Rankin on Behalf of Bd. of Ed. of City of New York v. Shanker

• Decision Date: 30 October 1968
• Docket Number: AFL--CIO,AFL-CIO
• Citation: 23 N.Y.2d 111,242 N.E.2d 802,295 N.Y.S.2d 625
• Parties: , 242 N.E.2d 802 J. Lee RANKIN, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, on Behalf of the BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. Albert SHANKER, Individually and on Behalf of the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, American Federation of Teachers,, et al., Appellants. J. Lee RANKIN, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, on Behalf of the BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v. Albert SHANKER, Individually and as President of the United Federation of Teachers, Local 2, American Federation of Teachers,, et al., Defendants and Walter J. Degnan, Individually and as President of the Council of Supervisory Associations, et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 625

295 N.Y.S.2d 625

23 N.Y.2d 111, 242 N.E.2d 802

J. Lee RANKIN, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York,

on Behalf of the BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF

NEW YORK, Respondent, v. Albert SHANKER, Individually and on Behalf of the United

Federation of Teachers, Local 2, American

Federation of Teachers, AFL--CIO, et

al., Appellants.

J. Lee RANKIN, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York,

on Behalf of the BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the CITY OF

NEW YORK, Respondent, v. Albert SHANKER, Individually and as President of the United

Federation of Teachers, Local 2, American Federation of

Teachers, AFL-CIO, et al., Defendants and Walter J. Degnan,

Individually and as President of the Council of Supervisory

Associations, et al., Appellants.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 30, 1968.

Ralph P. Katz, Ernest Fleischman, Stephen F. Gordon, New York City, and Martin R. Ganzglass for Albert Shanker and another, appellants.

Max H. Frankle, New York City, for Walter J. Degnan and the Council of Supervisory Associations; Everett .e. Lewis and Bernard Yaker, New York City, of counsel.

J. Lee Rankin, Corp. Counsel (Frederic S. Nathan, William M. Murphy and Laurence D. Cherkis, Assts. Corp. Counsel, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

FULD, Chief Judge.

These appeals require us to pass upon a fundamental question of high importance in connection with the enforcement of the provisions of the recently enacted Taylor Law (L.1967, ch. 392; Civil Service Law, Consol.Laws, c. 7, art. 14, §§ 200--212). Are public employees or the unions which represent them entitled, as a matter of right, to trial by jury in a criminal contempt proceeding brought against them for alleged violation of section 210 (subd. 1) of that statute, in that (as to the employees) they engaged in a strike and (as to the organizations) they instigated, encouraged or condoned such strike?

In the present case, the Corporation Counsel of the City of New York sought an order--pursuant to section 211 of the Civil Service Law and sections 750 and 751 of the Judiciary Law, Consol.Laws, c. 30--to punish the defendants for criminal contempt, claiming that they had willfully disobeyed the restraining provisions of the temporary injunction issued by the Supreme Court on September 9, 1968. The defendants' demand for a trial by jury, based on their claim that they are entitled to such a trial as a matter of right by virtue of statutory and constitutional provisions, was rejected by Special Term, and its resulting orders were unanimously affirmed by the Appellate Division. The appeals are before us by leave of the latter court on certified questions.

The statutory provisions on which the several defendants rely are section 753--a of the Judiciary Law and section 808 of the Labor Law, Consol.Laws c. 31 (formerly Civ.Prac.Act, § 882--a). Those sections, in substantially identical language, grant the right of jury trial in a proceeding to punish, as a criminal contempt, a failure or refusal to obey an injunction order granted 'in any case involving or growing out of a labor dispute'. It is urged by the defendants that the legislative design to apply those sections to strikes by public employees (§ 210, subd. 1) is demonstrated by the fact that, whereas the Legislature expressly provided that section 807 of the Labor Law ¹ is inapplicable to injunctions to restrain violations of section 210 (subd. 1), no similar exclusionary language applies to section 808. We find no substance to this argument.

Our discussion of the statutory question may well begin by noting that a primary command to the judiciary in the interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the purpose of the Legislature. In finding such purpose, one should look to the entire statute, its legislative history and the statutes of which it is made a part. (See e.g., Matter of Hogan v. Culkin, 18 N.Y.2d 330, 335, 274 N.Y.S.2d 881, 884, 221 N.E.2d 546, 549; Levine v. Bornstein, 4 N.Y.2d 241, 244, 173 N.Y.S.2d 599, 602, 149 N.E.2d 883, 885; see, also, McKinney's Cons.Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes, §§ 92, 95, 96, 97, 98, 111.)

Section 807 and section 808 of the Labor Law (as well as Judiciary Law, § 753--a) are but the identically worded successors of a statutory provision enacted in the 1930's which constituted this State's Little Norris-LaGuardia Act (Civ.Prac.Act, § 876--a), named for its Federal prototype, the Norris-LaGuardia Act (47 U.S.Stat. 70; U.S.Code, tit. 29, §§ 101--115). Accordingly, in determining the reach of the new statutes, we find it highly significant that for the past three decades their predecessors have been held inapplicable to public employees. More specifically, the courts have ruled that such provisions--both those restricting or limiting the issuance of labor injunctions and those granting the right of trial by jury in criminal contempt proceedings involving labor disputes--apply solely to employees in private industry and not to those in public employment. (See United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 298, 67 S.Ct. 677, 698, 91 L.Ed. 884; Jewish Hosp. of Brooklyn v. 'John Doe', 252 App.Div. 581, 585, 300 N.Y.S. 1111, 1118; see, also, New York City Tr. Auth. v. Loos, 2 Misc.2d 733, 742, 154 N.Y.S.2d 209, 219, affd. 3 A.D.2d 740, 161 N.Y.S.2d 564; New York City Tr. Auth. v. Loos, 9 Misc.2d 492, 493, 170 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269.) It is overly simplistic reasoning to assume that the Legislature, in excluding the provisions of section 807 from the application of the Taylor Law, but failing similarly to mention section 808, intended to grant the right of trial by jury to public employees, a right which they had never previously possessed under the latter section.

If it had been the design of the Legislature to grant such a right, that body would undoubtedly have done so expressly and unequivocally. There is nothing in the provisions under consideration relating to jury trials (Labor Law, §§ 807, 808; Judiciary Law, § 753--a) which discloses any concern with, or application to, public employment. In point of fact, when we look to the legislative history which preceded and accompanied the enactment of the Taylor Law, there is no suggestion that any one, in or out of the Legislature, proposed trial by jury in contempt proceedings for its violation. It is inconceivable, we suggest, that so vital and salient a feature would not have been enacted, let alone not mentioned, by the Legislature if there had been any design or desire to provided therefor. To accept the position of our dissenting brothers would ascribe to the Legislature an intention not only to override decisions on the books for upwards of 30 years, which denied the right to trial by jury to public employees (see supra, 23 N.Y.2d p. 115, 295 N.Y.S.2d p. 629, 242 N.E.2d p. 804), but also to nullify the 'old and well-known rule that statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.' (United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 272, 67 S.Ct. 677, 686, supra.)

The conclusion, therefore, is clear. The Taylor Law was never intended to, and does not, make provision for jury trials in contempt enforcement proceedings; the reference in the Taylor Law to section 807 cannot possibly create a right to a jury trial under section 808.

Nor do we find any basis for a claim that a denial of a jury trial in this case offends against any constitutional provision.

Contrary to the defendants' contention, to refuse a trial by jury to public employees or their representative organizations and to grant it to those in private industry does not violate the equal protection of the laws under the Constitution of either the United States or New York State. Ever since the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act and our State's Little Norris-LaGuardia Act, the view has been uniformly and consistently held that a legitimate distinction between public and private employment is constitutionally permissible. This has been recognized, we note, with regard not only to the prohibition against strikes but also to the issue, now confronting us, affecting jury trials. (See United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 298, 67 S.Ct. 677, supra; Jewish Hosp. of Brooklyn v. 'John Doe', 252 App.Div. 581, 585, 300 N.Y.S. 1111, 1118, supra; see, also, New York City Tr. Auth. v. Loos, 2 Misc.2d 733, 742, 154 N.Y.S.2d 209, 219, affd. 3 A.D.2d 740, 161 N.Y.S.2d 564, supra; New York City Tr. Auth. v. Loos, 9 Misc.2d 492, 493, 170 N.Y.S.2d 266, 269, supra.) Indeed, the Supreme Court, explicitly dealing with the problem in the Mine Workers case--where the miners were governmental employees--declared (330 U.S., at p. 298, 67 S.Ct., at p. 698):

'Not only were the defendants fully informed that a criminal contempt was charged, but we think they enjoyed during the trial itself all the enhanced protections accorded defendants in criminal contempt proceedings. We need not treat these at length, for defendants, in this respect, urge only their right to a jury trial as provided in § 11 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. But § 11 is not operative here, for it applies only to cases 'arising under this Act,' and we have already held that the restriction upon injunctions imposed by the Act do not govern this case. The defendants, we think, were properly tried by the court without a jury.'

There is at least one vital reason why a jury trial is not appropriate or desirable in applying sanctions for violation of statutes regulating labor relations with public employees or their representative organizations. Prompt determinations, unencumbered by the long, drawn-out procedures involved in jury trials, are needed in criminal contempt proceedings under the Taylor Law in order to deter the continuance of paralyzing public strikes by visiting speedy punishment on the offenders. ² It is not unreasonable to assume that ...