Reagan v. People
| Decision Date | 03 January 1911 |
| Citation | 49 Colo. 316,112 P. 785 |
| Parties | REAGAN v. PEOPLE. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Error to District Court, City and County of Denver; Carlton M Bliss, Judge.
Daniel Reagan was convicted of murder, and he brings error. Affirmed.
J. K. P. McCallum, for plaintiff in error.
John T Barnett, Atty. Gen. (George H. Thorne, of counsel), for the People.
Plaintiff in error, defendant below, was convicted of murder of the first degree. The jury fixed the penalty at imprisonment in the penitentiary, at hard labor, for life. From a sentence accordingly, the defendant has brought the case here for review on error.
In his opening statement the district attorney detailed, in substance, the contents of signed statements of the defendant purporting to be a confession of the part he took in the commission of the crime for which he was on trial. Counsel for defendant interposed an objection to these statements, which was overruled. Later, these statements over the objection of the defendant, were admitted in evidence. Upon these rulings of the court two errors are assigned. The first is based upon the proposition that it is error to permit the district attorney to make statements of alleged facts in opening the case on behalf of the prosecution which he is precluded from proving; and, second, that the confessions were inadmissible for the reason that they were not voluntary. We shall consider the second first, for the reason that if the confessions were properly admitted to evidence, then, of course, it was not error to permit the district attorney to refer to them, or to give the substance of their contents in his opening statement to the jury.
Extrajudicial statements or confessions of one on trial for the commission of a crime must be voluntary; otherwise, they are not admissible against him. This rule is so well recognized, and the reasons therefore so well understood, that a discussion of the proposition or citation of authorities is not necessary. Many cases have decided the question of when statements were to be regarded as voluntary or involuntary, and conclusions, pro and con, reached from the circumstances under which the statement or confession was made or secured. In all cases where the question is material, the inquiry must be, Was the statement voluntary? For the purpose of ascertaining this fact, no inflexible rule can be promulgated. It must be determined from the facts and circumstances relating to how the confession was made or obtained. In order, then, to determine the vital question involved, it becomes necessary to consider the testimony bearing on the circumstances under which the defendant made the statements connecting him with the murder for which he was convicted, prefaced by a brief history of the murder and the theory of the prosecution with respect to the part the defendant took in the commission of the crime.
John Bronk, the victim of the homicide, was an old man who lived in a shack on the banks of Cherry creek, in the city of Denver. The ground in the near vicinity of his place was used for dumping refuse. Bronk kept a few chickens by which means he supported himself and accumulated some money, which he appears to have secreted at his house or carried on his person. The defendant was engaged by the city to direct the dumping of refuse, and was ordinarily stationed not far from the Bronk shack. He became acquainted with the deceased, and frequently went there at noon to eat his midday lunch, which he carried with him. He suggested to Bronk that improvements soon to be made would compel him to remove his shack, and that he had better secure some insurance, and then burn his place. Previous to this suggestion, the defendant had taken two other persons into his confidence, who were to visit Bronk, pretend to insure him by the issuance of an insurance policy, secure the premium, divide it with the defendant, and later, having by their visit learned where Bronk kept his money and the amount, rob him, and divide the money thus secured with the defendant. The plan was carried out, $30 being secured for an insurance policy, one-third of which was given the defendant. Later, these two men went to Bronk's shack and robbed him of $150, and, in doing so, killed him. Fifty dollars of this money was also given the defendant. The murder occurred on a Monday, but was not discovered by the authorities until Wednesday following. Shortly after the discovery the defendant was taken to the office of the chief of police, for the reason, it was thought, in view of the fact that as he was stationed near Bronk's place, he might be able to give some clue which would lead to the detection of the guilty parties. At this interview the defendant stated that he had been in Bronk's place as late as 4 p. m. of the day Bronk was murdered, and that the old man was alive at that time. A day or so later the defendant was arrested and placed in jail. He denied that he was guilty. He was kept in jail for about three days, when he was visited by his son-in-law, a police officer by the name of Wilson. According to the testimony, the statement of the defendant was secured under the following circumstances: Chief of Police Armstrong testified that the first intimation he had that defendant had said anything about the murder was when Wilson told him that defendant said he knew the two men who committed the crime, and that the defendant wanted to see him; that he then went to the jail and said to the defendant, 'If you know these people that did this job, tell us so that we can go and get them,' and that then the statement was made which was afterwards reduced to writing and signed by the defendant. This statement was brought out by interrogatories propounded by Chief of Police Armstrong, and began: The witness then proceeded with his statement, and, in answer to other interrogatories, gave the details of the insurance scheme, the robbery and murder, and his connection with these crimes, which conform substantially with the theory of the prosecution, as outlined to the jury and upon which it was tried. It concludes with the following questions and answers: This is one of the statements or confessions which was referred to by the district attorney in his preliminary outline to the jury, and which was afterwards admitted in evidence.
An addition to the conditions under which the foregoing statement was obtained, there is the following: The court asked a witness, who was present when it was made: On cross-examination by defendant's counsel this witness was asked:
So far as we are advised from the record, there is not a word of testimony contradicting the signed statement of the defendant, to the effect that he made it of his own free will. The testimony of Chief of Police Armstrong, and other witnesses, bearing on the subject of the circumstances under which the defendant made the statement, is not controverted. No threats or promises were made, nor were any inducements held out to the defendant to make the statement he did. By the officer merely stating to the defendant that he wanted nothing but the straight facts, to tell him what he knew about the matter, and not keep anything back, did not imply that the defendant was to secure any advantage if the confessed. State v. Kornstett, 62 Kan. 221, 61 P. 805; Commonwealth v. Preece, 140 Mass. 276, 5 N.E. 494. The mere fact that the confession was elicited by questions is not sufficient to render it inadmissible. The questions were not of a character, or propounded under circumstances and in a manner either to coerce or persuade. In other...
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