Rawlins v. Kansas

• Decision Date: 17 April 2012
• Docket Number: Case No. 11-3034-SAC
• Parties: DAMARIS RAWLINS, Petitioner, v. STATE OF KANSAS, and DEREK SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF KANSAS, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

DAMARIS RAWLINS, Petitioner, v. STATE OF KANSAS, and DEREK SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY GENERAL STATE OF KANSAS, Respondents.

Case No. 11-3034-SAC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

Dated: April 17, 2012

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the court on a petition for a writ of audita querela, or in the alternative a writ of coram vobis, pursuant to the All Writs Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (2012). Petitioner presents the following claims: 1) she was convicted of battery on a law enforcement officer based upon insufficient evidence; 2) she was denied due process by the state court's failure to instruct the jury on self-defense; 3) she was denied her right to effective assistance of counsel; and 4) she was denied due process when state courts denied her request for a new evidentiary hearing. Doc. 1, 3, p. 34-69.

Procedural History

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of one count of battery on a law enforcement officer in violation of K.S.A. § 21-3413. She was sentenced to12 months imprisonment, and was granted 36 months probation in lieu of imprisonment. On direct appeal, petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the Kansas Court of Appeals, and the Kansas Supreme Court denied review. Petitioner then sought post-conviction relief under K.S.A. § 60-1507 for ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The trial court initially dismissed Ms. Rawlins' petition for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the Kansas Court of Appeals overturned the trial court's finding and remanded the petition for a decision on the merits. The state court again denied post-conviction relief, this time on the merits, and the Kansas Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. The Kansas Supreme Court again denied review. After having exhausted all available state court remedies as to each of the claims raised in this petition, petitioner has timely filed this petition for audita querela relief or, in the alternative, a writ of coram vobis. See Doc. 16, p. 3; Doc. 1, 3, p. 16.

Jurisdiction

Petitioner filed two extraordinary writs under the All Writs Act: a writ of audita querela and, in the alternative, a writ of coram vobis. This court first considers whether the district court has the necessary jurisdiction to review petitioner's writs of error pursuant to the All Writs Act. The All Writs Act does not extend a federal court's jurisdiction and is only meant to assist a court in exercising its own jurisdiction. See Syngenta Crop Protection, Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002). The All Writs Act provides a manner inwhich to address those cases where "the absence of any avenue of collateral attack would raise serious constitutional questions." Thornbrugh v. United States, 2011 WL 2066564, at *2 (10th Cir. 2011).

For a petitioner to be eligible for relief under this act, she must prove the following: 1) that she was diligent in bringing her claim; 2) "that other remedies are unavailable or inadequate"; and 3) that the state decision results "in a complete miscarriage of justice." See U.S. v. Thody, 2012 WL 375528, at *2 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing to United States v. Morgan, 346 U .S. 502, 511-12 (1954); Embrey v. United States, 240 F. App'x. 791, 793-94 (10th Cir. 2007)).

Writ of Audita Querela

The particular writ of audita querela existed at common law in order to provide relief in those circumstances where "execution had been issued or was about to be issued upon a judgment, which it would be contrary to justice to allow to be enforced, because of matters arising subsequent to the rendition thereof." Oliver v. City of Shattuck ex rel. Versluis, 157 F.2d 150, 153 (10th Cir. 1946). There is some question as to whether this particular writ still exists.

"Writs of audita querela and coram nobis "are similar, but not identical." United States v. Reyes, 945 F.2d 862, 863 n. 1 (5th Cir.1991). Usually, a writ of coram nobis is used "to attack a judgment that was infirm [at the time it issued], for reasons that later came to light." Id. By contrast, a writ of audita querela is used to challenge "a judgment that was correct at the time rendered but which is rendered infirm by matters which arise after its rendition." Id. Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of CivilProcedure formally abolished both writs. United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 45, 118 S. Ct. 1862, 141 L.Ed.2d 32 (1998); Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (both stating that writs of coram nobis and audita querela were abolished by Rule 60(b)). However, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 98 L.Ed. 248 (1954), that the writ of coram nobis could still be pursued in the criminal contexts under the All Writs Act."

United States v. Torres, 282 F.3d 1241, 1245 n. 6 (10th Cir. 2002).

For the purposes of this opinion, the court will assume, without deciding, that the writ of audita querela exists. See United States v. Thody, 2012 WL 375528 (10th Cir. 2012) (denying petition based on other grounds); Torres, 282 F.3d at 1245 n. 6 (holding on the merits of the petition without deciding whether audita querela was preserved under Rule 60(b)); United States v. Reyes, 945 F.2d 862, 866 (1991) (same).

Writ of Coram Vobis

As for the alternative writ of coram vobis, it is well established that the distinction between a writ of coram vobis and a writ of coram nobis is "virtually meaningless." United States v. Thomas, 49 F. App'x. 781, 783 (10th Cir. 2002). Courts have generally treated both writs as interchangeable and have applied the same procedural requirements to both writs of error. See, e.g., In re Jordan, 157 F. App'x. 597, 598 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing to United States v. Sawyer, 239 F.3d 31, 37 n. 4 (1st Cir. 2001)).

The writ of coram vobis has been recognized as a medium for federal attack of a conviction only after a prisoner is released from federal custody. See Rivenburgh v. Utah, 299 F.2d 842, 843 (10th Cir. 1962) (stating thatcoram nobis "is sometimes broadly recognized as available in matters strictly confined within the federal judicial system. . . But [it] . . . cannot be used as a substitute for habeas corpus or as a collateral writ of error between state and federal jurisdictions.") (emphasis added). The petitioner in this case was convicted under a state criminal statute and was placed in state custody, so it is unlikely that this particular writ is properly before this court.

Nevertheless, this court will still exercise jurisdiction in this case under the assumption that petitioner's writ of audita querela is properly before this court.

AEDPA Standard

"Collateral attacks upon criminal convictions, no matter how they are characterized by a litigant," are "properly governed by the same considerations which underlie habeas corpus." Carter v. Attorney General, 782 F.2d 138, 141 (10th Cir. 1986). Accordingly, the Court applies the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), which creates the current standard of review for writs of habeas corpus. Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70 (2003).

Under AEDPA, a federal court "is bound by the state court's interpretation of its own law" and otherwise treats state decisions with great deference. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); see also Cash v. Maxwell, 132 S.Ct. 611, 611 (2012) (stating AEDPA "requires that federal habeas courts extend deference to the factual findings of state courts"). Afederal court may grant relief only if it establishes that the state decision "(1) . . . was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) . . . was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." Greene v. Fisher, 132 S.Ct. 38, 43 (2011) (citing to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).

Factual Background

This court presumes that all factual findings of the state court are correct absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Saiz v. Ortiz, 392 F.3d 1166, 1175 (10th Cir. 2004), cert denied, 545 U.S. 1145 (2005). No evidence countering the state court findings of fact has been shown; therefore, this court adopts the findings of fact as provided by the Kansas Court of Appeals opinion:

On January 23, 2000, Rawlins was arrested on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. Rawlins was transported to the Johnson County jail and placed in a safety cell for the night. The next morning Deputy Thomas Erickson took her to the nurse's desk where she refused to answer questions. Rawlins followed Deputy Erickson to his desk where she refused to answer additional questions. Deputy Erickson told Rawlins she had to go to the booking lounge. Rawlins did not respond to the directions. Deputy Buckendahl told Rawlins: "You get up, I'm going to give you a count of three to get out of this chair and go to the booking lounge or we're going to have to physically move you." Rawlins still refused to cooperate.

As the deputies picked Rawlins up, she let her legs go limp and dropped to the floor. Despite orders to stand up, Rawlins remained on the floor. The deputies carried her back to the safety cell with Deputy Erickson holding Rawlins' arms and Deputy Buckendahl holding her legs. Deputy Erickson entered the cell first and laid Rawlins' midsection down while maintainingcontrol of her arms until her back was on the floor. As Deputy Buckendahl let go of Rawlins' legs, she kicked him at least twice on his shin. Both deputies denied striking Rawlins' head. Deputy Buckendahl recalled Rawlins complaining about a bloody lip, but surmised Rawlins must have received it as result of struggling with the deputies as they tried to subdue her. Sergeant Joel Noelker, the deputies' supervisor, recalled seeing "a little trickle of blood" on Rawlins' lip after the struggle to restrain her in the safety cell.

Rawlins testified that four deputies dragged her on the ground back to the safely cell. She further claimed the deputies slammed her head

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