Randall v. State

• Decision Date: 11 June 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-KA-00521-SCT,96-KA-00521-SCT
• Citation: 716 So.2d 584
• Parties: Armon Andre RANDALL v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

Page 584

716 So.2d 584

Armon Andre RANDALL v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 96-KA-00521-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

June 11, 1998.

James L. Davis, III, Gulfport, for Appellant.

Michael C. Moore, Attorney General, Jeffrey A. Klingfuss, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee.

Before PRATHER, C.J., and SMITH and WALLER, JJ.

WALLER, Justice, for the Court:

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

¶1 Armon Andre Randall was convicted of capital murder and armed robbery. Randall received a sentence of life without parole for capital murder and forty years for the armed robbery charge. On appeal to this Court, Randall argues that the court below improperly prevented him from exercising a peremptory challenge on juror Allen Perkins; and, that it was error for the lower court to refuse a requested lesser included offense instruction on manslaughter. Finding no merit in either argument, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 Mr. Tim Bui and his wife, Kim Che Le, owned and operated Tim's Auto Service in Biloxi. On May 12, 1994, they both closed up shop and left for their home around 7:15 p.m. Unbeknownst to the couple, they were followed by a car carrying Armon Randall and his confederates, Chris Payne, Rose Mary Henderson, and Jamie Sue Skinner.

¶3 Earlier, Randall and Payne had discussed performing a robbery as a means of earning some quick cash. Each was armed, Armon Randall with a .32 revolver, and Chris Payne with a .380 auto. Although well armed, the two needed a car. So, the two fell in with Skinner and Henderson and left in Henderson's blue Camaro. The four drove around for awhile and then noticed the victims either closing down their shop or stopping at a stoplight.

¶4 They followed the victims back to Gulfport. Payne and Randall got out of the car and made a bungling attempt to rob the couple, while Jones and Skinner made the block. Payne struck Mr. Bui in the head with his pistol; but, Randall panicked when he saw Mrs. Le move around in her seat and shot her in the neck. Payne and Randall then fled the scene on foot, making away with a bag of cucumbers. Mrs. Le bled to death in her driveway.

¶5 The police initially had no leads in this case, but as circumstance would have it, Payne had allegedly committed a prior armed robbery in the company of one Chris ¶6 At the station, Chris Payne gave a statement resulting in arrest warrants being issued for himself, Armon Randall, Jamie Sue Skinner, and Rose Mary Henderson. Armon Randall was arrested and the grand jury subsequently returned an indictment against Randall for capital murder and armed robbery. Armon's trial spanned three days and ultimately the jury returned guilty verdicts on both counts, sentencing Armon Randall to prison for life without parole for the capital murder of Kim Che Le, and 40 years for the armed robbery of Tim Bui.

Henderson. Chris Henderson, picked up in relation to this other crime, related that he had overheard Chris Payne and Armon Randall discussing "doing" an armed robbery. The investigating officer contacted Detective Guinn, assigned to the instant case, who, based on his interview with Chris Henderson, obtained a search warrant for Chris Payne's house. The police recovered numerous weapons, including a .380 automatic, and Chris Payne was subsequently arrested.

¶7 From this conviction, Armon Randall filed timely notice of appeal, raising the following issues for this Court's consideration:

I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING THE DEFENDANT TO USE HIS PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE ON JUROR ALLEN PERKINS.

II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING A LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSE INSTRUCTION.

DISCUSSION

I. DID THE LOWER COURT ERR IN PREVENTING RANDALL FROM EXERCISING A PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE AGAINST JUROR ALLEN PERKINS?

¶8 The availability of peremptory challenges is not a matter of constitutional right; but, it is well established that the exercise of such challenges, when made available, must be constitutional. The wellspring of current jurisprudence on this question is Batson v. Kentucky in which the Supreme Court held that a juror may not be struck by the prosecution in a criminal case simply because she is black. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). Batson protection has since been extended to civil trials, to strikes exercised by the defense, and to discriminatory strikes based on gender. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631, 111 S.Ct. 2077, 114 L.Ed.2d 660, (1991) (Batson extended to civil context); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 120 L.Ed.2d 33, (1992) (extending Batson to strikes exercised by criminal defendant); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 141, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89(1994)(applying Batson to gender).

¶9 The Supreme Court recently outlined the Batson test in Hernandez v. New York as follows ¹:

First, the [opponent of the strike] must make a prima facie showing that the [proponent] has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. Second, if the requisite showing has been made, the burden shifts to the [proponent] to articulate a race-neutral explanation for striking the jurors in question. Finally, the trial court must determine whether the [opponent] has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.

Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991)(Plurality opinion) (citations omitted). The Batson test has spawned an enormous amount of legal commentary and judicial opinion, and thus it is helpful to consider each prong separately.

A. The Prima Facie Case

¶10 Traditionally a prima facie showing of discrimination required that the opponent of the strike show,

1. That he is a member of a "cognizable racial group" 2. That the proponent has exercised peremptory challenges toward the elimination of veniremen of his race; and

3. That facts and circumstances raised an inference that the proponent used his peremptory challenges for the purpose of striking minorities.

Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977)).

¶11 This test, however, has been modified somewhat by the Supreme Court's decision in Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). In that case the Supreme Court held that Powers, a white, had standing to challenge the exclusion of black jurors on the grounds that the equal protection right of the juror to serve was protected by Batson. Powers, 499 U.S. at 406, 111 S.Ct. 1364. Essentially, this means that step three above becomes the pivotal inquiry to determine a prima facie case, as this Court recognized in Davis v. State, 660 So.2d 1228, 1240 (Miss.1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1192, 116 S.Ct. 1684, 134 L.Ed.2d 785 (1996). Specifically, the pivotal question is whether the opponent of the strike has met the burden of showing that proponent has engaged in a pattern of strikes based on race or gender, or in other words "the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose." Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712.

¶12 This Court has examined the number of strikes on a particular class, the ultimate ethnic or gender makeup of the jury, the nature of questions asked during the voir dire, and the overall demeanor of the attorney. See Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 786 (Miss.1997); Davis, 660 So.2d at 1263 (Banks, J., concurring); Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1299 (Miss.1994), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 880, 116 S.Ct. 214, 133 L.Ed.2d 146 (1995). Additionally, "[t]he [opponent of the strike] may also rely on the fact that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate." Batson, 476 U.S. at 80, 106 S.Ct. at 1714; Simon v. State, 688 So.2d 791, 808 (Miss, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 2524, 138 L.Ed.2d 1025 (1997); Harper v. State, 635 So.2d 864, 868 (Miss.1994).

¶13 Obviously, such a fact intensive inquiry gives rise to a highly deferential standard of review, as both this Court and the Supreme Court have recognized. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. 1712, Collins v. State, 691 So.2d 918, 926 (Miss, reh'g denied 693 So.2d 384, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 198, 139 L.Ed.2d 135,(1997); Davis, 660 So.2d at 1242.

¶14 Turning to the facts of the instant case it is clear that the state satisfies step one of Batson. The State noted after strike D-3 the pattern of striking males from the jury, and the learned trial judge appropriately examined the record for a pattern of strikes and made the determination that a prima facie case of gender discrimination had been established:

MR. MARTIN: The State would make a general objection, Your Honor, to the defense strikes, to the pattern of strikes on the white males.

THE COURT: I'm looking back here to see which ones have been accepted.

MR. DAVIS: I'll go ahead, Judge. I've accepted some white males.

THE COURT: Well, I don't see any.

MR. DAVIS: Peter Sheely.

THE COURT: You did accept Mr. Sheely. All right. With a word of caution, the next white male that is struck I will require you to give a race neutral--not a race neutral, but a gender neutral reason, okay. What do you say as to Sandra Ladner, State?

MR. MARTIN: Accept.

THE COURT: I take it that gender neutral reasons fall into the same category, there must be an established pattern. One has been accepted. Defense, what do you say as to William Coleman?

MR. DAVIS: That would be D-4.

THE COURT: Okay. Give me a gender neutral reason then.

¶15 In light of the deference accorded factual findings, it is clear that the judge acted well within his discretion in determining that a prima facie case of discrimination existed.

B. Gender Neutral Explanations

¶16 Step two of the Batson test requires that the proponent of the strike provide race or gender neutral reasons for the strike. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The Supreme Court has made clear...