Roeder Co. v. Burlington Northern, Inc.
| Decision Date | 27 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 51136-5,51196-9,s. 51136-5 |
| Citation | 716 P.2d 855,105 Wn.2d 567 |
| Parties | The ROEDER COMPANY, Respondent, v. BURLINGTON NORTHERN, INC., a Delaware corporation, et al., Defendants, Clarence Harper and Jane Doe Harper, individually and the marital community composed thereof; Ernest Paul Davis and Celia Irene Davis, individually and the marital community composed thereof, Appellants. The ROEDER COMPANY, Respondent, v. Howard Burton PORTER and Dolores M. Porter, his wife, and the marital community composed thereof; William E. Brandt and Marie J. Brandt, his wife, and the marital community composed thereof; Melvin Davidson and Barbara Davidson, his wife, and the marital community composed thereof; Frank C. Brooks and Nancy Brooks, his wife, and the marital community composed thereof; Bellingham Cold Storage Development Company, a Washington corporation, Appellants, Pioneer National Title Insurance Company, a Washington corporation, et al., Defendants. En Banc |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Robert Burks, Sam W. Peach, Bellingham, for appellants Porter, et al.
Davis, Wright, Todd, Riese & Jones, Douglas C. Ross, Seattle, for respondent.
At issue in this case is whether title to abandoned railroad rights of way in the Bellingham area should be quieted in the successor of the original grantor of the rights of way or in the owners of the property abutting the rights of way.
This case concerns two of the seven lawsuits brought by the Roeder Company (Roeder) to quiet title to abandoned railroad rights of way. 1 These suits involved seven separate deeds by a common grantor, Bellingham Bay Improvement Company (the Improvement Company) to various railroads between 1890 and 1914. We granted direct review of two of the seven cases, referred to herein as Porter and Harper, and consolidated them on appeal. The conveyances at issue in each case are described below.
The Porter appellants claim ownership of a 50-foot right of way based on a series of conveyances beginning in 1914.
In a deed recorded on September 4, 1914, the Improvement Company by statutory warranty deed conveyed a 50-foot-wide strip of property to the Bellingham and Northern Railway (Bellingham Northern). The granting clause of the deed states that the Improvement Company, in consideration of ten dollars, "conveys and warrants unto Bellingham and Northern Railway Company ... for all railroad and other right of way purposes, certain tracts and parcels of land situate in the City of Bellingham ..." The deed proceeds to describe parcel (a) (title to which is not at issue here) and parcel (b), which is the railroad right of way in dispute
Bellingham Northern subsequently conveyed its interest in the right of way to the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad (the Milwaukee Road). The Milwaukee Road ceased operations over this property sometime before January 1, 1976, and conveyed portions of the right of way by separate quitclaim deeds to appellants Porter, Davidson, Brandt and Bellingham Cold Storage Development Company (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Porter").
In addition to the quitclaim deeds, Porter owns fee title to property adjoining the abandoned right of way which was acquired from the Improvement Company or its successors. The deeds conveying these adjoining parcels either contain metes and bounds descriptions of the land conveyed or mention the railroad right of way as a boundary. Porter claims title to the right of way both by virtue of the quitclaim deeds and its abutting landowner status.
Roeder's claim to the abandoned right of way arises from a series of conveyances made in connection with the Improvement Company's dissolution. These conveyances were made beginning on December 18, 1933, when the Improvement Company granted to Bellingham Securities Syndicate, Inc., (Bellingham Securities) certain land located in Whatcom County. The deed describes a number of parcels of land with specificity, then adds:
together with any and all other real property of every kind and nature and wheresoever situate, in which the Roeder argues that this "catchall" clause conveyed the railroad right of way to its predecessor, Bellingham Securities. Subsequent deeds with similar clauses then conveyed Bellingham Securities' interest in the right of way to Roeder.
first party has at this time or may hereafter acquire any interest.
Roeder filed a quiet title action against Porter on January 20, 1984. Following a bench trial, the trial court held that the 1914 deed from the Improvement Company to Bellingham Northern conveyed an easement, not a fee, and that the Improvement Company thus retained a fee simple interest in the right of way property. The trial court also held that Roeder succeeded to the Improvement Company's fee interest through the catch-all clauses which were adequate to convey the fee in the right of way from the Improvement Company to Bellingham Securities and on to Roeder. Finally, the trial court concluded that Porter's ownership of property adjoining the right of way gave it no interest in the abandoned right of way. The court then quieted title to the 50-foot right of way in Roeder.
On October 1, 1899, the Improvement Company conveyed to the Bellingham Bay & British Columbia Railroad (the B.C. Railroad) a railroad easement over a 30-foot-wide strip of land in Bellingham. Roeder claims title to this right of way through the same chain of title related above.
Appellants Harper and Davis claim an interest in the right of way based on their ownership of abutting property. Harper's predecessor obtained land abutting the right of way by a 1904 deed that described the Harper property as "lying Southeast of the right-of-way of the Bellingham Bay and Eastern Railroad Company ... [and] being bounded ... by the Southeast line of the right-of-way of the Bellingham Bay and Eastern Railroad Company ..." The Davises' claim is based solely on their ownership of abutting property. Neither the location of the Davises' property nor the deeds through which they acquired their property Roeder filed suit against the appellants Harper and Davis on October 4, 1983. The trial court ruled that neither Harper nor Davis acquired any interest in the right of way by virtue of their status as adjoining property owners and quieted title to the 30-foot right of way in Roeder.
are included in the record before us.
This appeal presents three issues.
ISSUE ONE. Did the Improvement Company convey an easement or fee simple title to Bellingham Northern?
ISSUE TWO. Is a "catchall" description of a grantor's land in a deed legally sufficient to convey title to that land?
ISSUE THREE. Do abutting property owners become owners to the center line of a railroad right of way when the right of way is abandoned?
ISSUE ONE.
CONCLUSION. Since the granting clause of the Improvement Company's deed declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad, the deed passes an easement, not a fee.
The conveyance of a right of way to a railroad may be in fee simple or only an easement. 2 Where only an easement for a right of way is concerned, and its use for such purpose ceases, the land is discharged of the burden of the easement and the right to possession reverts to the original landowner or to that landowner's successors in interest; the right to possession does not go to grantees and successors in interest of the railroad company. 3
The interpretation of a right of way deed is a mixed question of fact and law. 4 Determining the parties' intent is a factual question and the courts must look to the entire document in order to ascertain such intent. 5
In Veach v. Culp, 92 Wash.2d 570, 599 P.2d 526 (1979), the granting and habendum clauses of the deed contained absolute grants of land to the railroad. There, the parties had described the land being conveyed as "a right-of-way 100 feet wide, being 50 feet on each side of the center line of the railroad." 6 The court observed that "[l]anguage like this has been found to create an easement, not a fee simple estate." 7 The court then referred to the following rule from Morsbach v. Thurston County, 152 Wash. 562, 278 P. 686 (1929), as clarified in Swan v. O'Leary, 37 Wash.2d 533, 537, 225 P.2d 199 (1950):
[I]t is clear that we adopted the rule that when the granting clause of a deed declares the purpose of the grant to be a right of way for a railroad the deed passes an easement only, and not a fee with a restricted use, even though the deed is in the usual form to convey a fee title.
Veach, 92 Wash. at 574, 599 P.2d 526.
The deed in the Porter case likewise stated in its granting clause that the Improvement Company conveyed to Bellingham Northern "for all railroad and other right-of-way purposes", a parcel of land 50 feet wide. Under the rule enunciated in Morsbach, Swan and Veach, and absent persuasive evidence of intent to the contrary, it thus appears that the 50-foot strip was an easement. 8
Porter maintains, however, that if the entire deed is examined as Veach requires, the conveyance of a fee is evident.
Examining the entire deed, we note that while it contains no habendum clause, its final paragraph reserves to the grantor the right to use the land being conveyed in certain designated ways so long as such uses do not interfere with the railroad. In the early case of Reichenbach v. Washington Short Line Ry., 10 Wash. 357, 360, 38 P. 1126 (1894), this court held that a deed with similar provisions conveyed an easement only. The deed in Reichenbach conveyed a right of way to be used for a railroad and stated that the right of way was not to be fenced and that the grantors retained the right to cross and recross it at will. These provisions were found to be inconsistent with the intention to grant a fee and consistent with the grant of only an...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Kershaw Sunnyside Ranches, Inc. v. Yakima Interurban Lines Ass'n
......Level 3 Communications, LLC, a Delaware Limited Liability Company, Appellant, . The Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railway Company, a Delaware Company, Respondent. . No. 21289-1-III. . Court ... We have given special significance to the words "right of way" in railroad deeds. In Roeder [ Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 105 Wash.2d 567, 716 P.2d 855 (1986) ], for example, one of the ......
-
Kershaw Sunnyside Ranches, Inc. v. Yakima Interurban Lines Association, No. 21289-1-III (WA 5/25/2004), 21289-1-III
...only easements: We have given special significance to the words `right of way' in railroad deeds. In Roeder {Co. v. Burlington N., Inc., 105 Wn.2d 567, 716 P.2d 855 (1986)}, for example, one of the deeds provided, in part, the grantor: `conveys and warrants unto Bellingham and Northern Rail......
-
Ray v. King County
......For most of the last century, the ELS Corridor was known as "Northern Pacific Railroad Right of Way" because Northern Pacific acquired ownership from the Seattle Lake Shore and Eastern Railway. 5 Burlington Northern and The Land Conservancy of Seattle were successors in interest ... In Roeder, for example, one of the deeds provided, in part, the grantor: "conveys ... rely on a recent Division III case of this court, Hanson Industries, Inc. v. Spokane County. 72 In Hanson, the court held that a series of 1903 ......
-
Lucier v. United States, 16-865L
......In 1970, the Northern Pacific Railway Company merged with the Great Northern Railway Company and the Chicago Burlington and Quincy Railroad Company and became the Burlington Northern Railroad ...Cromartie , 526 U.S. 541, 549 (1999); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. .... . ." Roeder Co. v. Burlington N., Inc. , 716 P.2d 855, 859 (Wash.), recons. denied ......