Rapid Transit Ry. Co. v. Allen

• Decision Date: 27 February 1909
• Citation: 117 S.W. 486
• Parties: RAPID TRANSIT RY. CO. v. ALLEN.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

117 S.W. 486

RAPID TRANSIT RY. CO. v. ALLEN.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas.

February 27, 1909.

Appeal from District Court, Dallas County; E. B. Muse, Judge.

Action by Mary S. Allen against the Rapid Transit Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Walter H. Walne and Finley, Knight & Harris, for appellant. A. W. Nowlin, J. E Forrest, N. G. Turney, and T. F. Lewis, for appellee.

TALBOT, J.

This is an action for damages on acount of personal injuries sustained by appellee through the negligence of appellant's servants. The petition alleged that appellee was a passenger on one of appellant's street cars; that when said car arrived at the intersection of First avenue and Ash Lane, public streets in the city of Dallas, it was stopped, among other things, for the purpose of allowing appellee to alight therefrom, but that appellant's servants in charge of said car failed to stop it a reasonably sufficient length of time to enable her to alight in safety; that, while she was in the act of alighting from said car, it was negligently started and moved forward with a sudden lurch and jerk which caused appellee to be thrown with great force and violence down upon the platform or steps of said car and upon the cross walk of said streets in such manner as to catch her foot and drag her some distance, by reason of which she sustained serious and permanent injuries. Defendant answered by general demurrer, special exceptions, and general denial. The case was tried before a jury and resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of appellee for the sum of $3,000, and the appellant appealed.

It is assigned that the trial court erred in permitting Dr. S. Egan to testify that, when he was called to treat appellee some 18 months after the accident, he found her to be a mental wreck; that her mind was seriously affected. This testimony was objected to on the ground that there was no sufficient basis in the pleading for such proof. We are of the opinion the court did not err in the admission of the testimony. It was alleged that appellee was seriously and permanently wounded, bruised, and injured, both internally and externally in and on her back, spine, legs, hips, head, and shoulders, arms, and body; that by being dragged, and by reason of the bruises, wounds, and injuries received as aforesaid, her uterus, ovaries, kidneys, and bladder, together with the nerves and muscles by which the same are controlled, were seriously and permanently displaced, injured, and affected, and her lungs and abdomen seriously impaired and injured, and her nervous system seriously impaired and shattered. Dr. Egan testified, in substance, that the injury to appellee's nervous system is very great; that from his last examination of her the gravest condition he found is one that relates to the nervous system; that there are two nervous systems in the body— one controls the voluntary acts of the body, the brain and spinal cord and their nerves, and the organic nervous system, which presides over all the organic functions of the body, the circulation, the nutrition, and assimilation, and the very life of the individual —that he found in appellee's case very serious injury to both of these nervous systems; and that her mind has been seriously affected. He further testified that he found appellee in very broken health; that she was a physical and mental wreck, in a state of extreme prostration and depression, great emaciation, and not only imperfect nutrition, but imperfect in all the organic processes of the body—that is, in the circulation of the blood, in the digestion, and in the assimilation. The rule that a general allegation of damages for personal injury will admit evidence of such damages only as naturally and necessarily result from the injury charged seems to be well established. Railway v. Curry, 64 Tex. 85; Campbell v. Cook, 86 Tex. 630, 26 S. W. 486, 40 Am. St. Rep. 878. In Railway v. Curry, supra, the Supreme Court, after laying down the general rule, substantially as above stated, said: "The rule, however, is satisfied when from the facts stated the law infers other fact or facts; for, whatsoever the law infers from a given state of facts, the adverse party is presumed to know and must take notice of, whether it is specially pleaded or not." So that it is not essential, in order to let in proof thereof, that all the results of the act or injury complained of should be set forth in detail, if such results are necessarily or legally implied from the injuries alleged. Railway v. McMannewitz, 70 Tex. 73, 8 S. W. 66; Railway v. Mitchell, 72 Tex....