Rasi v. Howard Mfg. Co., 15565.

• Decision Date: 19 January 1920
• Docket Number: 15565.
• Citation: 187 P. 327,109 Wash. 524
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: RASI v. HOWARD MFG. CO.

187 P. 327

109 Wash. 524

RASI v. HOWARD MFG. CO.

No. 15565.

Supreme Court of Washington

January 19, 1920

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Mitchell Gilliam, Judge.

Action by Hilda Rasi against the Howard Manufacturing Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed, and action dismissed.

R. D Hill and S. H. Kelleran, both of Seattle, for appellant.

James B. Murphy, of Seattle, for respondent.

MOUNT J.

This appeal is from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an action for personal injuries. The defendant has appealed.

The principal and only question necessary for us to consider is whether the action may be sustained. The facts are as follows:

The appellant is a corporation engaged in business in Seattle in the manufacture of woodenware. It has various power-driven machines, which are used in its factory. One of these machines is a sanding machine, for smoothing flat boards. The respondent was employed as an off-bearer upon this sanding machine. In some manner her left hand was caught between the rolls of this machine, and she lost the four fingers of her left hand. Her injury occurred on July 3, 1918, when she had worked at this machine but a short time. At the time of her employment she was past 15 years of age, but not 16. She had no permit to work from a superior court judge of the county where she lived. The business of the appellant was within the terms of the Workingmen's Compensation Act (Rem. Code 1915, §§ 6604-1 to 6604-32), and appellant made regular returns and had complied with all the requirements of that law. After respondent's injury she brought this action at common law to recover on account of the alleged negligence. The appellant insists that the sole remedy of respondent is to be found in the terms of the Workingmen's Compensation Act and that she has no redress by statute against her employer. This position must be sustained. The first section (Rem. Code, § 6604-1) of that act provides as follows:

'The common-law system governing the remedy of workmen against employers for injuries received in hazardous work is inconsistent with modern industrial conditions. In practice it proves to be economically unwise and unfair. Its administration has produced the result that little of the cost of the employer has reached the workman and that little only at large expense to the public. The remedy of the workman has been uncertain, slow and inadequate. Injuries in such works, formerly occasional, have become frequent and inevitable. The welfare of the state depends upon its industries, and even more upon the welfare of its wageworker. The state of Washington, therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of the premises are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for workmen, injured in extrahazardous work and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation, except as otherwise provided in this act; and to that end all civil actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished, except as in this act provided.'

In Ross v. Erickson Construction Co., 89 Wash. 634, 155 P. 153, L. R. A. 1916F, 319, after quoting from this section we said:

'The Legislature undertook to withdraw 'all phases of the premises from private controversy,' and provide 'sure and certain relief for workmen,' and to that end abolished 'all civil actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries,' and abolished all jurisdiction of the courts over such cases, except as in the act provided. * * * Clearly the purpose of the act was to end all litigation growing out of, incident to, or resulting from the primary injury, and, in lieu thereof, give to the workman one recovery in the way of certain compensation, and to make the charge upon the contributing industries alone. That purpose is made reasonably clear by reference to the act.'

See, also, Stertz v. Industrial Insurance Commission, 91 Wash. 588, 158 P. 256, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 354, and cases there cited.

If the respondent was a workman, within the meaning of this act there can be no doubt that her sole redress must be found in the terms of the act. If she...