Rauda v. State

• Decision Date: 15 May 2017
• Docket Number: A16-1027
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals
• Parties: Erasmo Monge Rauda, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

Erasmo Monge Rauda, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.

A16-1027

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

May 15, 2017

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).

Affirmed

Rodenberg, Judge

Dakota County District Court

File No. 19HA-CR-13-3583

Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Lydia Maria Villalva Lijó, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

James C. Backstrom, Dakota County Attorney, Heather D. Pipenhagen, Assistant County Attorney, Hastings, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Ross, Judge; and Kalitowski, Judge.^*

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

RODENBERG, Judge

Appellant Erasmo Monge Rauda¹ challenges the postconviction court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea without an evidentiary hearing. Appellant argues that his mental state at the time of the plea hearing rendered his guilty plea not voluntary or intelligent. He also argues that his guilty plea is invalid because of ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

FACTS

Appellant is a citizen of El Salvador and is living in the United States. In 2007, he was charged with being subject to removal proceedings under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) as an alien present in the United States who had not been admitted or paroled. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) (2012) (stating that an alien present without admission or parole is inadmissible). He thereafter applied for and received Temporary Protected Status (TPS), which provided temporary protection from removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2012) (defining the status and providing eligibility requirements).

In 2013, appellant was charged with fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. Appellant pleaded guilty to that charge pursuant to a plea agreement. The plea petition included the following: "My attorney has told me and I understand that if I am not a citizen of the United States this plea of guilty may result in deportation, exclusion from admissionto the United States of America or denial of citizenship." The petition was written in English, but appellant confirmed that, with the aid of an interpreter, he had discussed the petition with his attorney. He testified that he was satisfied with his understanding of the contents of the petition.

Appellant was questioned by the district court and defense counsel about his mental state. Appellant testified that he has depression, that he was taking identified medications, and that he has memory lapses caused by post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). When asked if he was thinking with a clear mind, appellant initially answered the district court's question in the affirmative, but when later asked a similar question by defense counsel, he answered, "Not very well." When asked if he would prefer that proceedings be delayed until he was thinking with a clear mind, appellant answered, "I would not change my mind now." When asked if he had forgotten things that had been discussed with defense counsel earlier in the day, appellant answered, "Just some things. But, for whatever has been said here, no, I remember."

Defense counsel asked appellant about their discussions concerning the decision to enter a guilty plea, the trial rights appellant would waive by doing so, and appellant's understanding of the agreement. Immigration consequences were discussed on the record:

Defense counsel: . . . We also talked about that if you're not a United States citizen that this guilty plea will likely result in immigration consequences. Even though you have legal permission to be here, United States could revoke that permission and deport you from the United States.

Appellant: Yes.

Defense counsel: You understand that's a risk you're taking.

Appellant: Yes.

After a factual basis for the plea was provided, the district court accepted appellant's guilty plea. Before sentencing, the state moved for a competency evaluation to ensure that appellant was competent to understand the proceedings. The evaluator concluded that appellant was competent to proceed with sentencing despite his mental illness and possible mental deficiency. The evaluator noted that appellant understood the charges against him and knew the reasons behind his decision to plead guilty. In March 2015, appellant was sentenced in conformity with the plea agreement.

After sentencing, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) provided notice of an additional charge of removability under the INA stemming from appellant's guilty plea. Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief, seeking to withdraw his plea. Appellant filed a supporting affidavit explaining that he suffers from several mental-health issues and was taking multiple prescribed medications at the time of his guilty plea. The affidavit primarily concerned appellant's mental health, but did allege in very summary fashion that appellant was not told that he "would be deported." Appellant also alleged that he felt pressured to plead guilty and that he did not understand his plea at the time it was entered. The postconviction court denied appellant's motion to withdraw his plea without an evidentiary hearing.

This appeal followed.

DECISION

"[Appellate courts] review the denial of a petition for postconviction relief, as well as a request for an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion." Taylor v. State, 874 N.W.2d 429, 430 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). We review the postconviction court'sfactual findings for clear error and review the legal conclusions de novo. Martin v. State, 825 N.W.2d 734, 740 (Minn. 2013).

I. Appellant's mental state did not render his guilty plea invalid.

A defendant does not have an "absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it." State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). After sentencing, a defendant may withdraw a guilty plea only "to correct a manifest injustice." Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice exists if a guilty plea is not valid. State v. Theis, 742 N.W.2d 643, 646 (Minn. 2007). "To be constitutionally valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent." Nelson v. State, 880 N.W.2d 852, 858 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted). The petitioner "bears the burden of showing his plea was invalid." Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. The validity of a plea is reviewed de novo. Id.

Appellant argues that his plea was not voluntary because he felt pressured into pleading guilty. "The voluntariness requirement ensures a defendant is not pleading guilty due to improper pressure or coercion." Id. at 96. Improper pressure or coercion generally requires a threat or promise made to induce a defendant to plead guilty. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970) ("[A]gents of the State may not produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant."); State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) ("A guilty plea cannot be induced by unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises . . . ."). We examine "what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea agreement" and all other relevant circumstances. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 96.

Appellant alleged no facts in his affidavit to support a conclusion that the state, defense counsel, the district court, or any other person subjected appellant to improper pressure. Appellant was asked multiple times during the plea colloquy if the terms of the agreement, announced on the record, represented his understanding of the plea agreement. He answered in the affirmative. The report of the competency evaluator supports the conclusion that appellant understood the terms of the agreement at the time of his plea.

Appellant also argues that his plea was not intelligent because of his memory lapses and the medication that he was taking at the time of the hearing. "An intelligent plea is one made 'knowingly and understandingly.'" Uselman v. State, 831 N.W.2d 690, 693 (Minn. App. 2013) (quoting Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997)). We examine whether, at the time the plea was entered, the defendant "understood the charges against him, the rights he waived, and the consequences of the plea." Nelson, 880 N.W.2d at 861.

At the plea hearing, appellant identified his medical issues, listed his medications, and talked about his memory lapses. Appellant told the court that he had forgotten some things from earlier that day, but that he remembered everything that had been said up to that point in the proceedings. Defense counsel asked appellant about the rights he was waiving, and appellant answered that he understood the rights. At no point did appellant state that he did not understand or did not remember discussing his rights, the charges, or the consequences of the plea, all of which were discussed with appellant on the record and to which he indicated that he understood.

To the extent that appellant argues the postconviction court abused its discretion by considering the information within the competency evaluation for the purpose of considering the validity of the plea, we disagree. The postconviction court could reasonably determine from a review of the plea-hearing transcript that appellant understood the nature of the claims against him, the rights he waived, the consequences of the plea, and the terms of the plea agreement. Moreover, the guilty plea was made before the same district judge who considered the postconviction petition. Appellant's responses to the competency evaluator's questions concerning his understanding of his trial rights and the consequences of his plea only bolstered the plea-hearing record, which demonstrates that appellant's guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent.

II. The postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's request to withdraw his plea based on ineffective...