Ratliff v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.
| Decision Date | 31 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:15–cv–893–J–32MCR |
| Citation | 220 F.Supp.3d 1292 |
| Parties | Richard O. RATLIFF, Jr., as Personal Representative of the Estate of Richard O. Ratliff, Sr. and on Behalf of All Survivors, Robert D. Ratliff, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Anne R. Ratliff, and on Behalf of All Survivors, and B. B., A Minor, Individually, by and through his legal guardians, Robert D. Ratliff and Amy Ratliff, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., an Ohio Corporation, Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff Classic Transport, Inc. Third Party Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Cameron M. Kennedy, Carter W. Scott, James W. Gustafson, Jr., William A. Norton, Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley, PA, Tallahassee, FL, Stephen Julian Douglas, The Law Offices of Stephen J. Douglas, P.A., St. Petersburg, FL, for Plaintiffs.
Matthew J. Meyer, Ryan R. Corkery, Tyler J. Derr, Ansa Assuncao, LLP, Tampa, FL, for Defendant/Third Party Plaintiff.
Ellis T. Fernandez, III, Shannon H. Padgett, Fernandez Trial Lawyers, PA, Jacksonville, FL, for Third Party Defendant.
This case involving Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine arises out of a tragic July 2013 automobile accident in which a UPS package car crashed into a family's vehicle, killing Richard and Anne Ratliff and injuring their grandson. It is before the Court on Defendant United Parcel Service, Inc., an Ohio Corporation's ("UPS") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 45), to which Plaintiffs Richard O. Ratliff, Jr., as personal representative of the Estate of Richard O. Ratliff, Sr.; Robert D. Ratliff, as personal representative of the Estate of Anne R. Ratliff; and B.B., a minor, individually, by and through his legal guardians, Robert D. and Amy Ratliff, responded (Doc. 47). With the Court's permission (Doc. 54), UPS filed a reply (Doc. 55), and Plaintiffs filed a sur-reply (Doc. 56). On October 19, 2016, the Court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the record of which is incorporated herein. (Doc. 59).
UPS is the titled owner of the package car involved in the accident, a 2014 Freightliner vehicle. UPS used UPS Supply Chain Solutions, Inc. ("SCS"), its contracting arm, to arrange for the delivery of the package car from the manufacturer in Michigan to a UPS facility in Jacksonville, Florida.1 Pursuant to the SCS Car Haul Transportation Services Agreement ("Transportation Agreement") (Doc. 45–6), SCS contracted with Third Party Defendant Classic Transport, Inc. ("Classic") to deliver the package car to Jacksonville.2 According to the Transportation Agreement, Classic's relationship with SCS was that of an independent contractor. (Id. at 4 ¶ 3). Classic hired Georgia Anne Gray ("Gray"), a contract driver, to drive the package car. (Doc. 45–7 at 5, Pontius Dep. 23:14–19; Doc. 45–8 at 7–8, Groulx Dep. 28:2329:3).
On July 5, 2013, Richard and Anne Ratliff and their grandson were driving on U.S. 90 in Baker County when the UPS package car driven by Gray struck the rear driver's side of the Ratliffs' car, which careened off the road and crashed into a tree. Richard and Anne Ratliff died from their injuries, and their grandson, a minor, also sustained injuries in the accident.
On September 11, 2014, Plaintiffs and Classic signed a Release Agreement settling their dispute, with Classic's insurance paying $1,000,000 and Classic contributing an additional $25,000 (Doc. 45–20); the settlement excluded UPS. On June 22, 2015, Plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against UPS and SCS in the Circuit Court of the Fourth Judicial Circuit in and for Duval County, Florida, alleging wrongful death against UPS and SCS (Counts I and II), personal injury against UPS and SCS (Counts III and IV), and negligent infliction of emotional distress (Count V). (Doc. 2). UPS and SCS removed the case on July 20, 2015 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446. (Doc. 1). UPS and SCS filed third party complaints against Classic.3 (Docs. 8, 9). On May 25, 2016, UPS filed a motion for summary judgment, contending that it is entitled to summary judgment on a dispositive legal issue: the "shop" exception to Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine. (Doc. 45).
Summary judgment is proper "when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc. , 662 F.3d 1292, 1314 (11th Cir. 2011) ; Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), (c). The inquiry is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251–52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The movant bears the burden of showing the absence of dispute as to material facts, and upon such a showing the burden shifts to the non-moving party to establish that a genuine dispute exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The evidence must be viewed in favor of the non-moving party, and all inferences drawn in her favor. Anderson , 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
Judicially adopted in 1920, Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine "imposes strict vicarious liability upon the owner of a motor vehicle who voluntarily entrusts that motor vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation causes damage to another." Estate of Villanueva ex rel. Villanueva v. Youngblood , 927 So.2d 955, 957 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (citation omitted); S. Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920) (). The concept was implemented based on public policy concerns:
The dangerous instrumentality doctrine seeks to provide greater financial responsibility to pay for the carnage on our roads. It is premised upon the theory that the one who originates the danger by entrusting the automobile to another is in the best position to make certain that there will be adequate resources with which to pay the damages caused by its negligent operation. If Florida's traffic problems were sufficient to prompt its adoption in 1920, there is all the more reason for its application to today's high-speed travel upon crowded highways. The dangerous instrumentality doctrine is unique to Florida and has been applied with very few exceptions.
Aurbach v. Gallina , 753 So.2d 60, 62 (Fla. 2000) (quoting Kraemer v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. , 572 So.2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1990) ). In fact, courts have created only three exceptions, one of which is relevant here: the "shop" exception.4 See Castillo v. Bickley , 363 So.2d 792 (Fla. 1978) (). In carving out the shop exception, the Florida Supreme Court sought to "pare back" the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in service station and repairman situations, reasoning that although "an automobile owner is generally able to select the persons to whom a vehicle may be entrusted for general use,...he rarely has authority and control over the operation or use of the vehicle when it is turned over to a firm in the business of service and repair." Id. at 793. Therefore, the court held that "the owner of a motor vehicle is not liable for injuries caused by the negligence of the repairman or serviceman with whom the vehicle has been left, so long as the owner does not exercise control over the injury-causing operation of the vehicle during the servicing, service-related testing, or transport of the vehicle, and is not otherwise negligent." Id.
Here, UPS contends that the shop exception applies, and therefore, it is not liable for Plaintiffs' injuries under the dangerous instrumentality doctrine. (Doc. 45). UPS argues that the delivery of the package car was a service contracted for between SCS and Classic. Specifically, UPS points to Gray's pre-trip inspections, such as checking the tires, looking for dents and scratches, and ensuring no damage occurred in the evening and that the package car was safe to operate, as examples of how Gray serviced the package car. (Doc. 45 at 6). Next, UPS asserts that it did not exercise control over the injury-causing operation of the package car because it was not in possession of the vehicle and did not control Gray or Classic's operation of the vehicle during its transportation.
(Id. at 19–20). UPS distances itself from control over the package car, noting that SCS hired Classic (an independent contractor), and Classic hired Gray (another independent contractor). According to UPS, Classic controlled the operation of the package car under the Transportation Agreement, which states that Classic "shall have control of its activities with the right to exercise independent judgment as to performing its obligations under [the] Agreement" and that Classic's "relationship with SCS shall be that of an independent contractor." (Id. at 19; Doc. 45–6 at 4 ¶ 3). Finally, UPS reasons that it was not "otherwise negligent," as it had yet to possess the vehicle and could not maintain or affect its condition.5 (Doc. 45 at 20).
Despite UPS's arguments to the contrary, this case closely resembles the scenario contemplated by the Florida Supreme Court when it fashioned the dangerous instrumentality doctrine in Southern Cotton Oil and applied it in Demshar v. AAACon Auto Transport, Inc. , 337 So.2d 963 (Fla. 1976).6 In Demshar , an automobile owner contracted with AAACon Auto Transport, Inc., a transportation company, to have his car transported from Florida to Ohio. AAACon hired Snyder, an independent contractor, to deliver the car, and during delivery, Snyder negligently operated the car and injured others. Thereafter, an action was brought...
To continue reading
Request your trial