Rau v. Sacramento County Retirement Bd.

• Decision Date: 14 December 1966
• Citation: 55 Cal.Rptr. 296,247 Cal.App.2d 234
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Joseph RAU and Ruth E. Rau, Petitioners and Appellants, v. SACRAMENTO COUNTY RETIREMENT BOARD et al., Respondents. Civ. 676.

Page 296

55 Cal.Rptr. 296

247 Cal.App.2d 234

Joseph RAU and Ruth E. Rau, Petitioners and Appellants, v. SACRAMENTO COUNTY RETIREMENT BOARD et al., Respondents.

Civ. 676.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Dec. 14, 1966.

William D. Heekin, Carmichael, for appellants.

John B. Heinrich, County Counsel, Fred G. Williams, Deputy County Counsel, Sacramento, for respondents.

OPINION

McMURRAY, Justice pro tem. ^*

This is an appeal from a judgment in a proceeding in mandamus to review a ruling of the Sacramento County Retirement Board. The appellant Joseph Rau alleged that he suffered a disabling injury to his back while working as a heavy-equipment operator for the County of Sacramento on November 3, 1958. After long treatment, he had his coccyx surgically removed in May 1961. Rau claimed this to be a service-connected injury entitling him to a disability retirement. After many hearings on the matter, respondent Sacramento County Retirement Board refused to grant the service-connected disability, but did grant Rau a normal service retirement.

Rau sought a writ of mandate in the Sacramento County Superior Court, and that court referred the case back to the board for a full hearing and review. After hearings on two separate dates, the board received a written communication and oral testimony from Dr. Matthis, the county health officer and, under section 31530 of the Government Code, the medical adviser to the board. At a third meeting, appellant Rau's counsel objected to the receipt and consideration by the board of a letter from Dr. Matthis and to his oral testimony given at that time. The board, on advice of its counsel, however, accepted the evidence, and then refused Rau a service-connected disability retirement.

At the subsequent hearing in the superior court on petition for a writ of mandate the court upheld the decision of the board, and mandate was denied. The instant appeal is on the ground that the decision of the board was not supported by substantial evidence, and that the board did not proceed in a lawful manner in that it received testimony after the case had been submitted for decision. Both of these contentions were raised in the superior court action.

At the start it may be said that the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937, sections 31450 to 31894, inclusive, of the Government Code, places the administration of the county employees' retirement system in the hands of the retirement board. Section 31520 of the Government Code provides, in part:

'The management of the retirement system is vested in the board of retirement, consisting of five members, one of whom shall be the county treasurer. The second and third members of the board shall be members of the association elected by it within 30 days after the retirement system becomes operative in a manner determined by the board of supervisors. The fourth and fifth members shall be qualified electors of the county who are not connected with county government in any capacity, except one may be a supervisor and one may be a retired member, and shall be chosen by the board of supervisors. * * *'

Sections 31720 to 31739.4, inclusive, provide a comprehensive legislative enactment for the determination of the rights of a county employee to be retired for disability. Section 31720 specifies:

'Any member permanently incapacitated for the performance of duty shall be retired for disability regardless of age if, and only if:

'(a) His incapacity is a result of injury or disease arising out of and in the course of his employment, or

'(b) He has completed five years of service, * * *.'

Section 31725 provides:

'Permanent incapacity for the performance of duty shall in all cases be determined by the board.'

It will be seen that this retirement board is a local administrative body vested with quasi-judicial powers. (Rogers v. Retirement Board, 109 Cal.App.2d 751, 241 P.2d 611; Robinson v. Board of Retirement, 140 Cal.App.2d 115, 294 P.2d 724.) One of the later decisions on this subject is Flaherty v. Board of Retirement of Los Angeles 198 Cal.App.2d 397, 18 Cal.Rptr. 256, 264, holding that a board of retirement under the County Employees Retirement Law of 1937 is a quasi-judicial body, wherein it is said:

"The rule in California is that upon review of the decision of a local administrative body, the reviewing court is concerned only with the presence or absence of substantial evidence in the agency record which will support the agency's determination. The reviewing court may not consider evidence which was not presented to the local board; there is to be no trial de novo with respect to matters upon which the agency was authorized to and did in fact decide." (P. 408.)

Flaherty has been followed more recently in Le Strange v. City of Berkeley, 210 Cal.App.2d 313, at page 321, 26 Cal.Rptr. 550, 555, where it is said:

'Where local agencies or boards exercise judicial or constitutional quasi-judicial power the superior court in its review of the decisions of such agencies or boards is confined to determining whether there was substantial evidence before the agency or board to support its findings. * * *

'When the superior court has rendered its judgment on mandamus and the judgment is appealed, the power of the appellate court is governed by the substantial evidence rule, i.e., the determination of whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the respondent, sustains the findings of the trial court, resolving any reasonable...