Ramos v. City of Chi.

Decision Date24 May 2013
Docket NumberNo. 10–3425.,10–3425.
Citation716 F.3d 1013
PartiesPedro RAMOS, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, et al., Defendants–Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Kenneth N. Flaxman (argued), Attorney, Chicago, IL, for PlaintiffAppellant.

Sara K. Hornstra (argued), Attorney, City of Chicago Law Department, Chicago, IL, for DefendantsAppellees.

Before ROVNER, WOOD, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge.

Pedro Ramos was arrested in 2007 and charged with residential burglary in violation of 720 ILCS 5/19–3. After a bench trial, he was acquitted of that charge, and he subsequently brought an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants, the City of Chicago and five of its police officers, violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments in conducting a false arrest and malicious prosecution, and also asserting state law claims for malicious prosecution and indemnification. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the § 1983 claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Ramos' state law claims. Ramos appeals the summary judgment as to his § 1983 claims.

On appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we review the decision of the district court de novo. Naficy v. Ill. Dep't of Human Servs., 697 F.3d 504, 509 (7th Cir.2012). Examining the evidence in the light most favorable to Ramos, and construing all inferences in his favor, we will affirm summary judgment only if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. Our narrative that follows is limited to the facts upon which there is no dispute, as set forth in the parties' Rule 56.1 Statement, and additional facts submitted to the district court by Ramos.

On September 27, 2007, Jose Garcia went to check on a house that he co-owned with his brother who was on vacation. When he arrived at the backyard of the home, Garcia noticed that the back gate was uncharacteristically open, and the storm door to the home was ajar. As Garcia walked toward the house, he noticed that two men stood inside the open doorway. Upon seeing Garcia, the men ran deeper into the interior of the home and then fled from it. One of the intruders, Miguel Manzano, drove a station wagon from the home, and Garcia gave chase in his own vehicle. While tracking Manzano, Garcia, who was an off-duty Chicago police detective, called 9–1–1 and requested police backup. Detective Michael Pagan responded to that call and assisted Garcia in apprehending Manzano. Pagan subsequently transmitted information over police radio concerning the existence of the second intruder and the address of the burglary. Defendant Officers John Stanley and Timothy Shanahan joined by two others who were eventually dismissed from the case, Jim Johnson and Cesar Claudio, then proceeded to that address, at which time they received updated information from Officer Brian Reidy via radio, indicating that the second suspect: [s]upposedly lives at 7249 South Lawndale, first name Jose” and that he was a male, Hispanic, and in his 20s. The radio dispatch also indicated that the suspect had a red shirt on but had taken it off and probably had a white tank shirt on, and that he was about 5'2? and bald. One officer inquired over the radio about the suspect “Peso,” but the dispatcher corrected the officer and informed him that the name of the suspect was “Jose.” In addition, the officers received transmissions indicating that the second suspect was a member of the “Saints” street gang, and that he was believed to have guns in his house.

Based on those radio transmission, the officers proceeded to the South Lawndale address. As they approached the front entrance of that residence, they noticed Ramos, a Hispanic male in a red shirt, who appeared as though he could be in his twenties, pulling away from the curb in front of the residence in a Chevy Equinox. Officer Stanley motioned for the vehicle to stop, and asked Ramos for his driver's license. Ramos did not possess a valid driver's license, and he produced only his state identification to Stanley. Stanley then asked Ramos to exit the vehicle, handcuffed him, and explained that they were investigating a burglary. The officers placed Ramos in the back of the police car until they could bring Garcia to the scene from his location a few blocks away. Garcia identified Ramos as the other person he observed inside the burglarized home, at which point Stanley, Johnson, Claudio, and Shanahan placed Ramos under arrest. Evidence presented to the district court indicated that Ramos was actually 33 years of age (although Ramos acknowledged in the undisputed facts that he appeared as though he could be in his 20s), stood 6'1? tall, and weighed 320 pounds. There was some evidence that Garcia had described the second intruder as larger than 5'7?, but taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Ramos, we assume that the description the officers had was of a person who stood 5'2? in height.

Ramos had previously been arrested for a weapons violation and charged with six counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/24–1.6(A)(1),(2), and one count of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/24–1.1. He had posted bond on August 3, 2007 on the weapons charges, but that bond was revoked when he was charged with residential burglary. Accordingly, Ramos remained incarcerated from the time of his arrest until his acquittal on the residential burglary charge on June 5, 2008, at which time his bond was reinstated. On August 12, 2008, he pled guilty to one count of unlawful use of a weapon, and was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment. The 253 days that he served from his residential burglary arrest on September 27, 2007 until the June 5, 2008 acquittal was credited as time served on his weapons conviction.

Ramos then brought this § 1983 action against the defendants, alleging that one or more of the defendants arrested him without a lawful basis, and caused him to be charged and prosecuted unlawfully by including false statements in one or more police reports, in contravention of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protections. Specifically, Ramos contends that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated by his arrest which was not based on probable cause. On appeal, he limits this claim to the time period before Garcia positively identified him as the second intruder. He argues that the defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by stopping his vehicle and then handcuffing him and placing him in the police vehicle while awaiting Garcia. In addition, he asserts a claim of wrongful prosecution, alleging that one or more of the defendants falsely stated that Manzano, the first intruder, had implicated Ramos. He argues on appeal that Officer Shanahan prepared a police report stating that Manzano implicated Ramos in the burglary. Manzano, in his deposition testimony, denied that he had identified Ramos as his partner in the burglary, and stated that he did not know Ramos until he met him in jail awaiting trial in the criminal case.

The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on both claims. With respect to the claim for false arrest, the court held that the brief detention of Ramos while investigating the situation was not an arrest, but rather was an investigatory stop that, under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), is permissible as long as the officers have reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is ongoing. The court held that the officers were justified in the initial stop of the vehicle because they had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity based on the description and location of the second suspect, and that the knowledge about his gang affiliation and gun ownership justified placing him in handcuffs without converting that investigatory stop into an arrest.

Regarding the claim for wrongful prosecution, the district court held that a constitutional claim for malicious prosecution is not available where a state law remedy exists. McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 786 (7th Cir.2003). Because Illinois recognizes the tort of malicious prosecution, the court held that Ramos could not proceed on a due process challenge in the court on the same grounds. The court further considered whether Ramos could pursue a Brady-type violation” premised upon the officer's fabrication of evidence and failure to reveal that falsification to Ramos. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Parish v. City of Chicago, 594 F.3d 551 (7th Cir.2009). The court rejected that claim as well, however, because Ramos had failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from the false evidence.

On appeal, Ramos challenges the court's holdings on the merits, but argues as an initial matter that the court should not have considered the possibility that his detention was a valid Terry stop because the defendants did not argue that in their motion for summary judgment. A party seeking summary judgment generally must raise arguments in support of that motion in its opening memorandum in order to give the other party a fair opportunity to respond. Smith v. Bray, 681 F.3d 888, 902–03 (7th Cir.2012). Ramos is incorrect, however, in his contention that the Terry argument was not adequately asserted. The motion for summary judgment addressed the claim in the complaint, which was that Ramos was arrested without a lawful basis. Accordingly, the arguments in the motion were focused on the actions of the defendants that could be construed as an arrest, which undoubtedly included the clear arrest after Garcia identified Ramos, but also arguably included the actions of the defendants in detaining and handcuffing Ramos. Although the initial stop of the vehicle was not discussed at length, the...

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