Ramos v. County of Madera

• Decision Date: 28 April 1971
• Docket Number: S.F. 22779
• Citation: 4 Cal.3d 685,94 Cal.Rptr. 421
• Parties: , 484 P.2d 93 Manuela RAMOS, a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF MADERA et al., Defendants and Respondents.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 421

94 Cal.Rptr. 421

4 Cal.3d 685, 484 P.2d 93

Manuela RAMOS, a Minor, etc., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. COUNTY OF MADERA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

S.F. 22779.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

April 28, 1971.

Ralph Santiago Abascal, Marysville, Dennis R. Powell, Maurice Jourdane, Salinas, J. V. Henry, Medera, Don B. Kates, Jr., San Francisco, and Martin Spiegel, Santa Rosa, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Roy E. Wolfe, County Counsel, and Edward H. Chidlaw, Chowchilla, for defendants and respondents.

PETERS, Justice.

Plaintiffs, recipients of Aid to Families With Dependent Children, and of Aid to the Blind (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 11200--11488; 42 U.S.C.A. § 601 et seq.; Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 12500--12850), appeal from the judgment of the trial court, which sustained defendants' general demurrer to their complaint without leave to amend on the ground that plaintiffs had not exhausted available administrative remedies. Plaintiffs in their class action seek injunctive and declaratory relief for the class and damages for the individually named plaintiffs.

The allegations of the complaint, which we must assume to be true for purposes of ruling upon a demurrer, may be summarized as follows:

On Saturday, September 16, 1967, it was announced that Madera schools would be closed the following week to enable pupils to assist in the grape harvest. Employees of defendant county welfare department allegedly announced that AFDC welfare recipients of 10 years old or older must work in the fields or have their assistance terminated. Nineteen families were terminated that week for failure to send children into the fields.

Plaintiffs are two families, the Sagovias and the Valeros, affected by the department's order. ¹ The department's actions toward each family, through two different social workers, were allegedly similar.

On Monday, September 18, defendant social worker Schleich (an agent and employee of the department) allegedly threatened Mrs. Segovia with termination unless she and her four daughters reported to pick grapes. A written threat was allegedly communicated the next day. The family feared termination and decided to work. However, Mrs. Segovia has a disabled arm, and her 15-year-old daughter, Armandina, is mentally retarded, and cannot work without close parental supervision. These two therefore stayed home. Three other Segovia daughters, aged 10, 11, and 17, went to the field, accompanied by their stepfather, a recipient of Aid to the Blind, who feared for their safety.

The Segovias worked in a field under the auspices of Mr. Contrares, a labor contractor to whom they had been referred by Schleich. In the field there was allegedly no toilet, no place to wash one's hands, and no first aid kit. The drinking water available was in an aluminum can without a cover. Two or three used beer cans were used by all the workers as drinking cups.

None of the children had work permits, nor had they been told that they must have them to obtain work.

That same afternoon Schleich allegedly came to the house and told Mrs. Segovia that her disabled arm was an insufficient excuse for not working, and that she would be terminated unless she worked. On Thursday and Friday, therefore, all but the mentally retarded child went to the fields. On Thursday, September 21, Schleich allegedly phoned the home, found Armandina there, and so verbally assaulted her that she was still emotionally distraught when the family returned that evening.

On Friday, Schleich allegedly called again at 2 p.m. Upon being told the family had not sought further employment that last day of the harvest, when their jobs were finished at 11:30 a.m., he heaped verbal abuse on Mrs. Segovia, causing her severe distress, and then terminated the family's welfare payments.

Similarly, on Monday, September 18, an unnamed defendant welfare worker allegedly threatened Mrs. Valero, her grandson, and two granddaughters with termination unless all the children, including the 11-year-old grandson, worked in the grape harvest. The social worker referred her to Mr. Contrares as a means of getting work. After further threats on Tuesday, in which the social worker would accept no excuses, Mrs. Valero sent the children, aged 11, 14, and 16, to the fields with friends. ² None of the children had work permits, nor had they been told to get them. They worked that Wednesday morning. After lunch Richard, the youngest, allegedly got very pale, vomited, and had to lie down for the rest of the afternoon. Gloria, the eldest, allegedly went to bed immediately upon their return from the field with nerve spasms in her side. On Thursday, September 21, the department allegedly terminated the family's aid payments because these two children refused further employment in the fields. The letter of termination, issued over the name of defendant Mabey, director of the department, stated that aid was terminated because 'several of your children over 10 years of age were not working.'

Plaintiffs requested fair hearings appealing termination of their welfare benefits. (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 10950.) The Valero family also asked in their hearing request for consequential damages suffered by the minor children from working in the fields. Both families also filed damage claims with the county and department. These claims were rejected.

This action, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for the class of minors wrongfully coerced to work, and damages for the individually named plaintiffs, was filed before decisions were rendered in the fair hearings. ³

The trial court sustained defendants' general demurrer without leave to amend on the sole ground that plaintiffs had not exhausted their administrative remedies. Although the complaint stated causes of actions for class relief and for individual damages, the court declared that plaintiffs could not 'thereby circumvent the required administrative procedure.' We have concluded that the trial court erred and that plaintiffs have stated a cause of action.

Section 10950 of the Welfare & Institutions Code provides in full: 'If any applicant for or recipient of public social services is dissatisfied with any action of the county department relating to his application for or receipt of aid or services, or if his application is not acted upon with reasonable promptness, or if any person who desires to apply for such aid or services is refused the opportunity to submit a signed application therefor, and is dissatisfied with such refusal, he shall, in person or through an authorized representative, without the necessity of filing a claim with the board of supervisors, upon filing a request with the department, be accorded an opportunity for a fair hearing. ( ) As used in this chapter, 'recipient' means an applicant for or recipient of aid or services except aid or services exclusively financed by county funds.'

The entire fair hearing scheme is premised on an individualized treatment of claims for aid. Each individual theoretically has different needs, and his claim for aid would be treated separately. In no section of this chapter (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 10950--10965) is there provision for class relief. It is the Individual who must apply for a hearing, regarding His application for or receipt of aid. He must do so in person or through an Authorized representative. It is clear that the hearing scheme established by the Legislature does not contemplate class actions.

There was therefore no failure to exhaust an administrative Remedy for class relief, for no such administrative remedy existed. ⁴ 'The rule that a party must exhaust his administrative remedies prior to seeking relief in the courts 'has no application in a situation where an administrative remedy is unavailable or inadequate.' (Martino v. Concord Community Hospital Dist. (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 51, 56, 43 Cal.Rptr. 255, 258.) * * *.' Diaz v. Quitoriano, 268 Cal.App.2d 807, 812, 74 Cal.Rptr. 358, 363. ⁵

For similar reasons there was no failure to exhaust administrative remedies in seeking damages from the county or the department. Plaintiffs did file damage claims with these agencies. The claims were rejected. There is no provision in the Welfare & Institutions Code for claiming damages in tort through the fair hearing system. The only remedies envisioned by the fair hearing system are grants of aid and/or services. (Welf. & Inst.Code, §§ 10957, 10961.) Again there was no failure to exhaust an administrative Remedy; none existed.

We thus reach the merits of the complaint. In brief summary, the complaint alleges that defendant public entities and their agent employees committed tortious acts which proximately caused the damages sustained by plaintiffs, and that defendants are liable to plaintiffs in the amounts claimed. The tortious acts complained of consist of coercing plaintiffs to work as a condition to receiving AFDC payments, contrary to state-imposed standards of eligibility for aid, contrary to state statutes governing working conditions in agriculture, and contrary to state child labor laws. It is not disputed that the injuries allegedly sustained were a foreseeable result of the alleged tortious coercion.

We must begin with the well-settled notion that in governmental tort cases 'the rule is liability, immunity is the exception.' (Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist., 55 Cal.2d 211, 219, 11 Cal.Rptr. 89, 94, 359 P.2d 457, 460.) '(I)t would be unjust in some circumstances to require an individual injured by official wrongdoing to bear the burden of his loss rather than distribute it throughout the community.' (Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary Sch. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 224, 230, 11 Cal.Rptr. 97, 99, 359 P.2d 465, 467.) 'Accordingly, courts should not casually decree governmental immunity; * * *.' (Johnson v. State of California, 69 Cal.2d 782, 798, 73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 251, 447 P.2d 352, 363.) Unless the Legislature has clearly provided for immunity,...