Raymond v. Robinson

• Decision Date: 12 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 25248-1-II.,25248-1-II.
• Citation: 104 Wn. App. 627,104 Wash. App. 627,15 P.3d 697
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: Richard RAYMOND, a single person, Appellant, v. Jack ROBINSON and Susan Robinson, husband and wife, d/b/a R.V. Interiors and/or R.V. Interiors, Inc., and R.V. Interiors, Inc., a foreign corporation, Respondents.

15 P.3d 697

104 Wn. App. 627

104 Wash. App. 627

Richard RAYMOND, a single person, Appellant, v. Jack ROBINSON and Susan Robinson, husband and wife, d/b/a R.V. Interiors and/or R.V. Interiors, Inc., and R.V. Interiors, Inc., a foreign corporation, Respondents.

No. 25248-1-II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

January 12, 2001.

Timothy R. Gosselin, Burgess Fitzer Leighton, Tacoma, for Respondents.

Thomas Joseph West, Krilich La Porte West, Tacoma; Mellani R Highes, Krilich La Porte West & Lockner Ps, Olympia, for Appellant.

SEINFELD, J.

Richard Raymond, a Washington resident, appeals the trial court's dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction of his suit against Jack and Susan Robinson, doing business as R.V. Interiors (RVI). Finding jurisdiction under the long-arm statute, RCW 4.28.185, we reverse.

FACTS

The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. RVI is an Arizona business that installs recreational vehicle accessories. RVI does not have any offices or agents in Washington State.

RVI advertises in four national magazines that reach this state. Between 1994 and 1999, RVI sold approximately 96 slide-out units, 9 to Washington residents.¹ During this same period, approximately 150 Washington residents contacted RVI, although not all of these contacts resulted in a sale. It is unclear from the record exactly how many of these sales or contacts resulted from RVI's advertisements.

All the slide-out units that RVI sold in Washington were manufactured in Arizona, and RVI performs all of its installations and most of its repairs and adjustments in Arizona. But occasionally RVI authorizes warranty repair work in the customer's home state.

Raymond, a Washington resident, contacted RVI after seeing one of its advertisements in a national magazine. After receiving brochures and a list of previous Washington customers from RVI and discussing terms by telephone and by letter, Raymond purchased a slide-out unit from RVI. Raymond drove his recreational vehicle (RV) to Arizona where RVI installed the slide-out. The slide-out came with a one-year limited warranty, which required the performance of all warranty work in Arizona.

Shortly after RVI installed the slide-out, Raymond began to experience problems with it. Raymond took his RV to Arizona for repairs once. Later, RVI authorized additional repairs and adjustments in Washington and South Dakota and sent a technician from Arizona to Washington to address the problems. RVI also orally agreed to extend Raymond's warranty. Later RVI determined that the slide-out was operating properly and refused to pay for any further repairs or adjustments.

Raymond sued RVI, alleging breach of written or oral agreements; negligent or unworkmanlike manufacture, installation, and repair; breach of express or implied warranty; and violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act. RVI moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted RVI's motion.

I. Standard of Review and Burden of Proof

When the underlying facts are undisputed, we review a trial court's dismissal order for lack of personal jurisdiction de novo. Lewis v. Bours, 119 Wash.2d 667, 669, 835 P.2d 221 (1992); Precision Lab. Plastics, Inc. v. Micro Test, Inc., 96 Wash.App. 721, 725, 96 Wash.App. 1007, 981 P.2d 454 (1999); MBM Fisheries, Inc. v. Bollinger Mach. Shop & Shipyard, Inc., 60 Wash.App. 414, 418, 804 P.2d 627 (1991). The plaintiff bears the burden of making a prima facie showing of jurisdiction. Precision Laboratory,96 Wash.App. at 725,96 Wash.App. 1007, 981 P.2d 454; MBM Fisheries, 60 Wash.App. at 418,804 P.2d 627. On appeal, we consider the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint as true. Precision Laboratory,96 Wash.App. at 725,96 Wash.App. 1007,981 P.2d 454; MBM Fisheries, 60 Wash.App. at 418,804 P.2d 627.

II. General Jurisdiction

General jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant is proper when the defendant's actions in the state are so substantial and continuous that justice allows the exercise of jurisdiction even for claims not arising from the defendant's contacts within the state. Precision Laboratory, 96 Wash.App. at 725, 96 Wash.App. 1007, 981 P.2d 454; Im Ex Trading Co. v. Raad, 92 Wash.App. 529, 534-35, 963 P.2d 952 (1998). RCW 4.28.080(10) authorizes general jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant if the defendant is transacting substantial and continuous business within the state of such character as to give rise to a legal obligation. Crose v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 88 Wash.2d 50, 54, 558 P.2d 764 (1977); Hartley v. Am. Contract Bridge League, 61 Wash.App. 600, 605, 812 P.2d 109 (1991); MBM Fisheries, 60 Wash.App. at 418, 804 P.2d 627; Hein v. Taco Bell, Inc., 60 Wash. App. 325, 330, 803 P.2d 329 (1991).

RVI's contacts with Washington consist of the following: (1) placing advertisements in four national magazines that reach Washington consumers; (2) sending brochures and informational materials or otherwise contacting approximately 150 Washington consumers, at least in part due to its national advertising; (3) negotiating terms with Washington consumers via phone and mail; (4) selling approximately 10 percent of its slide-out units to Washington consumers during a five-year period, at least in part due to its national advertising; (5) assembling a list of past customers residing in Washington and distributing this list to potential customers in Washington; (6) authorizing warranty repairs within Washington; (7) sending a technician to Washington to service Raymond's slide-out unit; and (8) orally extending Raymond's warranty while Raymond was in Washington.

Raymond asserts that these contacts are sufficient to establish that RVI has conducted substantial and continuous activities within this state, citing Hein and Hartley. In Hein, the court held that the defendant's contacts with Washington were sufficient to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over the defendant, Taco Bell. Taco Bell's contacts consisted of: (1) registering as a foreign corporation in Washington for 14 years, (2) operating 16 restaurants in the Seattle area and others throughout the state, (3) employing numerous Washington residents, and (4) purchasing supplies and selling goods within the state. The court also recognized that Taco Bell benefited from various state and local services, such as fire and police protection. Hein, 60 Wash.App. at 330-31, 803 P.2d 329.

Similarly, in Hartley, the court held that the defendant's contacts with Washington were sufficient to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction because the defendant, a bridge league: (1) published a magazine for its members, including several Washington residents; (2) collected fees from Washington residents for competitions held in Washington; (3) collected dues from members, including several Washington residents; (4) arranged bridge tournaments in Washington; (5) transported supplies and goods to these tournaments; (6) determined which Washington residents could participate in the tournaments; and (7) sold bridge-oriented goods to Washington residents. 61 Wash.App. at 606, 812 P.2d 109.

RVI distinguishes its activities from those in Hartley and Hein. It asserts that unlike the defendant in Hartley, it does not direct its advertising to particular Washington residents; it responds to inquiries from potential customers but does not participate in nor organize any events in Washington; it does not directly initiate contact with potential customers; and it does not buy, sell, or distribute products within the state. RVI also argues that, unlike the defendant in Hein, it is not a registered foreign corporation in Washington, it has no employees in the state, nor has it benefited from government services such as police and fire protection. RVI argues that its activities in Washington are more similar to those of the defendant in MBM Fisheries. In MBM Fisheries, the court held that the defendant's activities did not justify the exercise of general jurisdiction because the defendant's activities were isolated and minimal. 60 Wash.App. at 420,804 P.2d 627. The defendant's contacts or activities were limited to: (1) performing repair work in Louisiana on four vessels owned by Washington residents, including the plaintiff's, none of whom contacted the defendant because of its national advertising; (2) brokering the purchase of a barge located in Louisiana by a Louisiana client through a Washington broker; and (3) sending its vice-president and another employee to a trade show in Seattle. MBM Fisheries, 60 Wash.App. at 417-18,804 P.2d 627. Although the defendant had placed advertisements in four trade magazines, the court emphasized that none of the advertisements generated any business from Washington residents. MBM Fisheries, 60 Wash.App. at 420,804 P.2d 627.

RVI asserts that MBM Fisheries controls because it establishes that merely advertising in a forum state is an insufficient basis for establishing general jurisdiction. But the MBM Fisheries court simply recognized that the advertisements alone were insufficient to establish general jurisdiction, particularly because the advertisements did not generate any of the defendant's Washington business.

The cases that RVI and Raymond cite provide examples of situations where there clearly was or was not jurisdiction. The facts here fall between those two extremes: RVI had more contacts with Washington than the defendant in MBM Fisheries, but the cases that Raymond cites contain facts significantly more compelling than those here.

The facts of Banton v. Opryland U.S.A., Inc., 53 Wash.App. 409, 767 P.2d 584 (1989), overruled on other grounds, Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 113 Wash.2d 763, 783 P.2d 78 (1989),

appear more similar to those in this case. In Banton, the plaintiff injured himself while visiting the Grand Ole Opry House. Banton, 53 Wash.App. at 410,

767 P.2d 584. The plaintiff had visited Opryland in response to a...