Ratchford v. Ratchford
| Decision Date | 13 March 1986 |
| Parties | Nancy RATCHFORD v. James RATCHFORD, Third. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
Marshall F. Newman, Roslindale, for plaintiff.
Robert Erwin Silver, Newton Center, and Sherri E. Liftman, Newton, for defendant, submitted a brief.
Before WILKINS, LIACOS, NOLAN, LYNCH and O'CONNOR, JJ.
The plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint in the Boston Municipal Court based on a separation agreement (agreement). The defendant countered with a motion to dismiss, which is based on two grounds: (1) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, Dist./Mun.Cts.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (1975), and (2) the court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Dist./Mun.Cts.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) (1975). The motion was denied, and a request that the denial be reported to the Appellate Division was not then implemented by the judge. Following trial, judgment entered for the plaintiff. The defendant filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. The defendant renewed his request for a report to the Appellate Division of the denial of his motion to dismiss. After a hearing, the Appellate Division ordered the report dismissed. From that dismissal, this appeal comes. We affirm the order dismissing the report, but for reasons other than those advanced by the Appellate Division.
The plaintiff and the defendant were married in 1967, separated in 1971, and divorced by a decree nisi on June 24, 1974. On June 14, 1974, the plaintiff and the defendant had executed a separation agreement which, among other provisions, gave custody of the parties' two minor children to the plaintiff and required the defendant to pay $30 per week to the plaintiff for their support. It also provided as follows:
(emphasis added). The divorce decree nisi orders the defendant to pay to the Department of Public Welfare the sum of $30 per week for the support of the minor children.
The defendant argues that the Municipal Court was without jurisdiction of the subject matter because of the Probate Court decree, and, hence, his motion to dismiss should have been allowed. The plaintiff responds on two bases, procedural and substantive. Procedurally, the plaintiff argues that, once the motion to dismiss was denied, the defendant was required to perfect his appeal to the Appellate Division immediately and not to wait until trial. We shall not pass on the procedural issue because we...
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