Ramos v. State

• Decision Date: 26 June 1996
• Docket Number: No. 71,714,71,714
• Citation: 934 S.W.2d 358
• Parties: Robert Moreno RAMOS, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 358

934 S.W.2d 358

Robert Moreno RAMOS, Appellant, v. STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 71,714.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 26, 1996.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 11, 1996.

Joseph A. Connors, III, Mark Alexander, McAllen, for appellant.

Theodore C. Hake, Asst. District Attorney, Edinburg, Matthew Paul, State's Atty., Austin, for State.

OPINION

KELLER, Justice.

At a trial beginning in January 1993, a jury convicted the appellant of committing, on or about February 7, 1992, the capital murder of his wife, Leticia, and his two youngest children, Abigail and Jonathan. ¹ The jury answered the punishment issues in the State's favor, and appellant was sentenced to death. Direct appeal to this Court is automatic under Article 37.071 § 2(h). ² Appellant raises sixty-three points of error on appeal. We will affirm.

3. Criminal investigation

In points of error one, two, and four, appellant complains that law enforcement officials illegally obtained evidence. We shall, therefore, recite the events that occurred in connection with the police investigation.

On March 30, 1992, the police arrived at appellant's home to question appellant about his wife and children, whom his wife's sister had reported missing. Appellant voluntarily agreed to accompany law enforcement officials to the police station and later to the sheriff's office. Appellant was given Miranda warnings. An interview spanning a few hours was conducted. During that interview, appellant gave conflicting versions of the whereabouts of his family (Austin, San Antonio, Mexico). Appellant also stated that his family was guilty of welfare fraud and that was why they were in Mexico. Sometime during the interview at the sheriff's office, officers discovered some outstanding arrest warrants for appellant on traffic violations. The warrants had been dismissed but, because the justice of the peace's office had failed to notify the sheriff's office of the dismissals, that fact was unknown to the sheriff's office. During the interview, appellant was neither notified of the outstanding traffic warrants nor told that he was under arrest. After the interview was over, appellant was arrested on the traffic warrants. The warrants were never returned to the justice of the peace precinct but were kept as evidence of a felony investigation.

On March 31, 1992, appellant was either committed pending bond or convicted on the traffic warrants. ³ There was no trial to the court and no plea of guilty. The action was taken in a justice of the peace precinct different from the precinct that issued the warrants. On that same date, appellant executed a written consent to search his home. Officers conducted a visual inspection of the home but recovered no useful evidence.

On April 1, 1992, investigator Montemayor conducted an interview with appellant. Appellant's oldest son was present at the interview and spoke with appellant in front of Montemayor. The conversations in this interview essentially duplicated the facts learned in the earlier interview on March 30. Appellant also executed a consent to search his post office box. Later search of the post office box revealed a phone bill and a welfare check.

Appellant was arrested on April 2, 1992, in connection with a theft complaint made by his sister-in-law.

On April 5, 1992, a search warrant, based upon affidavit, was issued to search appellant's home. The warrant authorized a search for the items listed in the affidavit, which was attached. The affidavit listed the following as items to be searched for: "blood, clothing containing blood, a weapon and/or object used in the commission of a murder, and any and all evidence relating to a homicide and/or a kidnapping."

The affidavit contained the following allegations to support probable cause: Blanca Campos (appellant's sister-in-law) had reported Leticia and the two children as missing since February of 1992. Campos swore in an affidavit that she had learned from appellant's uncle that appellant had called his mother and told her that his wife and children were killed in a car accident. A named officer called appellant's mother, and she confirmed that appellant had relayed to her such information. Campos also stated that appellant asked her for $500 to get his oldest son out of jail in Austin. Appellant's oldest son swore in an affidavit that he was not in jail in Austin and never received any money from appellant. Appellant's cousin also swore in an affidavit that appellant told him that Leticia and the children died in a car accident and were cremated by a funeral home.

Two named neighbors swore in affidavits that appellant had mistreated his children. One of the neighbors also stated that she heard Leticia and her children screaming in pain on February 14, 1992 and that the suspected party was hitting and shouting vulgar language at them. Appellant's oldest son also stated that appellant was capable of killing his wife and two younger children due to his brutal behavior.

The probable cause affidavit also cited the interview with appellant on March 30 and the information obtained from that interview. The affidavit concluded with several more observations: The welfare department was not conducting an investigation of the Ramos family. No funeral services on appellant's wife and children had been held in the valley-wide area. Appellant's daughter Abigail had not been withdrawn from school but had been absent since February 10, 1992. Investigators had recovered a welfare check and a phone bill from appellant's post office box. And finally, investigators stated that, after interviewing appellant several times, he was uncooperative and refused to give the location of his family.

The probable cause affidavit concluded with a request that "a complete search be done" and that officers be allowed to "seize any and all evidence relating to a homicide or any other relating crimes."

A search of appellant's house was conducted on April 6, 1992. All items seized either had blood stains or potentially might have had blood stains ⁴ except three albums and a metal box containing papers. During the search, officers saw two hammers, discovered the sacks of women's and children's clothes and toys in the attic, noticed that the bathroom floor looked newly tiled, and conducted various types of blood testing throughout the house.

On April 7, after being given Miranda warnings both orally and in writing, appellant signed a written statement in which he related that he came home on February 7, 1992 to find his wife and children dead and that he had buried the bodies under the bathroom floor.

That day, officers obtained another search warrant, based upon affidavit, to search appellant's home. The search warrant incorporated the affidavit, which was attached. The affidavit requested to search for the bodies of Leticia, Abigail, and Jonathan, giving their first and last names and their dates of birth. The affidavit also requested "any and all evidence relating to a homicide." As probable cause, the second affidavit recited all of the earlier probable cause allegations found in the first affidavit with two additions: (1) the revelations from appellant's written statement of April 7, 1992, and (2) the blood evidence retrieved from the first search. Pursuant to the warrant, officers seized the bodies, two pipe wrenches, two soil samples, a pair of scissors, a ballpeen hammer, broken tile, burnt pieces of rope, a putty knife, a plastic container containing dried cement, tiles, and half of a post hole digger.

a. First search warrant

In point of error four, appellant complains that the evidence collected pursuant to the first search warrant should be excluded as illegally obtained in violation of Article 18.01, the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution. He contends that (1) there was no probable cause to enter the premises, (2) the affidavit does not show probable cause that a specific offense has been committed, (3) the affidavit does not show probable cause that the specifically described property or items to be seized are evidence of the offense, (4) the affidavit does not show probable cause that those items are located at the premises, (5) the affidavit does not give probable cause to search for a weapon, (6) the affidavit does not give probable cause to believe there was a kidnapping, and (7) the phrase "any and all evidence" is overbroad. We shall address each contention in turn. ⁵

Initially, we address appellant's first six arguments that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. Appellant does not dispute the accuracy of the statements contained in the probable cause affidavit; he merely argues that the facts alleged are not sufficient. Whether the facts alleged in a probable cause affidavit sufficiently support a search warrant is determined by examining the totality of circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 228-229, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2326-27, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The allegations are sufficient if they would "justify a conclusion that the object of the search is probably on the premises." Cassias v. State, 719 S.W.2d 585, 587 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). The magistrate is permitted to draw reasonable inferences from the facts and circumstances alleged. Id. at 587-588. Gish v. State, 606 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). Reviewing courts should accord great deference to the magistrate's determination. Bower v. State, 769 S.W.2d 887, 902 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 927, 109 S.Ct. 3266, 106 L.Ed.2d 611 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Heitman v. State, 815 S.W.2d 681 (Tex.Crim.App.1991).

The affidavit showed that the victims had been missing for more than a month and that appellant had told some relatives that the victims had died in a car accident. It also showed that appellant did not acknowledge to the police that the victims were dead but gave conflicting accounts as...