Ranells v. City of Cleveland

• Decision Date: 08 January 1975
• Docket Number: No. 73-951,73-951
• Citation: 70 O.O.2d 1,41 Ohio St.2d 1,321 N.E.2d 885
• Parties: , 70 O.O.2d 1 RANELLS, Admx., et al., Appellees, v. CITY OF CLEVELAND, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 1

41 Ohio St.2d 1

321 N.E.2d 885, 70 O.O.2d 1

RANELLS, Admx., et al., Appellees, v. CITY OF CLEVELAND, Appellant.

No. 73-951.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Jan. 8, 1975.

Syllabus by the Court

In the absence of a statute specifically authorizing such recovery, punitive damages can not be assessed against a municipal corporation.

On May 8, 1969, a severe electrical storm cut off the supply of electric power in parts of Cleveland. Among those entities affected were the Fairmount Pumping Station and the Baldwin Filtration Plant, both integral parts of the city's Water Department. During periods of normal operation, water is pumped from Fairmount to Baldwin, where liquid chlorine is converted to gas and added to the water supply. When the power failure stilled the electric pumps at Fairmount, no water moved through the chemical house at Baldwin. To prevent damage to the evaporators at Baldwin, it became necessary to shut off three tanks from which liquid chlorine had been flowing.

The chemical house operator entered the darkened chlorine room, and attempted to close the valve to each tank 'by feel.' While doing so, he detected a leak in one of the valve assemblies, and when power was restroed, he returned to change a washer. Apparently without checking to insure that the valve was completely closed, he began to remove the valve assembly. A substantial quantity of chlorine gas escaped into the room, hitting him in the face, and forcing him to leave and close the door. He or his assistant then activated a blower motor, drawing the gas from the chlorine room and directing it into the atmosphere outside the plant.

Richard and Sandra Ranells, and their three small children, lived immediately across the street from Baldwin. As the discharge of hazardous chlorine gas permeated their neighborhood, they and other residents were evacuated and hospitalized. As a direct result of chlorine gas inhalation, Richard Ranells died on May 9, 1969, approximately 24 hours after the occurrence. His wife, Sandra, died on May 11, 1969, some 51 hours later. Both were conscious and in great pain throughout most of their respective survival periods. The three Ranells children, despite inhaling substantial quanitities of the deadly gas, recovered after a period of hospitalization.

The administratrix of the estate of Richard Ranells, and the administrator of the estate of Sandra Ranells, initiated an action in the Court of Common Pleas to recover damages for wrongful death, conscious pain and suffering, and various expenditures incurred by, or on behalf of, the decedents. By alleging wanton misconduct on the part of the city of Cleveland, the plaintiffs sought to recover both compensatory and punitive damages.

The city admitted negligence in causing injury and subsequent death to plaintiffs' decedents, but denied the allegation of wanton misconduct, and objected to the court's charging the jury with regard to punitive damages. Motions by the city for directed verdicts as to the punitive damages causes were overruled.

Critical to the allegations of wanton misconduct was evidence that numerous recommendations to improve safety at the Baldwin plant had been ignored. On three occasions, employees of the City's Air Pollution Control section and Fire Prevention Bureau of the Fire Department had visited the Baldwin plant, and made specific recommendations as to needed improvements. Among them were changing the venting system so as to raise the vent to a level above the roof of the building; the preparation and posting of operations to be carried out in case of emergency; and the installation of a Scrubber, or other comparable device, t odilute the chlorine gas before its discharge into the atmosphere. Despite numerous letters to appropriate city officials, none of the major recommendations were carried out.

The jury returned a verdict for the administratrix of the estate of Richard Ranells in the amount of $616,378.95, including $375,000 in punitive damages. The jury returned a verdict for the administrator of the estate of Sandra Ranells in the amount of $742,653.55, including $375,000 in punitive damages. Judgment was entered upon the verdict.

Appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals, which, by a divided court, affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas. Two judges held that the issue of punitive damages, grounded upon the allegations of wanton misconduct, was properly submitted to the jury, and that the awards thereon were fully supported by the evidence. One judge dissented, contending that a municipal corporation could not be held liable for punitive damages.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Komito, Nurenberg, Plevin, Jacobsen, Heller & McCarthy and Marshall I. Nurenberg, Cleveland, for appellees.

Herbert R. Whiting, director of law, and Thomas A. Smith, Cleveland, for appellant.

PAUL W. BROWN, Justice.

We are asked to decide whether the city of Cleveland, having admitted negligence in the operation of its Water Department, can be held liable in punitive damages for alleged wanton misconduct.

Ohio law is well established that a municipal corporation, while acting in a governmental capacity, is immune from liability for tortious conduct. It is equally clear that when acting in a proprietary capacity, a municipal corporation may generally be held liable for tortious conduct in the same manner as would a private corporation or individual. ¹ Neither of those basic principles, embodied in this court's application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, is affected by our disposition of the present case.

Nor is it necessary to disturb the jury's awards by way of compensation for wrongful death, conscious pain and suffering, and other necessary and associated expenses. A unanimous Court of Appeals determined those awards to be more than adequately supported by the evidence, and we find nothing which persuades us to disagree.

However, the appellees' allegations of wanton misconduct, and the jury's awards of punitive damages based thereon, present problems of a more serious nature, for if punitive damages are to be awarded, they must further the public policy which justifies them. The petition herein clearly asserts acts of negligence in the handling of a hazardous gas, with some foreknowledge that serious consequences might ensue. Allegations of such a character are sufficient to form the basis for a finding of wanton misconduct. Kellerman v. J. S. Durig Co. (1964), 176 Ohio St. 320, 199 N.E.2d 562, a case upon which both parties rely.

Assuming, arguendo, that wanton misconduct, as defined in Kellerman, forms a sufficient basis for an award of punitive damages, ² we must determine whether the public policy upon which such awards are based continues in force when the action is one against a municipal corporation.

No prior decisions of this court are controlling on this point. Appellees cite Dayton v. Pease (1854), 4 Ohio St. 80; Hack v. Salem (1963), 174 Ohio St. 383, 189 N.E.2d 857; and Moloney v. Columbus (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 213, 208 N.E.2d 141, to support the proposition that a municipal corporation, when acting in a proprietary capacity, assumes liability in a manner identical to a private corporation. In none of the cited cases were punitive damages either sought or awarded. Thus the present case, specifically involving the issue of punitive damages, is one of first impression.

This issue has often been resolved by the courts of other states. A substantial majority of jurisdictions treating the issue have held that in the absence of statutory authority specifically providing for an award of punitive damages, an injured plaintiff has no right to recover exemplary or punitive damages against a municipal corporation. See, generally, 57 American Jurisprudence 2d 268, Section 318, and annotation, 19 A.L.R.2d 903, 905-911. In so holding, the courts have adopted a variety of rationales, the totality of which we find compelling.

For example, in Fisher v. Miami (Fla.App.1954), 160 So.2d 57, 59 affirmed, 172 So.2d 455, the Third District Court of Appeal declared that:

'* * * to permit such (punitive) damages against a public corporation is to contravene public policy since the parties who must bear the burden of the punishment are the taxpayers and citizens who constitute the very persons who as a group are to benefit from the public example which the granting of such damages is supposed to make of a wrongdoer.'

In Chappell v. Springfield (1968), 423 S.W.2d 810, 814, the Supreme Court of Missouri declared that:

'The theory that punitive damages serve as a deterrent to others adds little justification for the award against a municipality. It is assumed that public officials will do their duty, and if discipline of a wrongdoing municipal employee is indicated, appropriate measures are available through the electorate, or by superior officials responsible to the electorate, without recourse to punitive awards through the courts.'

In Costich v. Rochester (1902), 68 App.Div. 623, 631, 73 N.Y.S. 835, the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York laid to rest the contention that no distinction should exist between private and municipal corporations. Said the court, at page 631, 73 N.Y.S. at page 841: Private corporations 'are largely created and administered for purposes of profit or for some other personal object. Those who become members of them do so voluntarily, and in the majority of instances in the hope of gain. There are manifold and speedy ways by which to reach and replace any representative or agent who so mistakes or disregards his duty as to render liable in punitive damages the persons and interests represented by him. The municipal corporation is different. It is not organized for any purpose of gain or profit, but it is a legal creation, engaged in carrying on government and administering its details for the general good and as a...