Ray v. King County

Decision Date15 March 2004
Docket NumberNo. 50105-4-I.,50105-4-I.
Citation86 P.3d 183,120 Wash. App. 564
PartiesGerald L. RAY and Kathryn B. Ray, husband and wife, Appellants, v. KING COUNTY, a political subdivision, Respondent.
CourtWashington Court of Appeals

John Maurice Groen, Groen Stephens & Klinge LLP, Bellevue, WA, for Appellants.

Scott David Johnson, King County Administration Building, Seattle, WA, for Respondent.

Kristopher Ian Tefft, Olympia, WA, for Amicus Curiae (Building Industry Assn. of Washington).

COX, A.C.J.

This quiet title action presents two questions. First, did an 1887 deed to a railroad convey fee title or an easement? Second, did events subsequent to that conveyance divest the railroad of the interest conveyed by that deed?

We hold that Bill Hilchkanum and Mary Hilchkanum, grantors, conveyed fee title by deed dated May 9, 1887 to the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway ("the Railway"). We also hold that the location of the railroad tracks, as constructed, controls as a monument. Although the legal description of the location of that monument varies from the legal description of the right of way in the May 9, 1887 deed, there was no abandonment that divested the Railway of its fee title interest in the disputed strip. Accordingly, we affirm the summary judgment quieting title in King County, a successor in interest to the Railway.

The facts are largely undisputed.1 Gerald and Kathryn Ray own lakefront property near the eastern shore of Lake Sammamish in King County, Washington. The Rays are successors in interest to property formerly owned by Bill Hilchkanum and Mary Hilchkanum, husband and wife. The Rays acquired their interest by virtue of conveyances following the Hilchkanums' May 9, 1887 deed that is the focus of our inquiry in this case.2 Likewise, King County is a successor in interest to the estate the Hilchkanums conveyed to the Railway by that deed.3

The basic dispute between the parties centers on their conflicting claims of ownership of the 100-foot-wide strip of land that the Hilchkanums conveyed in their May 9, 1887 deed to the Railway. The strip is adjacent to the property on which the Rays reside.

This strip of land is one segment of the East Lake Sammamish ("ELS") Corridor,4 which runs near the eastern shore of Lake Sammamish. For most of the last century, the ELS Corridor was known as "Northern Pacific Railroad Right of Way" because Northern Pacific acquired ownership from the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway.5 Burlington Northern and The Land Conservancy of Seattle were successors in interest to Northern Pacific to the strip and predecessors in interest to King County for that property.6

In 1998, the County purchased roughly 11 miles of the ELS Corridor from The Land Conservancy. The purchase included the property the Hilchkanums conveyed in their May 1887 deed.7

The Rays argue that the May 9, 1887 deed conveyed an easement only to the Railway, not fee title. They also claim that the subsequent construction of the railway line in early 1888 in a location that varied from the legal description of the right of way set forth in the May 1887 deed constituted an abandonment of the estate conveyed in the deed. For these reasons, they claim title to the strip of land vests in them.

King County disputes the Rays' claim to ownership of the strip. The County maintains that the May 9, 1887 deed, properly construed, conveyed to the Railway an estate in fee title to the strip of land. The County further maintains that subsequent construction of the railway line between January and April 18888 established a monument as the centerline of the 100-foot strip described in the deed. Finally, the County argues that it acquired fee title to that 100-foot wide strip of land as a successor in interest to the Railway, the grantee under the May 1887 deed.

The Rays commenced this quiet title action to enforce their ownership claim, and King County counterclaimed to enforce its position. On cross motions for summary judgment, the trial court quieted title in the County, confirming that the May 1887 deed conveyed fee title, not an easement. The trial court further decided that the railroad line, as built, established the monument defining the property the original grantors intended to convey by virtue of the May 1887 deed.

The Rays appeal.

CONVEYANCE: FEE SIMPLE TITLE OR EASEMENT?

Our review of the grant of summary judgment below is governed by the usual standards: whether there are genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.9 A party seeking to quiet title "must succeed on the strength of his or her own title, not on the weakness of the other party's title."10 Where a deed conveys a right of way to a railroad, the conveyance may be in fee simple or may be an easement only.11 The interpretation of such a deed is a mixed question of fact and law.12 It is a factual question to determine the intent of the parties.13 Courts must then apply the rules of law to determine the legal consequences of that intent.14 Whether a conveyance is one of fee title or an easement is a conclusion of law as to the effect of a deed.15

The Hilchkanum deed is entirely handwritten, and states in relevant part:

Bill Hilchkanum and wife ) to ) Right of Way Deed S.L.S. and E.R.Y. Co. )

In consideration of the benefits and advantages to accrue to us from the location construction and operation of the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway in the County of King, in Washington territory, we do hereby donate grant and convey unto said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company a right of way one hundred (100) feet in width through our lands in said County described as follows to-wit

Lots one (1) two (2) and three (3) in section six (6) township 24 North of range six (6) East.

Such right of way strip to be fifty (50) feet in width on each side of the center line of the railway track as located across our said lands by the Engineer of said railway company which location is described as follows to-wit.

Commencing at a point 410 feet West from North East corner of Section six (6) township 24 N R 6 East and running thence on a one (1) degree curve to the left for 753 3/10 feet thence South 16 degrees and 34 minutes West 774 2/10 feet thence with a 3 degree curve to the right for 700 feet thence with an 8 degree curve to the right for 260 4/10 feet thence South 58 degrees and 24 minutes West 259 6/10 feet thence with an 8° curve to the left for 564 4/10 feet thence South 13° 15' W 341 4/10 feet thence with a 6° curve to the right for 383 3/10 feet thence S 36° 15 W 150 feet to South boundary of lot 3 of said Sec 6 which point is 1320 feet North and 2170 feet west from SE corner of said Sec 6

And the said Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway Company shall have the right to go upon the land adjacent to said line for a distance of two hundred (200) feet on each side thereof and cut down all trees dangerous to the operation of said road.

To have and to hold the said premises with the appurtenances unto the said party of the second part and to its successors and assigns forever.

In witness whereof the parties of the first part have hereunto put their hands and seals this 9th day of May AD 1887

Signed Sealed and delivered

in presence of Bill (his X mark) Hilchkanum =seal= BJ Tallman DJ Denny Mary (her X mark) Hilchkanum =seal= [16] In Brown v. State, our supreme court most recently articulated the principles governing resolution of the mixed questions of fact and law before us. There, the court resolved a dispute between property owners abutting the railroad right of way, who claimed reversionary interests in it, and the State, which purchased the right of way from a successor in interest to the original grantees of the strip under some 37 deeds. The deeds, which were dated between 1906 and 1910,17 were on preprinted forms with blank lines containing handwritten descriptions of the specific properties conveyed.18 The court ultimately held that the deeds conveyed fee simple title because they were "in statutory warranty form, expressly convey fee simple title, and contain no express or clear limitation or qualification otherwise."19

The court began its analysis by noting that the decisions dealing with conveyancing of rights of way to railroads in various jurisdictions "are in considerable disarray" and "turn on a case-by-case examination of each deed."20 In Washington, the general rule is that when construing a deed, "the intent of the parties is of paramount importance and the court's duty to ascertain and enforce."21 The court then identified the following factors for determining intent:

(1) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land, and did not contain additional language relating to the use or purpose to which the land was to be put, or in other ways limiting the estate conveyed; (2) whether the deed conveyed a strip of land and limited its use to a specific purpose; (3) whether the deed conveyed a right of way over a tract of land, rather than a strip thereof; (4) whether the deed granted only the privilege of constructing, operating, or maintaining a railroad over the land; (5) whether the deed contained a clause providing that if the railroad ceased to operate, the land conveyed would revert to the grantor; (6) whether the consideration expressed was substantial or nominal; and (7) whether the conveyance did or did not contain a habendum clause, and many other considerations suggested by the language of the particular deed. In addition to the language of the deed, we will also look at the circumstances surrounding the deed's execution and the subsequent conduct of the parties.[22]

The court also noted the special significance that has been accorded the term "right of way" in Washington deeds:

In Roeder, for example, one of the deeds provided, in part, the grantor: "conveys and warrants unto Bellingham and Northern Railway Company ... for all railroad and other right
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