Raley v. City of Camden

Decision Date24 September 1952
Docket NumberNo. 16671,16671
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesRALEY v. CITY OF CAMDEN.

Savage & Marion, Harold W. Funderburk, Camden, for appellant.

J. Clator Arrants, Murchison & West, Camden, for respondent.

FISHBURNE, Justice.

This is a Workmen's Compensation case. James R. Raley, the respondent-appellant, who is the claimant, will herein be referred to as employee or claimant. The City of Camden, appellant-respondent, will generally be referred to as the employer.

The claimant, a man forty-seven years of age, had been an employee of the City of Camden for about nineteen years,--first as a police officer, then as tax collector, and finally as Commissioner of streets. For three or four years prior to December 28, 1948, while serving as Commissioner, he suffered from high blood pressure. Prior to August, 1948, his duties had been solely of a supervisory nature, with about thirty or thirty-five city employees under his direction and control. He performed no manual work of any kind in connection with his employment, and on account of his physical condition, was not expected to perform any. The claimant was subject to the authority of the mayor of the City of Camden, who, in his testimony before the Single Commissioner, stated that he was well aware of the claimant's physical condition and permitted him to take rest periods during the lunch hour when necessary.

In August, 1948, the employer adopted a new form of government, which is referred to as the City Manager Plan. The newly appointed City Manager assumed full control of all municipal employees, with the power by virtue of his office, to hire and discharge. Within a month after he assumed his duties he required the claimant, over his protest, to do manual labor to which he was unaccustomed, and work longer hours. The claimant advised the City Manager of his heart condition, and requested that he be allowed to continue his rest periods in accordance with his doctor's instructions. This request was denied, and he was threatened with discharge if he violated the mandate of the City Manager. In order to hold his job, he continued to work as instructed, and he was subjected to unusual strain and physical exertion during his working hours.

The claimant was a man of highly nervous nature, and on the morning of December 28, 1948, he was called from his home much sooner than his regular work period began, and ordered by the City Manager to personally mark the streets so that new parking lines might be painted. This required a great deal of stooping and bending. After this was done, the City Manager directed him to go to the park, a short disstance away, where claimant was told to move some posts approximately eight or ten feet long and weighing between thirty-five and forty pounds each. He did this, and while lifting the posts, which were used to mark the boundaries of the walkways in the park, he became dizzy and 'TURNED BLIND'. WHEN HE RECOVERED FROM This fainting spell, he was able to walk across the street to where his doctor's office happened to be located, and was there given a medical examination. When he left the doctor's office he went home and to bed, as directed by his physician. The next morning he went to the office of the City Manager and told him that on account of his health, he could no longer continue to do manual labor. Thereafter he remained in bed under the doctor's orders for about three months, after which he resigned as Commissioner of streets. He was kept on the city payroll during this period of illness.

Dr. Rhame, claimant's physician, testified fully and at length. He had known of claimant's heart condition for two or three years, had prescribed a rest, and later advised him to see a heart specialist in Charlotte, which he did. His trouble was diagnosed as chronic auricular fibrillation with moderate to severe hypertension, all of which, as we understand these terms, means a 'skipping heart' and high blood pressure. The doctor stated that claimant's condition had progressively grown worse a few months before December 28, 1948, and he expressed the opinion that any heavy mental or physical strain would aggravate the condition. He further stated that the unusual and strenuous manual labor performed by claimant on the morning of December 28, 1948 aggravated his pre-existing heart condition, and brought on the attack which he suffered that day. Since the day of the alleged accident, while moving the heavy posts, claimant has been unable to do any work except of the lightest kind, but no physical labor.

The employer contended that claimant did not comply with Sections 7035-25 and 7035-26 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, providing that the occurrence of an accident should be reported within thirty days. However, there is much testimony to the effect that the proper city officials knew of the accident, and that the city manager himself visited the claimant at his home while he will still in bed; and was definitely told by claimant's wife that he (the City Manager) and through him, the city were responsible for claimant's condition.

Claimant testified that he did not file a written claim because the tension which permeated the new form of government, and the personal disagreements between him and the City Manager, were such that he was afraid of losing his job.

For several months prior to December 28, 1948, numerous city employees who knew of the serious heart condition of claimant, spoke to the City Manager on his behalf, requesting that he be allowed to execute his duties without having to perform manual labor. The mayor of the City of Camden, who retired from office in the year 1948,--prior to the alleged accident,--knew, as stated, the physical condition of claimant. He testified that as commissioner of streets, claimant fully and satisfactorily discharged his duties without the necessity of physical labor on his part.

Claimant testified that the sudden illness which overcame him on December 28, 1948, while attempting to perform the unusual and heavy work of lifting and moving the posts under the direction of the City Manager, was the first attack of its kind he had ever suffered; and that this was directly precipitated by the undue exertion, to which he was not accustomed. As stated, Dr. Rhame expressed the same opinion.

The Single Commissioner after finding the foregoing facts, which in our opinion are fully sustained by the testimony, adopted the opinion of Dr. Rhame, and concluded his report with:

'It is the opinion and conclusion of this Commissioner that the defendant had sufficient knowledge of the accident sustained by the claimant although no written notice was given and that the defendant has not been prejudiced thereby; and, the claimant's claim for compensation was filed with the Commission within the statutory period.

'It is also the opinion and conclusion of this Commissioner that the proper city officials knew of the claimant's condition prior to his accident and permitted him certain privileges which, when taken away, caused the claimant's present condition. That the claimant, because of his condition, was employed in a supervisory capacity only, until the time of the change in government and had never been required to do any manual labor; that the claimant had always performed his duties satisfactorily and no complaints had been registered. This was evidenced by the testimony of the city officials.'

The Single Commissioner definitely found as a fact that the claimant sustained the injuries by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment which aggravated a pre-existing condition; and that claimant as a result of the injuries sustained on December 28, 1948, 'is now and has been since the date of the accident, totally and permanently disabled.' The employer was directed to pay the claimant at the compensable rate of $25 per week for total and...

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13 cases
  • Price v. B. F. Shaw Co.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • August 20, 1953
    ...the findings of the Industrial Commission has long been well settled, and is admirably and succinctly stated in Raley v. City of Camden, 222 S.C. 303, 310, 72 S.E.2d 572, 575, as 'On appeal from the award of the Industrial Commission, the Circuit Court, and this Court, are limited in their ......
  • Lorick v. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • April 13, 1965
    ...v. Heslep & Thomasson Co., 199 S.C. 124, 18 S.E.2d 668; Green v. City of Bennettsville, 197 S.C. 313, 15 S.E.2d 334; Raley v. City of Camden, 222 S.C. 303, 72 S.E.2d 572; Ricker v. Village Management Corporation, 231 S.C. 47, 97 S.E.2d 83; Kearse v. S. C. Wildlife Resources Department, 236 ......
  • Walsh v. U.S. Rubber Co.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • June 5, 1961
    ...evidence to support the factual findings made by the Commission upon this issue. They are binding upon this Court. Raley v. City of Camden, 222 S.C. 303, 72 S.E.2d 572, and Gray v. Laurens Mill et al., 233 S.C. 421, 105 S.E.2d 409. This exception is The next question for determination is wh......
  • Kearse v. South Carolina Wildlife Resources Dept.
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • July 1, 1960
    ...pathology which may have been a contributing factor. Sweatt v. Marlboro Cotton Mills, 206 S.C. 476, 34 S.E.2d 762; Raley v. City of Camden, 222 S.C. 303, 72 S.E.2d 572. And the right to compensation is not affected by the fact that the unusual or excessive strain which precipitates the hear......
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