Ready v. Itawamba Cnty.
| Docket Number | 1:20-cv-00160-GHD-DAS |
| Decision Date | 11 January 2022 |
| Parties | BOBBIE READY, as Mother and Next of Kin of JOEL ANTHONY DAVIS, JR., Deceased, and on Behalf of the Heirs and Wrongful Death Beneficiaries of JOEL ANTHONY DAVIS, JR., Deceased PLAINTIFFS v. ITAWAMBA COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI; SHERIFF CHRIS DICKINSON; and DEPUTY FRED HECKART DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
Presently before the Court is the Defendants' motion for summary judgment [41]. In the Complaint, the Plaintiffs assert federal and state law claims against the Defendants related to the death of the Decedent Joel Anthony Davis. Upon due consideration, the Court finds that the motion should be granted and the Plaintiffs' claims dismissed.
On August 21, 2019, at approximately 4:00 p.m. during dry and clear weather conditions, the Decedent was traveling by motorcycle on Liberty Road/New Chapel Road in rural Itawamba County [Complaint, Doc. 1, at ¶ 9]. The Defendant Itawamba County Deputy Sheriff Heckart, on-duty and traveling along the same road, reported that he observed that the Decedent was driving the motorcycle on the wrong side of the road at a very high rate of speed [1, at ¶¶ 10-11]. Heckart initiated a pursuit of the Decedent, using his blue lights and siren in an attempt to pull over the Decedent [1 at ¶ 11]. The Decedent continued to drive at a high rate of speed and failed to properly stop during a pursuit of some eight miles along rural country roads [1, at ¶ 11]. The Decedent ultimately lost control of the motorcycle and crashed, whereupon he was thrown from the motorcycle [Doc 41-3 at p. 25; Doc. 41-4]. The Decedent was provided on-scene medical care and was evacuated via helicopter from the accident scene to North Mississippi Medical Center, where he died five hours later [Doc. 43-4]. A forensic toxicology report indicated that the Decedent had, among other substances, methamphetamine and amphetamines in his bloodstream [Doc. 43-2]. This litigation followed.
The Plaintiffs bring this action against the three Defendants, asserting federal claims for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment against Defendants Heckart and Dickinson, for due process violations and failure to train under the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendants Itawamba County and Dickinson, for deliberate indifference to the Decedent's medical needs against Defendant Heckart, and for conspiracy to deny the Decedent of his civil rights against all three Defendants. The Plaintiffs further assert a state law survival claim and wrongful death claim against all three Defendants. The Defendants have now filed the presently pending motion seeking dismissal of the Plaintiffs' claims, arguing that the Plaintiffs' state law claims are barred by the Mississippi Tort Claims Act, that the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity regarding the Plaintiffs' federal claims against them, and that Defendant Itawamba County is not liable under the requisite standards regarding municipal liability.
The Court grants summary judgment only “if the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Weaver v. CCA Indus., Inc., 529 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2008). The rule “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a sufficient showing to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the Court of the basis for the motion and identifying those portions of the record the moving party believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. at 323. Under Rule 56(a), the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to “go beyond the pleadings and by . . . affidavits, or by the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' ” Id. at 324; Littlefield v. Forney Indep. Sch. Dist., 268 F.3d 275, 282 (5th Cir. 2001); Willis v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995). When the parties dispute the facts, the Court must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378 (2007) (internal citations omitted). “However, a nonmovant may not overcome the summary judgment standard with conclusional allegations, unsupported assertions, or presentation of only a scintilla of evidence.” McClure v. Boles, 490 Fed.Appx. 666, 667 (5th Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007)).
As for the Individual Defendants' assertion of qualified immunity, “qualified immunity serves to shield … government officials from civil liability for damages based upon the performance of discretionary functions if the official's acts were objectively reasonable in light of then clearly established law.” Thompson v. Upshur County, Texas, 245 F.3d 447, 456 (5th Cir. 2001); see Hyatt v. Thomas, 843 F.3d 172, 177 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Qualified immunity protects officers from suit unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right.”) (quoting Mace v. City of Palestine, Tex., 333 F.3d 621, 623 (5th Cir. 2003)). Qualified immunity calls for a bifurcated test in which the court must first determine (1) “whether the plaintiff has alleged a violation of a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct and, if so, (2) whether the defendant [official's] conduct was objectively unreasonable.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011); Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir. 1999). “Once a defendant asserts the qualified immunity defense, ‘[t]he plaintiff bears the burden of negating qualified immunity.'” Id. (quoting Brown v. Callahan, 623 F.3d 249, 253 (5th Cir. 2010)). “Despite this burden-shifting, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the non-movant plaintiff's favor.” Id.
Under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978) and its progeny, a municipality may only be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating a citizen's constitutional rights if “the governmental body itself ‘subjects' [that] person to a deprivation of rights or ‘causes' a person ‘to be subjected' to such deprivation.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011). Governmental entities are “responsible only for [their] own illegal acts” and are “not vicariously liable under § 1983 for [their] employees' actions.” Id. Thus, there is no respondeat superior liability under § 1983; rather, the key to municipal liability is demonstrating that a deprivation of a constitutional right was inflicted pursuant to an official policy or custom of the municipality in question. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The alleged unconstitutional conduct asserted “must be directly attributable to the municipality through some sort of official action or imprimatur.” Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001).
To establish constitutional liability under Monell, a plaintiff must therefore demonstrate (1) an official policy or custom, of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose “moving force” is that policy or custom. Rivera v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 349 F.3d 244, 247-249 (5th Cir. 2003). A “policy or custom” can be either (1) a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision that is officially adopted and promulgated by the municipality's lawmaking officers or by an official to whom the lawmakers have delegated policy-making authority; or (2) a persistent, widespread practice of city officials or employees, which, although not authorized by officially adopted and promulgated policy, is so common and well settled as to constitute a custom that fairly represents municipal policy. McGregory v. City of Jackson, 335 Fed.Appx. 446, 448-449 (5th Cir. 2009); Crawford v. Desoto Cty. Sheriff's Dep't, No. 3:19CV013-MPM-RP, 2020 WL 55611, at *5 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 6, 2020).
The Plaintiffs have asserted federal claims against the Individual Defendants - for excessive force against both of them, for failure to train against Sheriff Dickinson, and for deliberate indifference to the Decedent's medical needs against Defendant Heckart. Both individual Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity regarding the Plaintiff's federal claims against them.
As noted above, qualified immunity shields state officials from suit so long as the official's complained-of conduct did not violate a clearly established statutory or constitutional right that a reasonable official would have known violated the law. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011). The Plaintiff bears the burden of negating a defendant's invocation of qualified immunity. Howell v. Town of Ball, 827 F.3d 515, 525 (5th Cir. 2016). In addition, it is axiomatic that, in order to state a claim against an individual government official defendant, a Plaintiff “must plead that each Government-official defendant through the...
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