Ray v. State
Decision Date | 02 April 2020 |
Docket Number | A18A0333 |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Parties | RAY v. The STATE. |
Grisham & Poole, Scott Thomas Poole ; Speights Law, Amanda Gaddis Speights, Benjamin James Huntington, for Appellant.
Shannon Glover Wallace, District Attorney, Lara A. Snow, for Appellee.
Phipps, Senior Appellate Judge.
This is the second appearance of this criminal matter before this Court. In Ray v. State , 345 Ga. App. 522, 812 S.E.2d 97 (2018) (" Ray I "), we rejected most of appellant James Roy Ray's assertions of error concerning his conviction for rape and sexual battery, but vacated the order denying his motion for new trial and remanded for further proceedings as to whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to assert a plea in bar and whether the trial court erred in excluding evidence concerning the victim's aunt's false accusations of sexual misconduct in a prior matter. Id. at 528-530 (3) (f), (4), 812 S.E.2d 97. On the second of these issues, the Supreme Court of Georgia vacated our opinion and remanded to this Court with instruction to "reconsider [our] decision in the light of" State v. Burns , 306 Ga. 117, 829 S.E.2d 367 (2019), which overruled the precedent on which we had relied. See Burns , 306 Ga. at 121 (2), 829 S.E.2d 367 ( ). State v. Ray (Case No. S18C1201) (decided August 19, 2019) (by order). On remand, we apply Burns and remand the case to the trial court with direction that it consider both the merits of Ray's remaining ineffective assistance claim and whether the evidence of the victim's aunt's false accusations is admissible under OCGA § 24-4-403 ("Rule 403").
Our previous opinion laid out the relevant facts as follows:
345 Ga. App. at 522-523, 812 S.E.2d 97.
Some weeks before trial, the State filed a motion to exclude "any testimony of alleged prior false allegations [by the victim] of sexual abuse" absent a determination that the testimony was relevant under OCGA § 24-1-104 and a "reasonable probability" that the prior allegations were false. See, e.g., Kelley v. State , 233 Ga. App. 244, 251 (5), 503 S.E.2d 881 (1998) ( )(requiring a showing of "reasonable probability" that prior allegations of sexual abuse were false in order for evidence of those allegations to be admissible). A few days before trial, the State moved (more specifically) to exclude testimony concerning an accusation made in the late 1990s by a three-year-old child against her father. The accusation was allegedly made in the presence of the deceased aunt of the victim in the case-in-chief.
At the pretrial hearing on the State's motion, the State argued that Ray should be barred from presenting testimony concerning the prior accusation, which the State saw as bolstering the defense's claim that the deceased aunt had coached the victim in this case. The defense responded with a proffer of testimony from the aunt's daughter showing that the aunt and other members of the victim's family had threatened and forced the daughter to make a false report that the daughter herself had been raped. After getting permission to treat the aunt's daughter as a hostile witness, the defense attempted to elicit testimony about this false report. The aunt's daughter admitted that she had been persuaded to report a rape, but refused to discredit her dead mother in any further detail. At the conclusion of the proffer, the trial court held that testimony concerning the aunt's false reports was inadmissible, and filed orders explaining that such testimony was not "relevant" or "[ ]admissible absent a further order of the Court."
Our opinion in Ray I recounts the proceedings that followed:
(Emphasis in original.) Ray I , 345 Ga. App. at 524 (1), 529 (4), 812 S.E.2d 97. In Ray I , we rejected most of Ray's claims of error, but vacated his conviction and remanded for further proceedings as to (1) his ineffectiveness claim concerning trial counsel's failure to assert a plea in bar under Barker v. Wingo , 407 U. S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972) ; and (2) the exclusion of evidence of the deceased aunt's prior false reports of sexual abuse. 345 Ga. App. at 528-529 (3) (f), (4), 812 S.E.2d 97. We now address the issue identified by our Supreme Court: whether evidence of the deceased aunt's prior false reports, previously deemed inadmissible without a determination of a "reasonable probability" of their falsity, should be admissible under Rule 403.
On this issue, the State's motions in limine and the trial court's orders granting the motions cite only OCGA § 24-1-104, which provides in relevant part:
(Emphasis supplied.) On its face, the statute concerns only "preliminary" determinations of relevance, and "shall not limit the right of a party to introduce before the jury evidence relevant to weight or credibility." OCGA § 24-1-104 (a), (e).
As we noted in our prior opinion, it may well be that testimony showing that the victim's deceased aunt, who reported the crimes at issue, had previously made false claims of sexual abuse "would be relevant to the veracity of the allegations here." Ray I , 345 Ga. App. at 529 (4), 812 S.E.2d 97. In any event, however, in order to make a definitive determination of whether such testimony was relevant, the trial court was obligated to consider whether the probative value of the evidence was "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury or by considerations of undue delay, waste of...
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Vallejo v. State
...remains good law. See id. at 119-126 (2)-(3), 829 S.E.2d 367.3 The dissent's reliance on our decision in Ray v. State , 356 Ga. App. 266, 841 S.E.2d 477 (2020) (" Ray III "), also is misplaced. In Ray v. State , 345 Ga. App. 522, 529 (4), 812 S.E.2d 97 (2018) (" Ray I "), overruled in part ......