Rawson v. Department of Licenses

• Decision Date: 10 November 1942
• Docket Number: 28873.
• Citation: 130 P.2d 876,15 Wn.2d 364
• Parties: RAWSON v. DEPARTMENT OF LICENSES.
• Court: Washington Supreme Court

130 P.2d 876

15 Wn.2d 364

RAWSON v. DEPARTMENT OF LICENSES.

No. 28873.

Supreme Court of Washington

November 10, 1942

Department 2.

Proceedings by Fred P. Rawson against Department of Licenses on appeal from order of Director of Licenses refusing to revoke order cancelling petitioner's automobile operator's license. From an order dismissing petition after demurrer thereto was sustained and petitioner refused to amend petitioner appeals.

Affirmed.

Appeal from Superior Court, Thurston County; D. F. Wright, judge.

Lynn J Gemmill, of Vancouver, for appellant.

Smith Troy and John E. Belcher, both of Olympia, for respondent.

BEALS Justice.

Prior to June 19, 1940, Fred P. Rawson, the petitioner herein, was licensed as an automobile operator in the state of Washington. On the date referred to, Mr Rawson's operator's license was revoked by the department of licenses, pursuant to the provisions of chapter 158, Laws of 1939, known as the Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act. Section 9 of this act, Rem.Rev.Stat.Supp § 6600-109, reads as follows: 'The motor vehicle operator's license and all of the registration certificates of any person shall (except as provided in section 12) be forthwith suspended by the Director upon receiving from the court in which rendered a certificate, in the form prescribed by the Director, showing that such person failed to satisfy within thirty (30) days any judgment which shall have become final by expiration without appeal within the time in which appeal might have been perfected, or by final affirmance on appeal, rendered against him by a court of competent jurisdiction in this state or in any other state, or in any District Court of the United States, for damages in any amount on account of personal injury, including death, or damage to property in excess of $100.00, resulting from the ownership, maintenance, use or operation of a motor vehicle.'

The section referred to was amended by chapter 122, Laws of 1941, by leaving out the words 'and all of the registration certificates of any person,' following the word 'license,' contained in the first line of the section as enacted in 1939.

May 27, 1942, Mr. Rawson filed with the director of the department of licenses his verified petition asking that the departmental order canceling his operator's license be revoked, and that he be permitted to take the examinations required to enable him to procure a license authorizing him to operate motor vehicles upon the public highways in the state of Washington. Mr. Rawson attached to this petition (making the same a part thereof by reference) a copy of certain proceedings had Before the superior court for Clark county in three actions which were instituted against him and his son, Sam Rawson, jointly.

It appears that September 27, 1939, Fred P. Rawson and his son, Sam Rawson, were the owners of a truck and trailer, which on that day was being operated by Sam Rawson. On the date last referred to, the truck and trailer collided with two automobiles, injuring several persons riding therein, and struck and killed one Joseph A. Johnson, then in the course of his employment in improving the highway upon which the cars were proceeding. Both Fred P. Rawson and his son, Sam Rawson, were sued and held liable for damages resulting from the accident, three judgments having been rendered against them, aggregating approximately $14,000. These judgments remaining unsatisfied, the director of licenses canceled Fred P. Rawson's operator's license, pursuant to the statute above referred to.

In his petition, Fred P. Rawson stated his contention that the section of the statute, as amended, had no application to one who had only a financial interest in the motor vehicle which caused the damage on account of which a judgment had been rendered, and did not apply to one who was not actually operating the vehicle at the time of the accident. The director of licenses, by order dated May 27, 1942, denied Mr. Rawson's petition, from which order Mr. Rawson appealed to the superior court, the proceeding having been transferred to that court by his appeal. Before the superior court, the director demurred to Mr. Rawson's petition, upon the ground that the same failed to state facts sufficient to entitled petitioner to the relief asked for. June 23, 1942, the court entered an order sustaining the state's demurrer to the petition, and on the same day, Mr. Rawson having elected to stand upon his petition, and having refused to plead further, an order was entered dismissing the petition, from which Mr. Rawson has appealed.

Appellant assigns error upon the entry of the order sustaining the demurrer, and upon the entry of the order dismissing his petition.

As to the question here at issue, the amendment to the statute above referred to by chapter 122, Laws of 1941, above noted, is not important, as the department of licenses revoked only appellant's operator's license.

Appellant makes two contentions: First, that under Rem.Rev.Stat.Supp. § 6600-109 et seq., the operator's license of one who is an owner or part owner of a motor vehicle, who is not driving the same at the time of the accident, may not be revoked; and second, that as construed by the department of licenses, the statute in question violates appellant's constitutional rights.

In support of his first contention, appellant cites the statutory definition of the word operator, as found in Rem.Rev.Stat.Supp. § 6600-103, subsection (b), which reads as follows: "Operator.' Every person who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a public highway.'

Rem.Rev.Stat.Supp. § 6600-110 provides that 'such operator's license' shall remain suspended and shall not be renewed while any judgment such as that referred to in § 6600-109, supra, remains unsatisfied. Section 6600-109, supra, provides that the motor vehicle operator's license of 'any person shall * * * be forthwith suspended,' if it appears that 'such person' has failed to satisfy any judgment rendered against him 'for damages in any amount on account of personal injury * * * resulting from the ownership, maintenance, use or operation of a motor vehicle.'

Appellant calls attention to Rem.Rev.Stat.Supp. § 6600-108, subsection (a) , which provides that 'the motor vehicle operator's license * * * of any person shall be suspended forthwith without notice or hearing' whenever such person shall have been convicted of any offense which requires suspension or revocation of the license of such person, etc. Appellant argues that as this section does not provide for the suspension of the operator's license of the owner of the vehicle driven by the person guilty of an offense, § 6600-109, supra, should not be construed as applying both to the driver of the vehicle and the owner. This argument is not persuasive, as the section refers to a criminal offense by the driver, concerns him alone, and is not connected with any damage to any third party.

Appellant also argues that, considering the entire statute in question as a whole, having in mind its intended purpose, further reason is found for construing the act in accordance with appellant's contention.

Appellant's contentions call for some consideration of the act, with particular reference to the section pursuant to which appellant's operator's license was revoked, and the reasons for such legislation, and...