Ralph D'Oench Co. v. St. Louis County Cleaning & Dyeing Co.

• Decision Date: 14 March 1949
• Docket Number: 41090
• Parties: The Ralph D'Oench Company, a Corporation, (Plaintiff) Respondent, v. St. Louis County Cleaning and Dyeing Company, a Corporation, (Defendant) Respondent, Peter W. Ranft and Lydia Ranft, His Wife, (Defendants) Appellants, and Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Company of St. Louis, a Corporation, (Defendant) Respondent
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

218 S.W.2d 609

358 Mo. 1072

The Ralph D'Oench Company, a Corporation, (Plaintiff) Respondent, v. St. Louis County Cleaning and Dyeing Company, a Corporation, (Defendant) Respondent, Peter W. Ranft and Lydia Ranft, His Wife, (Defendants) Appellants, and Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Company of St. Louis, a Corporation, (Defendant) Respondent

No. 41090

Supreme Court of Missouri

March 14, 1949

Appeal from Circuit Court of St. Louis County; Hon. Amandus Brackman, Judge.

Reversed and remanded.

Milton F. Napier and Louis E. Zuckerman for appellants.

(1) The court erred in sustaining plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and in rendering its decree thereon because there were conflicting issues in the case which the motion admitted as a matter of law, so that plaintiff was not entitled to judgment on the pleadings; in sustaining the motion, the court erroneously went beyond the face of the pleadings to take judicial notice of the file and judgment in another case, for the purpose of ruling upon the plea of res adjudicata therein, with the result that appellants were deprived of their defenses, claims and cross-claim for damages against plaintiff and Cleaning Company by a dismissal of their answer without a hearing on the merits thereof; the decree, in erroneously sustaining the plea of res adjudicata on which the motion for judgment on the pleadings was based assumed that only $ 8,054.01 is due appellants without evidence thereof; and the decree dismissing the answer of appellants, deprived them of their right to damages without a hearing thereon. Sloan v. Dunlap, 354 Mo. 1211, 194 S.W.2d 32; Linders v. Linders, 356 Mo. 852, 204 S.W.2d 229; Sullivan v. Bank, 140 S.W.2d 31; Baker v. Lamar, 140 S.W.2d 31; Cammann v. Edwards, 340 Mo. 1, 100 S.W.2d 846; Sec. 847.40 Mo. R.S.A.; Laws 1943, p. 353, sec. 40; Sec. 847.18 Mo. R.S.A.; Laws 1943, p. 353, sec. 18; Secs. 847.39, 847.40, and 847.41 Mo. R.S.A.; Laws 1943, p. 353; Secs. 847, 67, 68 Mo. R.S.A.; Laws 1943, p. 353, secs. 67, 68. (2) The court erred in dismissing appellants' answer and cross-claim for $ 10,000 against plaintiff and Cleaning Company, and in rendering its decree thereon, because it erroneously took "judicial notice" of matters not admitted on the face of the pleadings in order to sustain plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings based on a plea of res adjudicata. Knorp v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 44, 175 S.W.2d 889; Grue v. Hensley, 210 S.W.2d 7; Mo. R.S.A., Sec. 847.40

C.C. Wolff and A.E.L. Gardner for St. Louis Cleaning & Dyeing Company, respondent.

(1) The trial court in determining the issues in this cause was privileged to give consideration to the findings made in the prior case tried in Division No. 1 of said Circuit Court of St. Louis County for the reason that the pleadings were substantially the same, the parties the same and the issues to be determined practically identical. Knorp v. Thompson, Trustee, 352 Mo. 44; Dodd v. Mo. K. & T.R. Co., 193 S.W.2d 905; 25 C.J.S., sec. 197, p. 914.

John W. Giesecke for respondent Ralph D'Oench Company; Ackert, Giesecke & Waugh of counsel.

(1) A court can and should, when justice requires, take judicial notice of its own records, particularly so when the matter before it is between the same parties and the issues are moot. Knorp v. Thompson, 352 Mo. 44, 175 S.W.2d 889; Gildersleeve v. Overstolz, 97 Mo.App. 303, 71 S.W. 371; Odom v. Langston, 356 Mo. 1140, 205 S.W.2d 518; Bistol v. Fischel, 81 Mo.App. 367; Sec. 842.2, Mo. R.S.A.

OPINION

Tipton, P.J.

The petition in this case, in the nature of an interplea, was filed in the circuit court of St. Louis County and was assigned to division three of that court. The appellants Peter W. Ranft and Lydia Ranft and respondents St. Louis County Cleaning and Dyeing Company and Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Company were made defendants. After the pleadings were closed the plaintiff-respondent filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings which was sustained. A judgment was entered against appellants on the theory that the issues had been determined in a prior suit in another case in division one of that court and, therefore, such issues are res adjudicata in this suit.

The Ralph D'Oench Company will be referred to throughout this opinion as the escrow agent, the St. Louis County Cleaning and Dyeing Company as the purchaser, the Ranfts as the sellers and the Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Company as the bank.

The petition of the escrow agent stated that an escrow agreement was entered into between the escrow agent, the sellers and the purchaser in which the purchaser agreed to purchase certain real estate from the sellers; that under this agreement the sellers executed a warranty deed to the purchaser and it was placed with the escrow agent; that the purchaser executed a note for $ 9,000 secured by a deed of trust, the unpaid purchase price of the real estate, which was also deposited with the escrow agent pending tax and insurance adjustments to be made by the purchaser; that the sellers were to discharge a deed of trust securing a $ 20,000 note held by the bank; that when the tax and insurance adjustments were made and the deed of trust held by the bank discharged, then the escrow agent was to deliver the deed of trust and the $ 9,000 note to the sellers and the warranty deed was to be delivered to the purchaser; that the purchaser had paid to the escrow agent $ 1,679.86 on the $ 9,000 note and the sellers had accepted $ 911.03 of that sum but had refused to accept the balance, and had also refused to discharge the deed of trust held by the bank and had refused to carry out the terms of the escrow agreement; that the purchaser desired to perform its part of the agreement and pay in full the balance of the $ 9,000 puchase note but the sellers refused to accept the $ 9,000 note and deed of trust or the proceeds thereof and demanded that their warranty deed be returned to them. The effect of the prayer of the petition was that the sellers and purchaser be required to perform their agreements.

The purchaser entered its appearance and filed its answer, admitting all of the allegations of the escrow agent's petition. The bank's answer asserted ownership of the $ 20,000 deed of trust and stated that there was an outstanding balance of $ 526.66.

The answer of the sellers admits an agreement to sell the real estate described in the escrow agent's petition and states that there was an escrow agreement but contends that the escrow agreement was not the one described in the petition; that the agreement to sell the property was subject to certain conditions and restrictions as contained in their warranty deed; that the sellers kept and performed their agreement, but that the purchaser violated the escrow agreement by violating the conditions and restrictions contained in the deed; and that they have demanded a return of the warranty deed held by the escrow agent but it has refused that demand. The sellers also filed a cross petition for damages because of this alleged breach of covenants and conditions and the failure of the escrow agent to redeliver the warranty deed to them, and they claim damages in the sum of $ 10,000 against the purchaser and the escrow agent.

A reply and crossbill in two counts was filed to sellers' pleadings by the purchaser. Count one alleged that the issue raised by the sellers' pleadings were raised in their pleadings in an interplea suit filed by the escrow agent against the sellers and the purchaser, case No. 169149 assigned to division one of the St. Louis County circuit court, in which the same issues raised by the sellers were found against the sellers in a final judgment in that suit, and that that judgment is a final and conclusive determination of the issues raised in the sellers' counterclaim. Count two of this pleading asked that the agreement be enforced and asked for an accounting to...