Ransom v. Los Angeles City High School Dist. of Los Angeles County

• Citation: 129 Cal.App.2d 500,277 P.2d 455
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Decision Date: 13 December 1954
• Parties: Walter RANSOM, Ab Waxman, William Burroughs, Bernard Jackson, Louise Morehouse, Elyse Byler and Marie Long, On Behalf of Themselves and All Other Taxpayers of the Los Angeles City High School District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The LOS ANGELES CITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, State of California, and Dr. Hugh C. Willett, Arthur F. Gardner, Harry H. Hillman, Paul Burke, Mrs. Edith K. Stafford and Mrs. Ruth C. Cole, as members of the Board of Education for said District, Defendants and Respondents. Civ. 20231.

Page 455

277 P.2d 455

129 Cal.App.2d 500

Walter RANSOM, Ab Waxman, William Burroughs, Bernard Jackson, Louise Morehouse, Elyse Byler and Marie Long, On Behalf of Themselves and All Other Taxpayers of the Los Angeles City High School District, County of Los Angeles, State of California, Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. The LOS ANGELES CITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT OF the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, State of California, and Dr. Hugh C. Willett, Arthur F. Gardner, Harry H. Hillman, Paul Burke, Mrs. Edith K. Stafford and Mrs. Ruth C. Cole, as members of the Board of Education for said District, Defendants and Respondents.

Civ. 20231.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Dec. 13, 1954.

Hearing Denied Feb. 10, 1955.

Axelrad & Sevilla, Los Angeles, for appellants.

Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel, Wm. E. Lamoreaux, Clarence H. Langstaff, Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles, for respondents.

Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Charles F. Reiche, Asst. City Atty., Spencer L. Halverson, Deputy City Atty., Los Angeles, for City of Los Angeles, amicus curiae in support of respondents.

SHINN, Presiding Justice.

The plaintiffs appeal from a judgment of dismissal of a taxpayers' suit brought to enjoin the intended dedication of a right of way by defendant Los Angeles City High School District, and to enjoin the intended expenditure of funds by defendant district for improvement of the same.

The plaintiffs, Walter Ransom, Ab Waxman, William Burroughs, Bernard Jackson, Louise Morehouse, Elyse Byler and Marie Long are resident taxpayers in Los Angeles City High School District. The defendants are the district and the individual members of the Board of Education for said district.

On July 30, 1953, the defendant board, by resolution, declared its intention to dedicate to the City of Los Angeles a portion of the Palms Junior High School property as a right of way for public street purposes. The right of way would extend Ocean Park Avenue through the middle of the present Junior High School site. On August 3, 1953, certain expenditures in connection with the dedication and improvement of this street were approved by the board. The appellants seek to enjoin this dedication and expenditure of funds therewith.

Palms Junior High School is one of the schools operated by the district, and is located in the Palms community of the City of Los Angeles. The school site is rectangular in shape, being bounded on its northern property line by Woodbine Street, and on its southern property line by the Charnock Elementary School, there being no street on the southern boundary of the site in question. The site is bounded on the east by Midvale Avenue and on the west by Kelton Avenue; midway on the eastern and western boundary lines of the site, Ocean Park Avenue dead-ends at the school property. The intended dedication and improvement of this right of way by the school board therefore is for the purpose of connecting the two portions of the already existing Ocean Park Avenue. This connecting street, to be 84 feet in width, would bisect the school grounds into two approximately equal portions. Included in the intended plans is an underpass which is to connect the bisected portions of the grounds.

The district acquired this property in 1941, and in 1946 a bond issue was approved and construction of a junior high school on this site was proposed. Also, in 1946, Los Angeles City adopted a Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance with provisions that before any land located in the City of Los Angeles could be used for school purposes, a 'conditional use' permit must be obtained from the Los Angeles City Planning Commission. On June 26, 1947, the board filed its application for a 'conditional use' permit to use the property for a junior high school. On July 24, 1947, the commission granted the permit subject to the conditions that all the requirements of the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance be observed in the development of the site for public school purposes, and that the board file and record a tract map of said property 'in order to clear the public records' and make provision for extension, widening and improvement of the boundary streets in a manner satisfactory to the City Engineer, said map to be filed and recorded within a period of one year from the date of the conditional approval. In October of 1948, the board filed a tentative tract map with the commission which showed the property which the board now intends to dedicate as a separate lot on the tract and not as a street. On October 14, 1948, the commission recommended approval of the map to the city council on the condition that two boundary streets be widened, and that Ocean Park Avenue be opened through the tract in the presently proposed fashion to an 84 foot width and that the board improve the street and construct a pedestrian tunnel under it. On November 23, 1948, the council approved the recommendation of the commission and notified the board and the commission. On January 17, 1949, the board agreed to the conditions and on January 19th sent a letter of agreement to the council agreeing to dedicate and improve the 84 foot strip of land through the school site, 'if, as and when required by the city council.'

Subsequently due notice was given and a hearing held regarding the dedication and improvement of the boundary streets, and the same were dedicated and later improved.

The proceedings leading up to this petition for an injunction began on May 18, 1953, when the council requested the respondent district to immediately dedicate and improve the 84 foot right of way and construct a pedestrian tunnel underneath it. On June 11th, the board advised the council that there were insufficient funds then available to make the said improvements and asked clarification of the request of May 18th. July 3, 1953, the council requested the district to begin said dedication and improvement, and stated that 180 days from May 18th would be a reasonable time for completion. The board, acting pursuant to sections 18671 and 18672 ¹ of the Education Code, then adopted a resolution declaring its intent to dedicate the right of way in question, and fixed August 13, 1953 as the date when a public hearing would be held. The filing of the original complaint on August 7, 1953, seeking a temporary injunction restraining this intended action was precipitated by board approval on August 3, 1953, of $3,250 for engineering plans for the improvement, and $320 to the Los Angeles City Engineer for checking the plans.

In the complaint the appellants alleged with considerable elaboration that the intended action of the board would interfere with teaching, impose a traffic hazard, introduce a flood danger, impose difficult administrative problems, deprive the school of badly needed space, introduce new problems of morals, materially depreciate taxpayers' property and consume school funds needed for school purposes.

The demurrer of the defendants was sustained without leave to amend and the appellants in this proceeding appeal from a judgment of dismissal. In substance, the contentions of the appellants are the following: (1) Sections 18671 and 18004 ² and related sections of the Education Code do not authorize the dedication or improvement of property in a manner that would be detrimental to its use for school purposes; (2) The threatened dedication would constitute an abuse of discretion on the part of the board; (3) It would constitute a gift of the money and property of the district in violation of Article IV, section 31, and Article IX, section 1, of the State Constitution; (4) It was an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse the plaintiffs a right to file an amended and supplemental complaint.

The essence of plaintiffs' argument on the first and second points is that if the facts alleged in the complaint be taken as true, it follows that the proposed dedication and improvement of the right of way were not in furtherance of school purposes, and therefore such action would be in excess of the powers of the board. The answer to these contentions is found in the familiar rule that courts will not interfere with the actions of administrative boards in the absence of fraud, collusion, bad faith or manifest abuse of discretion. The most that was charged was error of judgment and the court has no power to substitute its judgment for that of the administrative board. The board has broad discretion in determination of the public interest and benefit to the district from its action and as the court said in Butler v. Compton Junior College Dist., 77 Cal.App.2d 719, at page 727, 176 P.2d 417, at page 423, quoting the case of Berkeley High School Dist. v. Coit, 7 Cal.2d 132, 59 P.2d 992: '* * * the courts 'cannot enter the board room * * * nor interfere at all with its action unless the board is exceeding its legislative powers, or its judgment or discretion is being fraudulently or corruptly exercised.' Nickerson v. San Bernardino County, 179 Cal. 518, 177 P. 465 .' See also Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal.2d 303, 315, 144 P.2d 4; Cramer v. County of Los Angeles, 96 Cal.App.2d 255, 256-257, 215 P.2d 497.

It must be presumed that all the matters alleged in the complaint which it is claimed would operate to the detriment of the district were considered by the board before it took its action and that the dedication and improvement, although entailing some disadvantages, would be consistent with a proper use of the property for school purposes.

The third contention of the appellants that this is a gift of public money or thing of value within the prohibition of Article IV, section 31, of the Constitution, is not well-taken. The section states: 'The Legislature shall have no power * * * to make any gift or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever; * * *' The public purpose doctrine is a...