Randolph v. American Airlines, Inc.

• Decision Date: 12 December 1956
• Citation: 144 N.E.2d 878,103 Ohio App. 172
• Parties: , 76 Ohio Law Abs. 408, 3 O.O.2d 240 BANDOLPH, Appellee, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, Inc., Appellant. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 172

103 Ohio App. 172

144 N.E.2d 878, 76 Ohio Law Abs. 408, 3 O.O.2d 240

BANDOLPH, Appellee, v. AMERICAN AIRLINES, Inc., Appellant. ^*

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Franklin County

Dec. 12, 1956.

Syllabus by the Court

1. In litigation involving an interstate shipment of baggage with an airline common carrier, the rights and liabilities are to be determined by federal law applicable thereto.

2. At common law, a distinction was made between a contract immunizing a common carrier from liability for negligence and a contract limiting liability upon an agreed valuation at a higher charge or rate.

3. The right of an interstate common carrier to limit its liability upon an agreed valuation for which it charges a higher rate arises at common law independent of federal statute except as provision may be made by law requiring the filing and publication of tariff rates and schedules, which, if reasonable, become binding alike upon the carrier and its patron.

4. The limitation of liability clause upon agreed valuation in the tariff filed by an interstate airline carrier pursuant to the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act (Title 49, Section 483, U.S.C.A.) is a valid regulation fixing and determining the amount of recovery by a passenger for lost baggage premised upon the amount to be charged for the carriage of such baggage in the light of the responsibility assumed.

5. Liability of an interstate airline carrier in respect to baggage of a passenger is limited under such carrier's tariff to the value stated therein unless a higher valuation is declared in advance and additional charges are paid pursuant to such tariff.

Bricker, Marburger, Evatt & Barton and Richard C. Pickett, Columbus, for appellee.

Collis Gundy Lane, Richard Huggard and Kent Ozmum, Columbus, for appellant.

FESS, Judge.

This is an appeal on questions of law from a judgment of the Common Pleas Court in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $835 and costs. The judgment was rendered by the court without the intervention of a jury upon an agreed stipulation of facts.

On March 20, 1952, plaintiff purchased a ticket for transportation from Columbus, Ohio, to New Orleans, Louisiana, for the sum of $64. On March 21, 1952, prior to boarding defendant's plane at Columbus, Ohio, plaintiff checked her suitcase, which with its contents was worth $835, with defendant for transportation to New Orleans. The suitcase was not delivered to plaintiff upon her arrival, or thereafter. At the time of the purchase of her ticket and also when she checked her suitcase, plaintiff declared no value on it. Defendant made no extra charge based on value in excess of $100. As a matter of fact, no discussion was had between the parties pertaining to the value of the luggage or the insuring of it.

In March 1952, defendant had on file with the Civil Aeronautics Board a tariff which was duly filed. posted and published, as required by the Civil Aeronautics Act, 49 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq. So far as is pertinent to this case, this tariff provided that the total liability of the defendant occasioned by reason of any loss of, injury to, or delay in the delivery of any personal property accepted for transportation as baggage would be limited to $100 for each passenger unless at the time of acceptance for transportation, when, for checking in for flight, the carrier has accepted greater liability; that 'upon request and declaration, and payment of an additional transportation charge computed at the rate of ten (10) cents for each $100 or fraction thereof, of excess value declared, the carrier will accept liability for loss of, injury to, or delay in the delivery of such baggage up to the amount declared for each piece, with a maximum limit per passenger' of $25,000. In clecking baggage with defendant and receiving a check therefor, plaintiff was unaware of and had no knowledge of the published tariff and plaintiff did not read the conditions in small print on her ticket and baggage check referring ti limited liability.

Inasmuch as this litigation involves an interstate shipment of baggage with a common airline carrier, the rights and liabilities of the parties are to be determined by federal law. Cf. Patton v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 75 Ohio App. 100, 60 N.E.2d 945; Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 33 S.Ct. 148, 57 L.Ed. 314, 44 L.R.A.,N.S., 257; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Nothnagle, 1953, 346 U.S. 128, 73 S.Ct. 986, 97 L.Ed. 1500. It must be conceded that a tariff properly filed and published pursuant to law becomes a part of the contract of carriage. Boston & Maine R. Co. v. Hooker, 1914, 233 U.S. 97, 34 S.Ct. 526, 58 L.Ed. 868; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co., 1920, 256 U.S. 566, 41 S.Ct. 584, 65 L.Ed 1094.

The sole question to be determined upon this appeal is whether the tariff limiting liability on baggage to $100, unless excess value is declared and the extra charge based on such valuation has been paid, was authorized to be filed under the provisions of the Civil Aeronautics Act and the regulations of the board.

There is a general rule of law that common carriers can not stipulate for immunity from their own or their agent's negligence. While this rule was fashioned by the courts, it has been continuously accepted as a guide to common-carrier relationships for more than a century and has acquired the force and precision of a legislative enactment. United States v. Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 236, 72 S.Ct. 666, 96 L.Ed. 907.

But at common law, a distinction was made between a contract immunizing a carrier from liability for negligence and a contract limiting liability upon an agreed valuation at a higher charge or rate. As early as 1848, in New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank of Boston, 6 How. 344, 384, 47 U.S. 344, 384, 12 L.Ed. 465, the Supreme Court recognized that a carrier was allowed to exempt himself from losses arising out of events and accidents against which he was a sort of insurer. In York Mfg. Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co., 1865, 3 Wall. 107, 70 U.S. 107, 18 L.Ed. 170, the court held that the common-law liability of a common carrier for the safe carriage of goods may be limited and qualified by special contract with the owner, provided such contract does not attempt to cover losses by negligence or misconduct. ¹

In Hart v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 1884, 112 U.S. 331, 5 S.Ct. 151, 28 L.Ed 717, the court held:

'Where a contract of carriage, signed by the shipper, is fairly made with a railroad company, agreeing on a valuation of the property carried, with the rate of freight based on the condition that the carrier assumes liability only to the extent of the agreed valuation, even in case of loss or damage by the negligence of the carrier, the contract will be upheld as a proper and lawful mode of securing a due proportion between the amount for which the carrier may be responsible and the freight he receives, and of protecting himself against extravagant and fanciful valuation.'

The language employed by the court in its opinion, 112 U.S. at page 337, 5 S.Ct. at page 154, is significant:

'The presumption is conclusive that if the liability had been assumed on a valuation as great as that now alleged, a higher rate of freight would have been charged. The rate of freight is indissolubly bound up with the valuation. If the rate of freight named was the only one offered by the defendant, it was because it was a rate measured by the valuation expressed. If the valuation was fixed at that expressed, when the real value was larger, it was because the rate of freight named was measured by the low valuation. The plaintiff cannot claim a higher valuation on the agreed rate of freight.' (Italics supplied.)

Further in the opinion, 112 U.S. at pages 340 and 341, 5 S.Ct. at page 156, the court goes on to say:

'The limitation as to value has no tendency to exempt from liability for negligence. It does not induce want of care. It exacts from the carrier the measure of care due to the value agreed on. The carrier is bound to respond in that value for negligence. The compensation for carriage is based on that value. The shipper is estopped from saying that the value is greater.'

The foregoing decisions were rendered prior to the enactment of the Carmack amendment in 1906. As originally enacted, the Carmack amendment merely required the carrier to issue a bill of lading and provided that the carrier should be liable to the holder thereof for any loss, etc., caused by the carrier or a connecting carrier, and that no contract should exempt such carrier from the liability thereby imposed. 34 Stats. at L. 595. No reference was made to limited liability upon agreed valuation such as is presently found in the second exception in Section 20(11). Title 49 U.S.C.A.

Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 1912, 226 U.S. 491, 33 S.Ct. 148, 57 L.Ed. 314, arose under the original subsection of Section 20 of the Carmack amendment as enacted in 1906. ² The primary question decided was that Congress had enacted a uniform rule as to liability imposed on interstate carriers with respect to bills of lading thus superseding all state regulations on the subject. The case involved a schedule based upon declared rates of valuation similar to the one involved in the instant case. The state court had awarded recovery for the full value of the diamond ring delivered to the express company for shipment. The judgment of the state court was reversed. in its opinion (226 U.S. at page 509 33 S.Ct. at page 153), the court said:

'That a common carrier cannot exempt himself from liability for his own negligence or that of his servants is elementary. York Mfg. Co. v. Illinois Central Railroad, 3 Wall. 107, 18 L.Ed. 170; New York Cent. Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. 357, 21 L.Ed. 627; Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co., 93 U.S. 174, 23 L.Ed. 872; Hart v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 112 U.S. 331, 338, 5 S.Ct. 151, 28 L.Ed. 717. The rule of the common...