Ramsay v. Lebow

• Decision Date: 25 February 1915
• Citation: 220 Mass. 227,107 N.E. 926
• Parties: RAMSAY v. LEBOW.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

220 Mass. 227

107 N.E. 926

RAMSAY v. LEBOW.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

February 25, 1915

COUNSEL

Thomas F. Dolan and John J. Cummings, both of Boston, for plaintiff.

Elisha Greenhood, of Boston, for defendant.

OPINION

CROSBY J.

After a trial of this action and a verdict for the plaintiff, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial and asked the court to rule that 'as matter of law the verdict must be set aside.' The court refused so to rule and overruled the motion. The defendant excepted to the refusal to rule as requested, and to the order overruling the motion for a new trial, Motions for new trial, under our practice, usually are addressed solely to the discretion of the court. The record does not show that at the trial the defendant made any requests for rulings, or that he excepted to any rulings given, but it appears that 'the court submitted the case to the jury on appropriate instructions, and the jury returned a verdict for $824.'

To raise the question of law, embodied in the motion, for the first time after verdict, is irregular. If often has been held by this court that a question that was raised, or that might have been raised, before a verdict, cannot be raised upon a motion to set aside the verdict and to grant a new trial. Although the statute (R. L. c. 173, § 106) provides that exceptions may be taken to rulings on questions of law at hearings on motions for new trial, still the statute has been held not to apply to rulings 'that were given or refused, or that might have been asked for and given or refused, at the trial before the verdict.' Loveland v. Rand, 200 Mass. 142 144, 85 N.E. 948, 950. In that case the exceptions then being considered were 'to rulings upon questions arising for the first time at the hearing on the motion for a new trial.' See, also Capper v. Capper, 172 Mass 262, 52 N.E. 98.

While the disposition of the motion for a new trial was wholly within the discretion of the presiding judge, we are of opinion, after carefully examining the evidence reported, that it is sufficient to warrant the verdict of the jury for the plaintiff.

The record, after reciting certain evidence offered by the plaintiff and by the defendant, states that:

'The plaintiff also introduced evidence tending to show the amount of time he had expended in the work he had done, and the amount of money he had paid out of his own pocket in developing

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