Ratliff v. Baltzer's Adm'r
| Decision Date | 14 February 1907 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | ROBERT RATLIFF, Appellant, v. CHRISTIAN BALTZER'S ADMINISTRATOR, Respondent |
INSANE PERSON-PERSON ENTIRELY WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING-PERSON NOT ENTIRELY WITHOUT UNDERSTANDING-CONTRACT OF-RESCISSION.
1. Under the provisions of section 2410, Revised Statutes, a person entirely without understanding has no power to make a contract of any kind, but is liable for the reasonable value of things furnished to him necessary for his support or the support of his family.
2. Under the provisions of section 2411, Revised Statutes, a conveyance or other contract of a person of unsound mind, but not entirely without understanding, made before his incapacity has been judicially determined, is subject to rescission.
3. Where a person is not entirely without understanding, and makes a contract, comprehending its full force and effect and no fraud or deceit has been practiced upon him, such a contract will not be rescinded under the provisions of section 2411, Revised Statutes.
4. Contracts made by such a person are not absolutely void, but only voidable.
5. Held, under the evidence in this case, that B. was competent to make the contract sued on, and that he is bound thereby.
(Syllabus by the court.)
APPEAL from the District Court of Seventh Judicial District for Canyon County. Hon. Frank J. Smith, Judge.
Action to foreclose a mortgage. Defense, incapacity of mortgagor to execute the contract. Judgment for respondent. Reversed.
Reversed and remanded, with instructions. Costs awarded to the appellant.
Ralph P. Quarles and L. M. Pritchard, for Appellant.
The real test of respondent's competency was, Did he understand the nature and effect of the deed, and of the note and mortgage that he gave at the time they were made? If so he was competent to make them, and they are valid and binding on him and on his estate, unless it is shown that fraud was practiced. The evidence does not show any such fraud. It shows that Ratliff had no knowledge or cause to think, at the time he sold the land, that Baltzer was mentally unsound.
But the law goes further, and holds that to avoid the contract on the ground of mental incapacity it must appear that the party was so insane that he did not have a reasonable perception or understanding of the nature of the contract and of its terms. The evidence shows to the contrary in this case.
Monomania or partial insanity does not disqualify, and is no cause for rescission.
Section 2411, Revised Statutes, was taken bodily from California, and the supreme court of that state has held that the statute prescribes no new rule, but is simply declaratory of what the law was prior to its enactment. This is undoubtedly correct. (More v. Calkins, 85 Cal. 177, 24 P. 729; Castro v. Geil, 110 Cal. 292, 52 Am. St. Rep. 84, 42 P. 804; Jacks v. Estee, 139 Cal. 507, 73 P. 247; Harris v. Harris, 59 Cal. 620.) This statute simply affirms the common-law rule, shown by the authorities hereinbefore cited, and leaves the manner of applying the rule to the courts, without prescribing the manner in which it is to be applied, and hence it must be applied in harmony with the rules of equity and the common law. (2 Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction, 2d ed., 453, 456.)
E. M. Wolfe, for Respondent.
It is argued that Baltzer wrote the deed; that he knew he was writing a deed; that he knew that the deed transferred the property from Ratliff to himself; therefore he knew what he was doing, and the deed must stand. The deed is Baltzer's written testimony that he was, at that time, crazy. It shows that instead of knowing what he was doing, he did not know what he did.
A further very important fact is that Mr. Ratliff sold the ranch for $ 1,000 more than it was worth, one-third more than he had offered it for a month before. This was a plain fraud upon a weak-minded person, which will not be sustained in any court of equity. (Crowthers v. Rowlandson, 27 Cal. 377; Moore v. Moore, 56 Cal. 89; Boyer v. Berryman, 123 Ind. 457, 24 N.E. 249; Pearson v. Cox, 71 Tex. 246, 10 Am. St. Rep. 740, 9 S.W. 124; Eaton v. Eaton, 37 N.J.L. 109, 18 Am. Rep. 716; Hovey v. Hobson, 53 Me. 452, 89 Am. Dec. 705; Reason v. Jones, 119 Mich. 672, 78 N.W. 899; Burnham v. Kidwell, 113 Ill. 425; Sedgwick v. Jack, Ill Iowa 745, 82 N.W. 1027; Hay v. Miller, 48 Neb. 158, 66 N.W. 1115; Allore v. Jewell, 94 U.S. 506, 24 L.Ed. 260.)
This action was brought by the appellant against the respondent to foreclose a certain mortgage on real estate given to secure the payment of the respondent's promissory note for the sum of $ 2,000. The defendant by his guardian answered and filed his cross-complaint. By the answer it is admitted that the respondent signed said note and mortgage, but that he was of unsound mind and mentally incompetent to sign and execute them, or to transact any business whatever at the time they were signed.
By way of cross-complaint, the guardian alleges that the respondent was of unsound mind, and mentally incapable of executing said note and mortgage, or of transacting any business whatever at the time he signed them, and that on the twenty-second day of June, 1904, the said Baltzer was declared insane by the probate court of Owyhee county; that on or about the eighteenth day of May, 1904, while the respondent was so insane and incompetent, the appellant sold to him the property described in the complaint and included in said mortgage, for the sum of $ 3,000; and that on that day the respondent paid in cash to the appellant $ 1,000, and on that date the appellant executed to the defendant a deed purporting to convey said described real estate to Baltzer, and that for the purpose of securing the balance of the purchase price, the appellant took from the defendant the mortgage described in the complaint, well knowing at that time, and for a long time prior thereto, said Baltzer was of unsound mind and mentally incompetent to transact any business; that at the time said deed and mortgage were made said real estate was of no greater value than the sum of $ 1,500, and that fact was well known to the appellant, and because of that fact the appellant committed a fraud on the defendant; and on information and belief, it is alleged that the deed to said real estate was never delivered to the said Baltzer, and that on or about the nineteenth day of April, 1905, said deed was handed to the guardian by the appellant, at which time the said guardian refused to accept said deed, but regardless of that fact the appellant left the deed in possession of the guardian; and that the mortgage described in appellant's complaint was never delivered to the appellant by the defendant or by any person at his request; that the respondent never took possession of the property described in the complaint, or any part thereof, and that appellant remained in possession thereof; that the guardian offered to transfer to the appellant all rights or claims of the defendant in and to said property, and requested him to return the $ 1,000 paid on the purchase price thereof, which he refused to do; that the said guardian is now ready, able and willing to relinquish all rights that said respondent may have in and to said property and prays for judgment; that the mortgage may be canceled; that said deed be returned to plaintiff; that the said appellant be required to pay to said guardian the said sum of $ 1,000, together with interest at the rate of ten per cent from the eighteenth day of May, 1904, and for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable.
The appellant answered the cross-complaint and denied the material allegations therein contained, and averred that at the time of said transaction the respondent was sane, was of sound mind, and fully knew and realized what he was doing; and denied that said land was not at that time worth to exceed $ 1,500, and avers that it was worth $ 3,000, or more.
The issues thus made were tried before the court without a jury and findings of fact were made and entered in favor of the defendant, and judgment was...
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