Rangel v. State
| Decision Date | 24 July 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 08-02-00242-CR.,08-02-00242-CR. |
| Parties | JEREMY LEE RANGEL, Appellant, v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from the County Court at Law #2 of Midland County, Texas, (TC# CR-85,310).
Before Panel No. 1 Larsen, McClure, and Chew, JJ.
Appellant, Jeremy Lee Rangel, was charged by information with failure of duty on striking an unattended vehicle in violation of Section 550.024 of the Texas Transportation Code. He was found guilty by a jury and the trial court sentenced him to 45 days confinement, probated for one year. Appellant was also ordered to pay a $500 fine. He now raises three issues on appeal. We affirm.
Just after midnight on July 17, 1999, Appellant and his girlfriend, Erika Zubia, were driving to the grocery store in Ms. Zubia's mother's automobile. During the drive, Appellant lost control of the vehicle and struck a parked pickup truck. The vehicle Appellant was driving entered the front lawn of the house at which the truck was parked. Appellant and Ms. Zubia left the scene of the accident and walked to the grocery store to use a pay phone. They called Ms. Zubia's brother, Jesse, to notify him of the accident. Jesse Zubia drove to the grocery store to meet Appellant. It was then determined the police should be notified of the accident. A friend of Jesse Zubia called the police to report the accident and Appellant returned to his vehicle. Upon arrival at the accident scene, Appellant encountered a tow truck that had been dispatched to remove Appellant's vehicle. According to Appellant's testimony at trial, the driver of the tow truck told Appellant the police had already arrived at and left from the scene. Appellant also testified he gave his contact and insurance information to the towing company before leaving again. Appellant did not leave a note on the truck or speak to anyone at the house or in the neighborhood.
Later that day, the police were contacted by Randy Pittman, the owner of the parked truck that had been damaged in the accident. A police investigation ultimately revealed Appellant as the driver in the accident. Appellant later gave a statement to the police admitting his involvement in the collision. In his statement, Appellant never asserted he had tried to contact the owner of the damaged truck or had left a note at the scene of the accident. Appellant was charged with and later convicted of a Class B misdemeanor for failure of duty on striking an unattended vehicle in violation of Section 550.024 of the Texas Transportation Code. See Tex.Transp.Code Ann. § 550.024 (Vernon 1999).
Appellant now raises three issues for appellate review. First, he argues the evidence establishing the amount of damage to be in excess of two hundred dollars was legally insufficient to sustain the conviction. Second, he asserts the trial court erred by not granting his first amended motion to quash the information for failure to provide adequate notice. Third, he contends the trial court erred by overruling defense counsel's objections to the prosecutor's improper comment during jury argument.
Appellant's first issue challenges the legal sufficiency of evidence proving the amount of damages to be $200 or greater. This legal sufficiency argument is predicated on the contention the court improperly admitted hearsay evidence to establish the value of the damage to the vehicle. In particular, Appellant complains of certain testimony given by Randy Pittman, the owner of the damaged pickup truck.
A legal sufficiency review of the evidence, requires the appellate court to determine whether, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2788-89, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573 (1979); Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154, 159 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Nevarez v. State, 847 S.W.2d 637, 642 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1993, pet. ref'd). It is not our role to ascertain whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Stoker v. State, 788 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 951, 111 S.Ct. 371, 112 L.Ed.2d 333 (1990); Van Zandt v. State, 932 S.W.2d 88, 95 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1996, pet. ref'd). Nor do we resolve any conflict of fact or assign credibility to the witnesses. See Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992); Nevarez, 847 S.W.2d at 642. Rather, this Court is to review the evidence as it is already weighted by the trier of fact's verdict, thereby deferring to the trier of fact's determinations of weight and credibility. See Moreno v. State, 755 S.W.2d 866, 867 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988); Rivera v. State, 885 S.W.2d 581, 583 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1994, no pet.). We must disregard evidence contrary to the verdict, and base our holding only on evidence supporting the verdict. See Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Rivera, 885 S.W.2d at 583. Moreover, we will not disturb the trier of fact's decision unless it is found to be irrational or unsupported by more than a "mere modicum" of the evidence. See Moreno, 755 S.W.2d at 867; Van Zandt, 932 S.W.2d at 95. Finally, claims of evidentiary insufficiency are measured against the elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge applicable to the case.[1] Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997); Mast v. State, 8 S.W.3d 366, 368-69 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.).
Texas courts have held in cases involving theft or criminal mischief that the owner of the stolen or damaged property may testify to the value of the property at issue.[2] See Sullivan v. State, 701 S.W.2d 905, 909 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986); Johnson v. State, 903 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.); Rivera, 885 S.W.2d at 584; Jones v. State, 814 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no pet.). Such testimony may be given in general or commonly understood terms as to the owner's opinion or estimate of the value. Sullivan, 701 S.W.2d at 909; Johnson, 903 S.W.2d at 498. Essentially this is an offer of the owner's best knowledge of the property value. Sullivan, 701 S.W.2d at 909; Jones, 814 S.W.2d at 803. If a defendant wishes to rebut an owner's opinion evidence at to value, he must offer additional controverting evidence. Sullivan, 701 S.W.2d at 909; Johnson, 903 S.W.2d at 498; Jones, 814 S.W.2d at 803. In other words, a defendant must do more than merely impeach the owner's credibility during cross-examination in order to successfully raise a legal sufficiency challenge on appeal. Id.
Sullivan and its progeny have mainly dealt with the issue of whether an owner was qualified to testify as to the value of his or her property or whether such testimony must be given by an expert. See Sullivan, 701 S.W.2d at 909; Johnson, 903 S.W.2d at 498; Jones, 814 S.W.2d at 803. In the case sub judice, Appellant's objection at trial and issue on appeal focuses on whether the property owner's testimony as to the value of the damage constitutes hearsay. While on direct examination, the following exchange took place between Mr. Pittman and the prosecutor:
Appellant maintains Mr. Pittman's statement indicating there was approximately $750 of damage to his truck is inadmissible hearsay. Appellant also argues this particular testimony is the only evidence presented regarding the amount of damage to the vehicle. He contends the evidence is not legally sufficient because only improperly admitted evidence was adduced at trial.
Appellant's objection at trial was not supported by an explanation or argument. Nor was the witness taken on voir dire. As a result, there is simply no record to substantiate Appellant's claim that the statement was hearsay. Without record or explanation, Appellant's general objection fails to properly advise the court of his concern. Tex.R.Evid. 103(a)(1); Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a). Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in overruling Appellant's objection at trial.
Having addressed Appellant's hearsay objection, we now turn to the general contention that the evidence was legally insufficient to prove an essential element of the offense, namely the amount of damage to all vehicles involved in the collision. Appellant was convicted of violating Section 550.024 of the Transportation Code, which provides:
Section 550.024. Duty on Striking Unattended Vehicle
(a) The operator of a vehicle that collides with and damages an unattended vehicle shall immediately stop and:
(1) locate the operator or owner of the unattended vehicle and give...
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