Ravnell v. Coiner, Civ. A. No. 69-47-E.

• Decision Date: 31 December 1970
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 69-47-E.
• Citation: 320 F. Supp. 1117
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of West Virginia
• Parties: William J. RAVNELL, Petitioner, v. Ira M. COINER, Warden of the West Virginia State Penitentiary, Respondent.

320 F. Supp. 1117

William J. RAVNELL, Petitioner, v. Ira M. COINER, Warden of the West Virginia State Penitentiary, Respondent.

Civ. A. No. 69-47-E.

United States District Court, N. D. West Virginia.

December 31, 1970.

Richard W. Cardot, Elkins, W. Va., for petitioner.

Chauncey Browning, Jr., Atty. Gen. of West Virginia, Willard Sullivan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, W. Va., for respondent.

MAXWELL, Chief Judge.

Shortly after the occurrence of an attempted robbery in Wellsburg, West Virginia, during which several gun shots were fired and one of the intended victims of the robbery was killed, Ravnell was found a few blocks from the scene, suffering from a bullet wound in his stomach. He was picked up by West Virginia police and taken to a hospital where he remained for several weeks. While there, he was advised of his constitutional rights and charged with armed robbery and murder.

Ravnell is a resident of Youngstown, Ohio. His family hired two attorneys from Youngstown who possessed very broad backgrounds in criminal matters. These attorneys represented Ravnell at all phases of preliminary matters as well as upon his final arraignment before the Circuit Court of Brooke County, West Virginia, on April 29, 1968.

At that arraignment Petitioner pleaded guilty to a charge of second degree murder and was sentenced to serve an indeterminate term of not less than five nor more than eighteen years.

At the time of filing his application in this Court for federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 et seq., Petitioner was an inmate at the West Virginia State Penitentiary in Moundsville, West Virginia. Since that time, however, he has at various times been under medical care at the West Virginia University Medical Center in Morgantown, West Virginia. He had been released under a six months order of executive clemency issued by the Governor of West Virginia, but has since been returned to custody.

Whether or not Petitioner is directly within the custody of Respondent, this Court continues to have jurisdiction over his application for relief. Once jurisdiction properly attaches, "it is not defeated by the release of the petitioner prior to completion of proceedings on such application." Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554 (1968); Rinehart v. Boles, 286 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. W.Va.1968).

Petitioner has exhausted the remedies which have been made available to all state habeas corpus petitioners under West Virginia's very full and complete Post-Conviction Relief Act, West Virginia Code § 53-4A-1, et seq. (Michie Supp.1969). The Circuit Court of Brooke County, West Virginia, on December 7, 1968, denied the habeas corpus relief which Petitioner sought in that court. He then filed a motion for a rehearing before that court, but it was refused on January 30, 1969. Petitioner subsequently appealed the decision of the Circuit Court of Brooke County to the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia by means of a writ of error. The same was refused without further hearing by an order dated March 31, 1969.

Because of the earlier exhaustion, this Court considered the issues presented in Petitioner's application. The factual nature of those issues necessitated the appointment of counsel by this Court to represent Petitioner in framing the context and content of his allegations so that the full beneficial effects of a plenary hearing could be realized. Points of contention were briefed by counsel and an evidentiary hearing was held in this Court.

A synopsis of all the allegations presented, either in the petition, in counsel's brief, or as adduced at the plenary hearing, are as follows:

I. Petitioner's recorded plea of guilty was involuntarily proffered because:

A. His trial counsel coerced him into entering a guilty plea;

B. His trial counsel otherwise ineffectively represented him;

C. His trial counsel told him that he would get out of jail in three years because of his leg;

D. The racial make-up of the court officers, the jury, and spectators in the courtroom, created a fear in the mind of Petitioner that he could not receive a fair trial if he pleaded not guilty;

E. The publicity given his case in the news media, specifically, television and newspapers, created such a hostility in the community that he felt he could not receive a fair trial; and

F. The treatment which he encountered in jail while awaiting trial influenced his plea.

II. Petitioner's recorded plea of guilty was unlawfully accepted by the trial court.

A. Petitioner did not withdraw his earlier not guilty plea prior to his entry of the guilty plea.

B. The trial court imposed judgment although the records fail to reflect that a plea was entered.

C. Petitioner was forced to become a witness against himself by entry of the plea of guilty.

III. There was error by the Circuit Court of Brooke County in its refusal to rehear Petitioner's habeas corpus action in that court.

I

The United States Supreme Court recently stated, "A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punishment." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). Cf. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L. Ed.2d 473 (1962). Being tantamount to a conviction, a court must carefully insure that the guilty plea was made knowingly and voluntarily before accepting it. Pilkington v. United States, 315 F.2d 204 (4th Cir. 1963); Bailey v. MacDougall, 392 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1968); United States ex rel. Thurmond v. Mancusi, 275 F.Supp. 508 (E.D.N.Y. 1967); Gibson v. Boles, 288 F.Supp. 472 (N.D.W.Va.1968); Rinehart v. Boles, 286 F.Supp. 562 (N.D.W.Va.1968).

As evidenced by cases involving a variety of situations, the circumstances are many which may cause a guilty plea to be involuntarily proffered. 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 423(2) (1961). Six such circumstances have been presented on behalf of Petitioner herein.

The first two of these circumstances involve the manner in which Petitioner was represented by his retained counsel. Petitioner asserts generally that the representation which he received was ineffective and specifically that his counsel coerced him into entering a plea of guilty.

The standard which is generally applied to the determination of whether or not an attorney's representation is ineffective is a strict one. Petitioner must show that the representation which he was afforded was a farce, a mockery of justice, or shocking to the conscience of the court. Root v. Cunningham, 344 F.2d 1 (4th Cir. 1965). Petitioner has not carried the burden of proof of this allegation by the preponderance of the credible evidence presented to this Court. Post v. Boles, 332 F.2d 738 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. den. 380 U.S. 981, 85 S. Ct. 1346, 14 L.Ed.2d 274 (1965).

The record indicates that Petitioner's family employed counsel to represent him. After Mr. Hanni was originally retained he requested that Mr. Nybell be hired and retained to assist him. They were both employed while Petitioner was still in the hospital recovering from the gunshot wounds. The first official proceeding at which they represented Petitioner was his appearance before a justice of the peace in a preliminary hearing.

Each attorney discussed the case with Petitioner at least six times prior to the date on which the case was set for trial. Extensive preparations were made by the attorneys with a view toward their defense of Petitioner. A pathologist was consulted with regard to the investigation of the chemistry of blood samplings. Counsel familiarized themselves with the function and utilization of a spectrograph because they believed spectrographic evidence would be relied on by the prosecution. A sampling of the soil in the yard of the deceased's home was taken for spectrographic analysis. The vicinity where the alleged act was said to have occurred was thoroughly examined with regard to various routes which could have been traveled from the home of the deceased to the place where Petitioner was taken into custody and the time which it would take to move along those various routes. Counsel also made an effort to determine the ethnic structure in the area, the public sentiment and the possibility of racial prejudice.

Further, Mr. Nybell related at the arraignment held on April 29, 1968, that "the pretrial motions were sustained in their entirety by the Court, the net effect of which was to inform the defense in substantial detail not only as to the bare facts set forth in the indictment but as to in considerable degree the proof upon which the State would have based its case. * * *" Transcript, p. 7. This shows other efforts which were made by counsel on behalf of their client.

After making their investigations, counsel discussed with Petitioner the merits of the case and the alternatives which were open to him. Mr. Nybell, in response to interrogatories propounded to him by Respondent in this habeas corpus action, stated that

"* * * on the day the case was called for trial we discussed the matter in detail, all possible ramifications. I would not say every conceivable ramification of the case was discussed with Mr. Ravnell; the various alternatives were placed before him, the possible penalties that would be attached to the various pleas of guilty to the various charges were explained, the distinction between first and second degree murder in the State of West Virginia wherein natural life, that is, the natural physical life of the Defendant is the penalty for first degree murder and whereas the lesser penalty attached to the plea of second degree murder was discussed, the possibility of securing an acquittal or a hung jury. All these matters were discussed in detail with Mr. Ravnell; and at no time was he coerced, threatened nor was he promised anything."

Moreover, Petitioner's hired counsel were...