Randall v. State
Decision Date | 27 October 1892 |
Docket Number | 16,758 |
Citation | 32 N.E. 305,132 Ind. 539 |
Parties | Randall v. The State |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Huntington Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed.
G. A Yopst and B. M. Cobb, for appellant.
W. A Branyan, for the State.
The appellant was tried on a charge of petit larceny and convicted.
He asks a reversal upon the ground that the court erred in overruling a motion to quash the information, and in overruling his motion for a new trial. Other errors are assigned, but not discussed. The information is as follows:
Prosecuting Attorney.
The appellant insists that the information is insufficient to charge a public offence because it contains no allegation of "the kind of money which it is claimed was stolen."
This counsel argue is necessary to a description of the alleged stolen property, and that without it there is no description.
The Bill of Rights (article 1 of the Constitution, section 58, R. S. 1881) guarantees to those accused of crime the right "to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him." This constitutional provision requires that one accused of larceny be informed by the indictment or information of what property the larceny is alleged to have been committed.
A statute which should attempt to dispense with any description whatever of the property alleged to be stolen would be void, and an indictment or information purporting to charge larceny that contained no description of the alleged stolen property would not charge a public offence.
Section 1750, R. S. 1881, prescribes that in indictments and informations it shall be sufficient to describe money, bank bills, or notes, United States Treasury notes, etc., "simply as money, without specifying any particular coin, note, bill, or currency." The information before us complies with this statutory requirement, and is sufficient. While it is not competent for the legislature to dispense with all description, it is competent for it to prescribe rules for the description of property in such cases, and to declare what shall be a sufficient description. Riggs v. State, 104 Ind. 261, 3 N.E. 886; Lewis v. State, 113 Ind. 59, 14 N.E. 892; Graves v. State, 121 Ind. 357, 23 N.E. 155; McCarty v. State, 127 Ind. 223, 26 N.E. 665.
The accused called one J. F. France as a witness for the defence, who, having testified to acquaintance with the accused, was asked the following question: "You may state if you are acquainted with his character for honesty and the proper respect for the property rights of others in that locality where he formerly lived?" The witness answered: "I think that I was at the time he resided there."
In answer to the question as to what that character was, whether good or bad, he answered, "It was good as far as I know."
The witness was cross-examined at considerable length, and among other things testified to having heard of the arrest of the accused once on a charge of surety of the peace, and once on a charge of house-breaking. He was then asked if he had not heard that he had previously been arrested in another county on a charge of malicious trespass. The question was answered in the affirmative. Over seasonable objection made by the accused, the witness further testified in that connection that he had learned that the accused had been convicted, fined and imprisoned for shooting a turkey. This it is urged was erroneous. The witness having testified to a knowledge of the character of the accused, and that it was good, it was proper, by cross-examination, to develop the extent of his knowledge of his character and the facts upon which his opinion was based. That the jury might properly weigh his estimate of character it was right that they be fully informed of the facts within the knowledge of the witness which led him to the formation of that estimate.
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