Ralphs v. McClellan, 20130413.
| Citation | 337 P.3d 230,2014 UT 36 |
| Decision Date | 29 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 20130413.,20130413. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Utah |
| Parties | Cecil Blaine RALPHS, Petitioner and Appellant, v. The Honorable Clark A. McCLELLAN, and the State of Utah, Respondents and Appellees. |
337 P.3d 230
2014 UT 36
Cecil Blaine RALPHS, Petitioner and Appellant
v.
The Honorable Clark A. McCLELLAN, and the State of Utah, Respondents and Appellees.
No. 20130413.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Aug. 29, 2014.
Staci A. Visser, Clayton A. Simms, Salt Lake City, for appellant.
Brent M. Johnson, Salt Lake City, for appellee Judge McClellan.
Daniel E. Bokovoy, Michael C. Drechsel, Vernal, for appellee State of Utah.
Justice LEE authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice DURRANT, Associate Chief Justice NEHRING, Justice DURHAM, and Justice PARRISH joined.
Opinion
Justice LEE, opinion of the court:
¶ 1 This case comes to us on a petition for extraordinary relief from a case originating in justice court. The underlying justice court proceedings involved misdemeanor charges against Cecil Ralphs under lewdness provisions of the criminal code. An earlier lewdness case culminated in a conviction in justice court in 2010. When Ralphs was subject to further lewdness charges in 2011 and 2012, he was charged with felonies in light of his prior convictions. And at that point Ralphs sought to challenge his 2010 conviction on the ground that he had been deprived of his right to appeal the 2010 justice court decision under the standards set forth in Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628, and Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(f).
¶ 2 The justice court determined that Ralphs had failed to establish that he had been denied his right to appeal under Manning. On de novo appeal to the district court, Judge McClellan affirmed the justice court's decision, concluding that Ralphs had
waived the right to assert the denial of his right to appeal under Manning by waiting too long to assert that claim.
¶ 3 The petition is granted. We hold that the procedures set forth in Manning and confirmed in Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(f) extend to a de novo appeal of a justice court decision filed in the district court. And, finding no time limit on the face of Manning or rule 4(f), we conclude that there was no basis for a finding of waiver, and accordingly order the district court to consider the merits of Ralphs's arguments under Manning and rule 4(f).
I
¶ 4 In December 2009, Ralphs entered a plea in abeyance in Uintah County Justice Court to a charge of lewdness under Utah Code section 76–9–702(1), a class B misdemeanor. In 2010, prior to the expiration of the twelve-month term of that plea in abeyance, Ralphs was charged with and convicted of a second act of lewdness. As a result, the justice court concluded that Ralphs had violated the terms of his plea in abeyance on the 2009 charge and accordingly entered a conviction on the 2009 charge.
¶ 5 In January 2011, Ralphs was charged with lewdness for a third time. In light of the two prior convictions, the State charged Ralphs with a third-degree felony under Utah Code section 76–9–702(2)(b)(ii), which provides for an enhancement of misdemeanor lewdness to a third-degree felony if the defendant has been previously convicted of lewdness two or more times. A jury found Ralphs guilty as charged in October 2011. In addition, the jury made a special finding that Ralphs had two prior lewdness convictions and the court accordingly entered a conviction for a third-degree felony.
¶ 6 Ralphs faced a fourth lewdness charge in April 2012. The 2012 case was also charged as a felony based on the prior convictions.
¶ 7 While this fourth lewdness case was pending, Ralphs filed a motion requesting a hearing under Manning v. State. In that motion Ralphs asserted that his otherwise time-barred appeal from the second (2010) lewdness case should be reinstated on the ground that he had been deprived of his right to appeal by no fault of his own. See Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, ¶ 31, 122 P.3d 628. Ralphs argued, specifically, that he had asked his attorney to file an appeal from the second lewdness judgment within the appropriate timeframe, but that his counsel had deprived him of the right to appeal by failing to file it. The justice court held a hearing on the Manning issue and ultimately denied Ralphs's motion, determining that Ralphs had not met his burden of proving that he was unconstitutionally deprived of his right to appeal.
¶ 8 Ralphs filed an appeal of that justice court ruling in the Eighth District Court, seeking de novo review under Utah Code section 78A–7–118. The State moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. At the initial hearing Judge McClellan determined to “take the evidence on the Manning ” issue and to decide later whether the court had jurisdiction to resolve the matter.
¶ 9 Ralphs's counsel called several witnesses in support of his Manning claim, including his appointed counsel in the second lewdness case. That attorney testified that Ralphs had expressed his desire to appeal, and that the attorney had not personally filed an appeal because he had sold his practice to another attorney during that time and had directed that attorney to file the appeal. The successor attorney did not testify at the hearing. Ralphs and his wife also testified. Both indicated that Ralphs had directed his attorney in the second lewdness conviction to file an appeal.
¶ 10 After hearing evidence and considering further briefing on jurisdiction, the district court granted the State's motion to dismiss. Instead of ruling on the jurisdictional question, however, the district court concluded that Ralphs had waived his right to a Manning hearing by waiting too long to assert his claim, and therefore held that Ralphs was foreclosed from “collaterally” attacking a conviction that served as an enhancement for the charge he currently faced. The district court held that if Ralphs had wanted to raise the argument that he was
deprived of his right to appeal in the second case, he should have done so in the third case. And it expressed concern over the “mischief” that would ensue from allowing Manning hearings to proceed without any time limit, on an issue that would leave the parties and subsequent proceedings in limbo.
¶ 11 Ralphs first sought to pursue an appeal of the district court's decision in the court of appeals, but subsequently withdrew the appeal and filed a petition for extraordinary relief. The court of appeals then certified the matter to us for review.
¶ 12 In the petition before us, Ralphs challenges the district court's decision granting the State's motion to dismiss on the grounds that the district court misinterpreted our precedent, rules of procedure, and statutes. Under civil rule 65B, this petition may succeed only if “no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available,” Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a), and upon a showing that the district court “abused its discretion.” Id. at 65B(d)(2).
¶ 13 The threshold portion of that standard is easily established. Because there is no right of appeal from a district court's de novo review of a justice court decision,1 there is no other “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy” for an abuse of discretion in a district court's decision in such circumstances. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(a). So the controlling question is simply whether the district court abused its discretion in dismissing Ralphs's motion. We turn to that question now.
II
¶ 14 In challenging the dismissal of his appeal, Ralphs contends that the district court misinterpreted and misapplied Manning, appellate rule 4(f), and the doctrine of waiver. Respondents, for their part, challenge the district court's jurisdiction to entertain a motion under Manning or rule 4(f), and also insist that any such motion was time-barred and foreclosed by Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 38, which generally governs appeals from justice courts to district courts, and by the exclusive remedy provision of the Post–Conviction Remedies Act (PCRA), Utah Code sections 78B–9–101 to 405.
¶ 15 We agree with Ralphs. We grant the petition, holding (a) that appellate rule 4(f) governs...
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