Ransome v. Consovoy, Civil Action No. 00-1349 (JBS) (D. N.J. 6/19/2000), Civil Action No. 00-1349 (JBS)
| Decision Date | 19 June 2000 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 00-1349 (JBS) |
| Parties | KENNETH LAMONT RANSOME, Plaintiff, v. ANDREW B. CONSOVOY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Jersey |
District Judge.
Plaintiff Kenneth Lamont Ransome ("Ransome"), formerly a prisoner confined at South Woods State Prison in Bridgeton, New Jersey ("SWSP"), brings this action in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1998). Based upon his affidavit of indigence and his prison account statement1 this Court will (1) grant Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis;(2) direct the Clerk of the Court to file the Complaint without pre-payment of the filing fee; (3) waiving the filing fee in light of plaintiff's status in forma pauperis and his release from prison. Mr. Ransome informed the Clerk of Court, in a letter received May 1, 2000, that he was released from incarceration and lives at the above address.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e) (2) and 1915A, the Court has reviewed the Complaint to identify cognizable claims. The Court will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.2 Defendants are Andrew B. Consovoy, Chairman of the New Jersey State Parole Board; Rachel Torres-Chowaniec, a Parole Board Member; Ruby J. Washington, a Parole Board Member, and Edward Ocskay, Chief of Parole Appeals and Data Unit System. (Compl., ¶ 5.)
Plaintiff asserts the following facts: On April 16, 1999, at SWSP, Plaintiff received a parole hearing conducted by Defendants Washington and Torres-Chowaniec. (Compl., ¶ 8.) Plaintiff states that these Defendants deferred his case to Yolanda Muse, Chief of the MAP program [sic]. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he was approved for MAP in July, 1999. (Id.) On November 3, 1999, while waiting for transfer into the MAP program, Plaintiff received a calculation sheet indicating that his parole had been denied on September 15, 1999, and that it would be sixteen months before he would again be eligible for parole. (Id.) Plaintiff states that he was not given notice and therefore not present at the hearing on September 15, 1999, to present evidence in his favor and to rebut evidence against him. (Id.) On November 6, 1999, Plaintiff was given a statement of reasons for the denial of parole. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that the reasons are without merit, and that he should have had an opportunity to be heard before the Defendants made the decision to deny him parole. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that he prepared an appeal to Defendant Ocskay and sent it by certified mail on November 17, 1999. (Id.) Plaintiff allegedly has received no response. He contends that Defendant Ocskay has failed to render a decision as required within 45 days, violating Plaintiff's due process rights. (Id.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Consovoy has purposely allowed Board members to act arbitrarily, has delayed parole hearings, and as a result has caused Plaintiff and thousands of other inmates to remain incarcerated for a longer period of time than they should have been. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks immediate release and compensatory and punitive damages. (Id., ¶ 9.) As noted above, he has been released from custody on some date prior to May 1, 2000.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, §§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996), requires the Court, prior to docketing or as soon as practicable after docketing, to review a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress against a governmental entity or employee. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B); 1915A. The Act requires the Court to identify cognizable claims and to dismiss any claim that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a Defendant who is immune from such relief. Id.
Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 (a) (2); accord Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). The Court "must determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff[] may be entitled to relief, and . . . must accept as true the factual allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom." Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Holder v. Allentown, 987 F.2d 188, 194 (3d Cir. 1993)); Eli Lily & Co. v. Roussel Corp., 23 F. Supp.2d 460, 474 (D.N.J. 1998) (citing Nami and Holder).
A pro se complaint is held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); Then v. I.N.S., 58 F. Supp.2d 422, 429 (D.N.J. 1999). "Under our liberal pleading rules, during the initial stage of litigation, a district court should construe all allegations in a complaint in favor of the complainant" and give "credit to the allegations of the complaint as they appear[] in the complaint." Gibbs v. Roman, 116 F.3d 83, 86 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Kulwicki v. Dawson, 969 F.2d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir. 1992). "When it appears beyond doubt that no relief could be granted under any set of facts which could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint, a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper." Robinson v. Fauver, 932 F. Supp. 639, 642 (D.N.J. 1996) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
The Court will liberally construe the Complaint as raising a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Because Plaintiff's claims are not cognizable under § 1983, the Court will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
(1) Immediate Release
Plaintiff asks this Court to order his immediate release based upon a denial of due process occurring when Defendants Washington and Torres-Chowaniec denied him parole at a hearing at which he was not present on September 15, 1999. (Compl., ¶ 8.) Because this claim challenges the duration of Plaintiff's imprisonment, Plaintiff's exclusive federal remedy is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which requires the exhaustion of state court remedies. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 471, 500 (1973) (); Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 397 (3d Cir. 1987) ().3 Plaintiff's claim for immediate release will be dismissed because his claim for release has become moot by the fact of release itself.
(2) Damages
Plaintiff's damages claim challenging the denial of parole also is not cognizable under § 1983, because a favorable judgment on the claim would necessarily imply the invalidity of the decision denying parole. See Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 645-47 (1997); Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Such a claim is not cognizable under § 1983 unless the revocation decision is either first overturned in the state system or called into question by the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See White v. Gittens, 121 F.3d 803, 806-7 (1st Cir. 1997) (); Benson v. New Jersey State Parole Board, 947 F.Supp. 827 (D.N.J. 1996) (). Since the record does not reflect the circumstances of plaintiff's release from imprisonment, this dismissal for failure to state a claim will be without prejudice to plaintiff's right to file a claim in a tribunal of competent jurisdiction if he is asserting that he was wrongfully incarcerated for a period of time beyond that which was authorized by his underlying sentence.
Based on the foregoing, the Court will dismiss the Complaint without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.
ORDER
ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and (b), Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis is hereby granted; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall file the Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and (b); and it is further
ORDERED that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), the Clerk shall serve a copy of this Order by regular mail on plaintiff and the Attorney General of the State of New Jersey and the Warden of South Woods State Prison; and it is further
ORDERED that the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e) (2) (B) (ii) and 1915A (b) (1); and it is further
ORDERED that, due to plaintiff's release from incarceration, the filing fee provisions for payments pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (b)(1)(A) will be waived and no further filing fees are due, the plaintiff being indigent.
1. Plaintiff has submitted an account statement covering the period from November 21, 1999, to February 14, 2000. Because of changes in the computer system at the ...
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