Ray v. Paul
| Citation | 563 N.W.2d 635 |
| Decision Date | 28 March 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-0736,96-0736 |
| Parties | Lolita RAY, Individually and as Next Friend and Mother of Kyle Ray, a Minor, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Mitchell H. PAUL, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | Iowa Court of Appeals |
James M. Powers and Mark H. Rettig of Hines, Pence, Day & Powers, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant.
Carole J. Anderson and Robert V.P. Waterman of Lane & Waterman, Davenport, for appellee.
Heard by CADY, P.J., and HUITINK and VOGEL, JJ.
Plaintiff Lolita Ray appeals from an adverse jury verdict and resulting judgment dismissing the medical malpractice claim she brought against defendant Dr. Mitchell R. Paul on behalf of her child Kyle Ray. We affirm.
Ray's three-year-old child Kyle was injured when he was hit by a truck in Fort Madison on May 20, 1991. Dr. Paul treated Kyle's broken leg by placing him in a body cast. When the cast was subsequently removed, a number of skin ulcerations were discovered on Kyle's body, necessitating additional treatment.
Because the truck driver was at fault and uninsured, Ray turned to her auto insurer, Westfield Insurance Co., for coverage to pay the damages resulting from the accident. Westfield paid Ray $75,000 under the uninsured motorist provisions of Ray's policy. In exchange for receipt of these benefits, Ray was required to sign a release. The terms of the release provided:
Claimant for herself and insured release ... [the] Insurance Company from any and all liability for claims ... based on damages ... including present and future damages for all known or unknown claims for the bodily injury or personal injuries, loss of services and society, medical expenses, emotional trauma and death and consequences thereof....
After settling with Westfield, Ray initiated this action seeking damages from Dr. Paul for Kyle's injuries allegedly caused by Dr. Paul's medical negligence. Paul eventually moved for summary judgment citing the terms of the foregoing release. Paul argued that Ray's settlement and release included compensation for all damages resulting from the May 20, 1991, accident, including those caused by negligent medical treatment. The district court denied Paul's motion finding disputed issues of fact concerning the intent of the parties to the release and whether Ray and her child received full compensation for their respective damages.
Prior to trial, Ray filed a motion in limine seeking exclusion of any evidence or reference to her settlement with Westfield or the terms of the release she signed. She argued that this evidence was inadmissible under the collateral source rule excluding evidence of payments received from a third party. The district court denied Ray's motion. Ray's application for interlocutory appeal was denied. Ray introduced the settlement and release as part of her case and made no objection to the admission of this evidence at trial.
During jury selection, two jurors indicated that Dr. Paul's professional status would make it difficult for them to decide the case impartially. The first of these jurors was excused without comment. When the second juror expressed this concern, the court asked him if his concerns were sincere or whether he was simply seeking to avoid service. Although the juror was excused, he was instructed to remain in the courtroom so the court could speak with him following completion of jury selection.
After the case was submitted to the jury, the court received a note from the jury foreman. In the note the foreman informed the court that one of the jurors expressed an opinion concerning Dr. Paul's professional reputation and also told other jurors that the juror's son had been successfully treated by Dr. Paul. The court denied Ray's motion for a mistrial and, following consultation with counsel, this juror was excused. The jury was instructed to disregard his remarks and rely on the evidence presented at trial.
The special verdict form returned by the jury included the jury's negative answer to an interrogatory asking, "Was Dr. Mitchell H. Paul negligent?" Ray's motion for a new trial was denied and judgment was entered dismissing her claims.
On appeal, Ray contends that evidence of her settlement with Westfield was inadmissible and it was error for the court to conclude otherwise. She also argues that she is entitled to a new trial based on jury misconduct and prejudicial remarks made by the district court to the second juror excused during voir dire.
Our review in this law action is for errors at law. Iowa R.App. P. 4.
We initially consider Paul's argument that Ray has either waived any objection to the admission of this evidence or failed to preserve error for appellate review. He cites Ray's election to introduce this evidence as part of her case and her failure to renew at trial the objection raised in her motion in limine.
The primary purpose of a motion in limine is to preclude reference to potentially prejudicial evidence prior to the trial court's definitive ruling on its admissibility. State v. Davis, 240 N.W.2d 662, 663 (Iowa 1976). Generally, any error based on the trial court's disposition of a motion in limine is not preserved unless the record includes a timely objection when the challenged evidence is offered at trial. Id. The resolution of a preservation of error issue is "not controlled by the title of the motion or its prayer." State v. O'Connell, 275 N.W.2d 197, 202 (Iowa 1979). Our concern is "what the ruling of the trial court does or purports to do." Id. A ruling limited to protection from prejudicial references must be distinguished from a ruling on the admissibility of the challenged evidence. State v. Miller, 229 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Iowa 1975). If the trial court's ruling is dispositive on the issue of admissibility, it is considered final for purposes of appeal and no further objection is necessary. Id.
In this case the district court's ruling on Ray's motion provided:
I'm going to ... grant the relief requested by the defendant and allow the issue of the prior settlement and the amount of the settlement to be issues for the jury to determine.
We hold this language does more than protect against prejudicial references. It is a definitive ruling admitting evidence of Ray's settlement and release of her uninsured motorist claim. No additional trial objections were necessary to preserve this issue for appeal.
Paul's waiver argument fails for the same reason. Because the trial court's ruling on admissibility was dispositive, Ray did not waive any resulting error by electing for strategic reasons to introduce this evidence as a part of her case. See State v. Jones, 271 N.W.2d 761, 765 (Iowa 1978) ().
The resolution of the preservation of error and waiver issues necessitates consideration of the merits of Ray's challenge to the admission of the terms of the settlement and release of her uninsured motorist claim against Westfield. As noted earlier, Ray contends this evidence was excludable under the collateral source rule. We disagree.
The collateral source rule is a common law principle that prohibits reduction of plaintiff's damages by sums the plaintiff has received from another or collateral source. See Groesbeck v. Napier, 275 N.W.2d 388, 392 (Iowa 1979). It also serves as a common law rule of evidence barring admission of evidence that a plaintiff has received payment from a collateral source. See, e.g., Stewart v. Madison, 278 N.W.2d 284, 293-94 (Iowa 1979). The applicability of the collateral source rule has been reduced by the adoption of legislation allowing admission of collateral source evidence. See Iowa Code §§ 668.14(1) 1 and 147.136 (1995)2. The parties however, agree that these sections are not relevant and the admission of the settlement and release evidence was not urged on this basis.
To the extent that the collateral source rule remains viable, its application is limited to those cases wherein the underlying purpose of the rule is advanced. We must accordingly determine if the purpose of the rule is served by its application in this case.
In Smith v. Conn, 163 N.W.2d 407 (Iowa 1968), the Iowa Supreme Court adopted a rule that:
... allows a recovery by an injured party in an action against the treating physician for malpractice even though the patient has settled his claim against the original tort-feasor. These jurisdictions [adopting this rule] submit to...
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