State ex rel. Valentine v. Watkins

• Decision Date: 14 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 27444.,27444.
• Citation: 208 W.Va. 26,537 S.E.2d 647
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia ex rel. Robert VALENTINE, Petitioner, v. Ron WATKINS, Sheriff of Marion County, Respondent.

537 S.E.2d 647

208 W.Va. 26

STATE of West Virginia ex rel. Robert VALENTINE, Petitioner, v. Ron WATKINS, Sheriff of Marion County, Respondent.

No. 27444.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted June 6, 2000.

Decided July 14, 2000.

Keith Skeen, Public Defender Corporation, Clarksburg, West Virginia, Attorney for the Petitioner.

Darrell V. McGraw, Jr., Attorney General, Charles Houdyschell, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Charleston, West Virginia, Attorneys for the Respondent.

DAVIS, Justice:

In this original jurisdiction proceeding, the petitioner herein, Robert Valentine [hereinafter "Valentine"], requests this Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus to secure his release from incarceration from the respondent herein, Ron Watkins, Sheriff of Marion County [hereinafter "Sheriff Watkins"].¹ Specifically, Valentine challenges the calculation of his discharge date, September 6, 2000, and contends that he should have been granted good time credit for his detention pending the West Virginia Parole Board's [hereinafter "Parole Board"] review of his parole status, which review was necessitated by his February 3-4, 1999, parole violations. Upon a review of the parties' arguments and the pertinent authorities, we grant as moulded the requested writ of habeas corpus. Having concluded that the Parole Board failed to conduct Valentine's parole revocation hearing within the time allowed for such a proceeding, we find that he is entitled to good time credit for that period of his detention necessitated by the Parole Board's delay.

I. FACTUAL HISTORY

The facts underlying Valentine's petition for habeas corpus relief commence with his conviction of unaggravated robbery² on June 3, 1988, and his resultant sentence therefor of 5-18 years in the West Virginia State Penitentiary.³ At the time of his incarceration, Valentine's minimum discharge date was estimated to be June 3, 1997, provided he earned good time credit while in prison.⁴ Since his initial imprisonment, however, officials with the West Virginia Division of Corrections [hereinafter "D.O.C."] have calculated that Valentine has lost a total of 830 days of good time credit during his incarceration, which time had to be added back to his minimum discharge date. With this adjustment, Valentine's minimum discharge date would have been September 23, 1999.

Following his incarceration for the minimum term of his robbery sentence, Valentine was released on parole on June 29, 1993.⁵ As a result of an undisclosed parole violation and his status as an absconder, Valentine, who was returned to custody on September 23, 1994, was charged with 7 months and 1 day good time not earned and 22 days for absconding, which time was added to his minimum discharge date. Therefore, Valentine's new minimum discharge date was calculated as being May 17, 2000.

On February 3, 1999, Valentine was again released on parole and again violated the conditions thereof. Pending the Parole Board's review of his parole status, Valentine was detained in the Marion County Jail.⁶ The Parole Board held a final revocation hearing on March 25, 1999, and issued its recommendation on April 14, 1999.⁷ In rendering its decision, the Parole Board evaluated the four parole violations, with which Valentine had been charged and to which he had pleaded guilty, and the circumstances surrounding these charges:

Charge # 1: You did violate Special Condition # 5.4 of your Parole Agreement governing your release on parole in that on 2-3-99 you did not adhere to your 8:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. curfew.

Mitigation: Parolee [Valentine], through counsel, admitted the curfew violation occurring on the same day he was released from prison for the past four and one-half (4½) years. Parolee indicated that he spent the night with his girlfriend.

....

Charge # 2: You did violate Special Condition # 5.3 of your Parole Agreement governing your release on parole in that on 2-4-99 you did consume alcohol.

Mitigation: Parolee admitted consumption of beer.

....

Charge # 3: You did violate Rule a of the WV Rules and Regulations governing your release on parole in that you failed to report in person to your parole officer on 2-4-99 as directed.

Dismissed by this hearing member.

Charge # 4: You did violate Rule e of the WV Rules and Regulations governing your release on parole in that you failed to maintain behavior that does not threaten the safety of yourself or others in that on 2-4-99 you fled the custody of your Parole Officer Deanna Lindsey, and Fairmont City Police Officer Brian Schuck.

Mitigation: Parolee admitted fleeing custody....

Based upon this information and additional evidence presented at the hearing, the presiding Parole Board hearing member found, as follows:

Recommendation: The fact that the Parolee violated the same day of his release is on its face, ridiculous. Moreover, subject previously violated parole in 1994. His new minimum discharge date appears to be 5/17/2000. It is doubtful that basic incarceration for another year will offer a cure for his alcoholism, even though the offer of reincarceration on Substance Abuse Unit 19 at PCC is possible and offer [sic] promise. What we see here is misconduct by an alcoholic more than criminal behavior. I believe the testimony of Echols Lambert is important.[⁸] I also believe that Officer Lindsey had little choice but to institute revocation. In this matter, I choose to blunder on the side of mercy. Reluctantly, I recommend reinstatement of parole for Parolee Valentine predicated on an approved out-of-state home plan.

(Footnote added).

Upon the Parole Board's reinstatement of his parole, Valentine was required, as a condition of his parole, to complete an inpatient substance abuse treatment program.⁹ Following the completion of this program, Valentine was re-released on parole. The exact date of his release, however, is disputed by the parties. Valentine contends that he was not released until June 24, 1999, while the D.O.C. states that he was released on June 18, 1999. Thereafter, on September 3, 1999, Valentine was determined to have re-violated the conditions of his parole, and, on September 9, 1999, was again committed to custody. As a result of the ultimate revocation of his second parole, Valentine was charged with 3 months and 15 days good time not earned and 6 days for his absconder status. When these figures were added to his prior discharge date, the D.O.C. determined Valentine to be eligible for release on September 6, 2000.

Upon learning of his amended discharge date, Valentine petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus. On December 29, 1999, we granted Valentine's petition and issued a rule to show cause.

II. STANDARD FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT

Procedurally, this case comes before us on Valentine's petition for post-conviction habeas corpus relief. Generally, "Habeas Corpus is a suit wherein probable cause therefor being shown, a writ is issued which challenges the right of one to hold another in custody or restraint." Syl. pt. 4, Click v. Click, 98 W.Va. 419, 127 S.E. 194 (1925). Accord Syl. pt. 4, State ex rel. Roach v. Dietrick, 185 W.Va. 23, 404 S.E.2d 415 (1991) (" `A writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum will lie to effect the release of one imprisoned in the State Penitentiary without authority of law.' Syllabus Point 1, State ex rel. Vandal v. Adams, 145 W.Va. 566, 115 S.E.2d 489 (1960)."); Tasker v. Griffith, 160 W.Va. 739, 742, 238 S.E.2d 229, 231 (1977) ("Habeas corpus lies to test the legality of the restraint under which a person is detained."); Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Tune v. Thompson, 151 W.Va. 282, 151 S.E.2d 732 (1966) ("The sole issue presented in a habeas corpus proceeding by a prisoner is whether he is restrained of his liberty by due process of law.").

With respect to the instant petition, W. Va.Code § 53-4A-1(a) (1967) (Repl.Vol.1994) explains to whom a post-conviction writ of habeas corpus is available.

Any person convicted of a crime and incarcerated under sentence of imprisonment therefor who contends that there was such a denial or infringement of his rights as to render the conviction or sentence void under the Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of this State, or both, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose the sentence, or that the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law, or that the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any ground of alleged error heretofore available under the common-law or any statutory provision of this State, may, without paying a filing fee, file a petition for writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum, and prosecute the same, seeking release from such illegal imprisonment, correction of the sentence, the setting aside of the plea, conviction and sentence, or other relief, if and only if such contention or contentions and the grounds in fact or law relied upon in support thereof have not been previously and finally adjudicated or waived in the proceedings which resulted in the conviction and sentence, or in a proceeding or proceedings on a prior petition or petitions filed under the provisions of this article, or in any other proceeding or proceedings which the petitioner has instituted to secure relief from such conviction or sentence....

When considering whether such a petition requesting post-conviction habeas corpus relief has stated grounds warranting the issuance of the writ, courts typically are afforded broad discretion. See W. Va.Code § 53-4A-3 (1971) (Repl.Vol.1994); W. Va. Code § 53-4A-7 (1967) (Repl.Vol.1994). See also Ravnell v. Coiner, 320 F.Supp. 1117, 1124 (N.D.W.Va.1970)

("The decision as to whether to grant relief, deny relief, or to hold an evidentiary hearing on factual issues, if any exist, is a matter of discretion with the courts of West Virginia." (citing W. Va.Code §§ 53-4A-3 and 53-4A-7)); State ex rel. McMannis v. Mohn, 163 W.Va. 129, 141, 254 S.E.2d 805, 811 (1979) ("The case is before us...