Shenango & Allegheny Railroad Co. v. Braham

Decision Date06 January 1876
Citation79 Pa. 447
CourtPennsylvania Supreme Court
PartiesShenango and Allegheny Railroad Co. <I>versus</I> Braham.

Before AGNEW, C. J., SHARSWOOD, MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON and WOODWARD, JJ.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Butler county: Of October and November Term 1875, No. 154.

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E. M. Bredin and Thompson & Scott, for plaintiffs in error.— The difference in the market value of land immediately before it is entered upon and after the improvement is made is the true test of the measure of damages: Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Thoburn, 7 S. & R. 411; Penna. Railroad Co. v. Heister, 8 Barr 450; Sunbury & Erie Railroad Co. v. Hummell, 3 Casey 104; Searle v. Lackawanna & B. Railroad Co., 9 Id. 57; Patten v. Northern Central, Id. 426; Watson v. Pitts. & Connellsville Railroad Co., 1 Wright 469; East Penna. Railroad Co. v. Hottenstine, 11 Id. 28; Harvey v. Lackawanna & B. Railroad Co., Id. 429; Hornstein v. Atlantic & G. W. Railroad Co., 1 P. F. Smith 90.

L. Z. Mitchell and G. A. & T. A. Black, for defendant in error, cited to the measure of damages: Hornstein v. Atlantic & G. Western Railroad Co.; Watson v. Pitts. & Conn. Railroad Co.; Sunbury & E. Railroad Co. v. Hummell; Searle v. Lackawanna & B. Railroad Co., supra; Pittsburg, F. W. & C. Railroad Co. v. Gilleland, 6 P. F. Smith 445. As to the defendants being trespassers: Brown v. Peterson, 7 Wright 505.

Mr. Justice PAXSON delivered the opinion of the court, January 6th 1876.

The third section of the Act of 9th April 1856, Pamph. L. 288, regulating appeals from the award of viewers appointed to assess damages for the taking of land for the construction of railroads, provides, that after appeal taken, either party may put the cause at issue, in the form directed by the court. This cause was put at issue as in an action of trespass quare clausum fregit. The form of the issue was allowable under the Act of Assembly. It does not follow, however, that because the issue was formed in trespass, the defendants were trespassers, and it was error to try the cause upon his theory. The defendants were not trespassers. Their entry upon the land of the plaintiff was legal. They took the land in pursuance of an Act of Assembly authorizing such taking. We think, therefore, they have cause to complain of that portion of the charge of the court in which the jury were told that the defendants had committed a trespass upon the property of the plaintiff. The natural tendency of such an instruction was to inflame the minds of the jury and to enhance the damages.

But the learned judge of the court below fell into a more serious error in his instructions to the jury upon the measure of damages. They were told that in considering and comparing the advantages and disadvantages of the defendants' road to the plaintiff, they were to regard only such as resulted to him as a farmer, and to his land as a farm. This idea runs through the entire charge, and appears in the second and each of the subsequent specifications of error.

We regard the rule as laid down by the court below as too narrow. In one of the early cases upon this subject (Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Thoburn, 7 S. & R. 411), it was held by this court, that the jury "should consider the matter just as if they were called upon to value the injury at the moment when compensation could first be demanded; they are to value the injury to the property without reference to the person of the owner, or the actual state of his business, and in doing that the only safe rule is to inquire what would the property unaffected by the obstruction have sold for at the time the injury was committed? What would it have sold for as affected by the injury? The difference is the measure of compensation." This rule has been followed in the Penna. Railroad Co. v. Heister, 8 Barr 450; Searle v....

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15 cases
  • Ranck v. City of Cedar Rapids
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • May 20, 1907
    ...are not necessary equivalents, but proof of the latter is often competent evidence for consideration in determining the former. Railroad Co. v. Braham, 79 Pa. 447. For instance, if the property condemned has upon a large business block, it would certainly be material to know whether the bui......
  • Guyandotte Valley Ry. Co. v. Buskirk (State Report Title: Guyandot Valley R'y Co. v. Buskirk)
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • March 21, 1905
    ...But practically all agree on the standard by which the value is to be determined. Railway Co. v. Vance, 115 Pa. 325, 8 A. 764; Railroad v. Braham, 79 Pa. 447; Low Railroad Co., 63 N.H. 557, 3 A. 739; Gregg v. Railroad Co., 67 N.H. 452, 41 A. 271; Tedens v. Chicago, 149 Ill. 87, 36 N.E. 1033......
  • Ranck v. City of Cedar Rapids
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • May 20, 1907
    ...v. Railroad Co., 105 Iowa, 682, 75 N. W. 501; Railroad Co. v. Woodruff, 49 Ark. 381, 5 S. W. 792, 4 Am. St. Rep. 51; Railroad Co. v. Braham, 79 Pa. 447; Lewis on Eminent Domain, §§ 408, 478; Johnson v. Railroad Co., 111 Ill. 414;Railroad Co. v. Gearhart, 81 Pa. 260. In this estimation the o......
  • John Wanamaker, Philadelphia v. School Dist. of Philadelphia
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • January 7, 1971
    ...value of the land everything which gives it intrinsic value is a proper element for consideration.' Shenango and Allegheny Railroad Co. v. Braham, 79 Pa. 447, 453 (1875). Having persuasively demonstrated, we hope, that the imposition of a tax on the use of real estate is constitutionally pe......
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