant in terms of dog-training is dubious, his testimony on what he saw bolsters Rainey's assertions. Further, a reasonable jury could infer Patton's intentionality from Rainey's testimony thatPatton was loudly yelling at her while she was getting on the ground and pointed a gun at her face. Based on these allegations and the totality of the circumstances, we do not think that expertise in dog training is necessary to establish that a factual dispute exists. This dispute is undoubtedly material, as it goes to whether Patton's actions were intentional as opposed to reckless or negligent.
In order to establish that Patton's intentional seizure involving the dog constituted an excessive use of force, Rainey must show that such force was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989); Dunigan, 390 F.3d at 493. A court "consider[s] not the 'extent of the injury inflicted' but whether an officer subjects a detainee to 'gratuitous violence.'" Miller v. Sanilac Cnty., 606 F.3d 240, 252 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Morrison v. Bd. of Tr. of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 407 (6th Cir. 2009)). This analysis requires a court to balance "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (internal quotation marks omitted). The court "pay[s] particular attention to 'the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether [s]he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.'" Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247 F.3d 633, 639 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). The reasonableness of a police officer's use of force "must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. In assessing such claims, the court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Schreiber v. Moe, 596 F.3d 323, 332 (6th Cir. 2010).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Rainey, we conclude that Patton's decision to employ his canine during the course of the traffic stop was unreasonable. Rainey committed a minor traffic offense. Patton had just come from responding to a domestic call placed by Rainey, and nothing in the record indicates that Rainey was a person Patton would have considered a threat to his safety or that of others such that it would be necessary to employ a canine. Moreover, Patton was a 6', 220-pound man, whereas Rainey was...
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