Raju v. Rhodes

Decision Date20 November 1992
Docket NumberCiv. A. No. J92-0206(L)(N).
Citation809 F. Supp. 1229
PartiesSeshadri RAJU, M.D. v. Robert S. RHODES, M.D.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

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Ed Davis Noble, M. Curtis McKee, Fuselier, Ott, McKee & Shivers, George H. Ritter, George Q. Evans, Wise, Carter, Child & Caraway, Jackson, MS for plaintiff.

Samuel L. Begley, John Maxey, Maxey, Pigott, Wann & Begley, Jackson, MS, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

TOM S. LEE, District Judge.

This cause is before the court on the motion of defendant Robert S. Rhodes, M.D., to dismiss plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Alternatively, defendant has moved for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 Plaintiff Seshadri Raju, M.D., has responded to the motion and the court has considered the memoranda of authorities together with attachments submitted by the parties in ruling on the motion. The court concludes that defendant's motion is well taken and summary judgment should be granted in his favor.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the reorganization of the Department of Surgery at the University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMC), a teaching hospital and a division of the State of Mississippi. The parties to this dispute are both employees of UMC. Plaintiff Seshadri Raju is a Professor of Surgery and member of the Department of Surgery, where he has been employed since 1972. Defendant Robert S. Rhodes has at all times material to this dispute been the Chairman of the Department of Surgery at UMC and, as such, plaintiff's departmental and academic supervisor.

In 1988, during his first year at UMC, defendant made several administrative changes in the Department of Surgery operations, one of which was to propose to surgeons in the department a "Management Services Agreement" under which defendant agreed to provide management services for income derived from participating staff members' outside practice of medicine.2 According to Dr. Raju, he reluctantly entered into such an agreement with Dr. Rhodes on June 13, 1989.3

Subsequently, in October of 1990, Dr. Rhodes, acting in his capacity as Chairman of the Department of Surgery, made several changes in the operation of the UMC Transplant Program, one of which was the removal of Dr. Raju from the position of Director of the Transplant Program, a position which he had held since 1980. Additionally, as part of the reorganization of the program, Dr. Rhodes established individual organ transplant teams consisting of different groups of surgeons and internists, permitted transplant surgery only if an intensive care unit bed were available prior to surgery, and temporarily suspended extra-renal transplants. Dr. Raju, who was to become Chief of Lung Transplantation and Chief of Liver Transplantation, was displeased with all of these changes, including his removal from the directorship and reassignment to the above positions. He therefore filed a grievance complaint through the proper channels at UMC seeking to enjoin all of Dr. Rhodes' actions. Dr. Raju alleged in his grievance that certain of Dr. Rhodes' decisions and actions concerning the reorganization of the Transplant Program, among other things, resulted in Dr. Raju's demotion, adversely affected patient care, and subjected him to harassment by Dr. Rhodes.

The first step of Dr. Raju's grievance procedure began with Dr. Rhodes, as Chairman of the Department of Surgery. Dr. Rhodes, disagreeing with Dr. Raju's perception of the events surrounding the reorganization, concluded that the grievance was without merit. Next, Dr. Raju appealed to Dr. Carl G. Evers, Associate Dean for Academic Affairs. Dr. Evers likewise found no merit in Dr. Raju's allegations. Dr. Raju thereafter appealed to Dr. Norman Nelson, Vice Chancellor for Health Affairs, who appointed a faculty grievance committee to investigate Dr. Raju's allegations. The faculty grievance committee heard evidence from a number of people involved in the Transplant Program and concluded unanimously that Dr. Raju's grievance against Dr. Rhodes lacked merit. Dr. Nelson concurred in the committee's opinion.

After exhausting all administrative remedies at the institutional level, Dr. Raju requested review by the Board of Trustees of State Institutions of Higher Learning (Board of Trustees), which considered Dr. Raju's grievance and determined that (a) the UMC due process procedures were followed, and (b) UMC's decision was not arbitrary and capricious. The Board of Trustees thus affirmed the grievance committee's finding of no merit in Dr. Raju's claim against Dr. Rhodes.

Aggrieved by the Board of Trustees' decision, Dr. Raju perfected an appeal to the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi, as provided in Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-95 (1972). Dr. Raju, in seeking to overturn the Board of Trustees' decision not to enjoin UMC's reorganization of its Transplant Program, claimed:

I. The decision will have an adverse impact on the current future prospects for the Medical Center;
II. The decision was arbitrary as the evidence gathered during the grievance procedure clearly does not support the conclusion reached; and
III. The decision was tainted by serious violations of due process which occurred during the grievance procedure.

The circuit court, finding that Dr. Raju's grievance had no merit, that there was substantial evidence to support the Board of Trustees' decision, and that all proceedings were in accord with due process, affirmed the decision of the Board of Trustees.

Prior to the circuit court's denial of his appeal, plaintiff filed a separate state court action against Dr. Rhodes asserting, in regard to the Management Services Agreement between he and Dr. Rhodes, claims for breach of contract and tortious interference with business and contractual relations. Subsequently, yet still prior to the circuit court's decision, plaintiff amended his complaint to include a claim for damages against Dr. Rhodes in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, as grounds for his § 1983 claim, Dr. Raju alleged that Dr. Rhodes' actions in reorganizing the Transplant Program at UMC deprived him of property interests in his position as Director of the Transplant Program and profits from his private practice, as well as liberty interests in the management of his practice, career and income, all of which were denied him without a predeprivation hearing. Dr. Raju also alleged a violation of his substantive due process rights, contending that as a result of the alleged "arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable" actions of Dr. Rhodes in reorganizing the Transplant Program, he is no longer a world renowned transplantation surgeon, but rather, "is now relegated to the genre of a garden variety transplant surgeon." Once Dr. Raju's state court complaint was amended to include claims under § 1983, Dr. Rhodes removed the case to this court and now seeks summary judgment as to all claims asserted against him.

As the primary bases for his motion, Dr. Rhodes contends that certain factual issues decided by the UMC faculty grievance committee, and later adopted by the Circuit Court of Hinds County as part of its judgment affirming the Board of Trustees' decision, must be accorded collateral estoppel effect by this court. Consequently, according to Dr. Rhodes, this court is compelled to dismiss him from this action on the ground that, as a public official who did not violate Dr. Raju's clearly established constitutional rights, he is immune from suit as a matter of law with respect to all of plaintiff's state law and § 1983 claims. Dr. Rhodes further argues that, on their merits, none of Dr. Raju's claims meet the heightened standards of pleading and proof required to overcome his qualified immunity. See Elliott v. Perez, 751 F.2d 1472, 1478 (5th Cir.1985).

LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Must the judgment of the state court affirming the findings of the Board of Trustees and faculty grievance committee be given preclusive effect in this federal court litigation?

It is undisputed that the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires federal courts to give the same preclusive effect to state court judgments that those judgments would be given in the courts of the state from which the judgments emerged. See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415, 66 L.Ed.2d 308 (1980); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the preclusion doctrine at issue in this case, "once a court decides an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision precludes relitigation of the same issue on a different cause of action between the same parties." Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 n. 6, 102 S.Ct. 1883, 1890 n. 6, 72 L.Ed.2d 262 (1982) (citations omitted).4

Whether a judgment is entitled to preclusive effect under § 1738 depends on whether the party against whom the state court judgment was rendered had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim at issue. Allen, 449 U.S. at 95, 101 S.Ct. at 415. In this regard, however, "state proceedings need do no more than satisfy the minimum procedural requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause in order to qualify for the full faith and credit guaranteed by federal law." Kremer, 456 U.S. at 481, 102 S.Ct. at 1897-98. In Kremer, the Supreme Court held that the State of New York's combined administrative hearing and judicial review procedures satisfied this test.5 As stated by the Court: "It is well established that judicial affirmance of an administrative determination is entitled to preclusive...

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