Reamer v. Walter H.C. Griffiths, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 October 1930
• Docket Number: 22307.
• Citation: 158 Wash. 665,291 P. 714
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: REAMER v. WALTER H. C. GRIFFITHS, Inc.

291 P. 714

158 Wash. 665

REAMER v. WALTER H. C. GRIFFITHS, Inc.

No. 22307.

Supreme Court of Washington

October 1, 1930

Department 2.

Appeal from Superior Court, King County; Mitchell Gilliam, Judge.

Action by Earl T. Reamer, as administrator of the estate of Cora Reamer, deceased, against Walter H. C. Griffiths, Inc. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

Affirmed.

Roberts, Skeel & Homan, of Seattle, for appellant.

Patterson & Patterson, of Seattle, for respondent.

MAIN J.

This action was brought to recover damages for wrongful death claimed to have been due to negligence chargeable to the defendant. The action was brought on behalf of C. E. Reamer the husband of Cora Reamer, deceased, their daughter and two sons. The trial resulted in a verdict in favor of the husband in the sum of $5,000, and in favor of the daughter in the sum of $1,000. As to the two sons, the verdict was in favor of the defendant. Motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for new trial were made and overruled. Judgment was entered upon the verdict, from which the defendant appeals.

Walter H. C. Griffiths, Inc., is a corporation, organized under the laws of this state, and engaged in the city of Seattle in the business of selling automobiles. C. E. Reamer and wife together with their daughter, had resided at Long Prairie Minn. Some time during the fall of the year 1928, Mr. and Mrs. Reamer came to Seattle to visit their two sons, who resided there, the daughter accompanying. The accident which caused the death of Mrs. Reamer occurred November 16, 1928, at about 3 o'clock p. m., at the intersection of Tenth Avenue Northeast and East Eightieth street, in the city of Seattle. Tenth Avenue Northeast extends north and south, and East Eightieth street, east and west, both of which streets are paved. At the northeast corner of the intersection there is a stop sign similar in design and located in approximately the same place with reference to the intersecting street as such signs are placed relative to arterial highways. Beginning five blocks to the south of East Eightieth street, Tenth Avenue Northeast is an arterial highway, extending into the business section of the city. From that point, or East Seventy-Fifth street, to the north across East Eightieth street, Tenth Avenue Northeast had not been legally designated as an arterial highway, though the stop sign above referred to was placed at the intersection by the streets and sewers department of the city.

On the day mentioned, Chester Reamer, one of the sons of Mr. and Mrs. Reamer, drove his mother into the city in a Chevrolet coupé which he owned, in order that one or both of them might do some incidental shopping. As they were driving home in the afternoon, the Chevrolet coupé, at the intersection of the two streets mentioned, collided with a De Soto sedan, owned by the appellant, but driven at the time by Mrs. Cecile A. Rice, who was accompanied by an employee of the appellant, and who was instructing her how to drive the car. Prior to this, Mr. and Mrs. Rice had arranged for the purchase of a De Soto automobile from the appellant, but that car had not been delivered. Each of them had previously driven a Ford, but were not familiar with the driving of any other car. A day or two prior, the appellant had sent an employee to instruct Mr. Rice how to drive the De Soto. Mr. and Mrs. Rice reside one block east and one block south of the intersection above referred to. Before the accident, Walter H. Grenfell, at the request of the appellant, had driven the De Soto to the residence of Mr. and Mrs. Rice for the purpose of instructing Mrs. Rice how to drive the same. After arriving there some conversation took place between Mr. Grenfell and Mrs. Rice as to her knowledge of the operation of the car, after which they both got into the car, Mrs. Rice taking the wheel. They then proceeded north to East Eightieth street and turned west with the intention of proceeding across Tenth Avenue Northeast and continuing to the west on East Eightieth street. At this time Chester Reamer and his mother were proceeding north on Tenth Avenue Northeast. The two cars were approaching the intersection at about the same time. The occupants of each car saw the occupants in the other car. Chester Reamer testified that he was approaching the intersection at twenty or twenty-five miles an hour; that he saw the De Soto and thought it was going to stop on account of the arterial highway sign; that it did not stop, and as he entered the intersection he set the brakes of the Chevrolet, but he did not have time to stop, and turned the Chevrolet to the left; that the De Soto proceeded straight across the intersection and struck the Chevrolet just back of the right front wheel. The door flew open and Mrs. Reamer fell out and sustained the injury from which she died later that day. There was other testimony that the De Soto did not stop in recognition of the stop sign.

Mr. Grenfell and Mrs. Rice testified that as they approached the intersection, and, a few feet before reaching the stop sign, the De Soto was stopped; that it was then started and was proceeding in second gear at a speed of about eight to twelve miles an hour. There was other testimony that the De Soto was proceeding at a speed of from fifteen to twenty miles per hour. As to the situation when the De Soto was about half a length into the intersection, Mr. Grenfell testified as follows: 'About the time we got half a car length into the intersection I saw he was coming faster than I had figured he was, and so I caught the emergency brake. I saw that I couldn't do any good by doing that so I--all the time we were moving--I started to grab the wheel. I got a hold of it and just about that time the crash came. I didn't have time to swing the wheel before the crash.'

Mrs. Rice and Mr. Grenfell testified that the Chevrolet car struck the De Soto on the left side back of the front wheel. The speed of the Chevrolet was placed by some of the testimony at thirty to thirty-five miles per hour.

It is first contended that the evidence was not sufficient to take the case to the jury. Under the facts as above stated, and they are facts which the jury had a right to find, the question was clearly one for the jury to determine. If the evidence offered by the respondent is to be believed, the De Soto car was driven into the intersection without being stopped in recognition of the sign and in disregard of the approach of the Chevrolet, that is, the jury had a right to so find. On the other hand, if the testimony offered by the appellant is correct, then the Chevrolet approached the intersection at an excessive speed and ran into the DeSoto as it was crossing the intersection.

Even though the driver of the Chevrolet was negligent, that would not necessarily be imputed to his mother, who was a mere guest at the time. This appears to be recognized by the appellant, and the case of Sadler v. Northern Pacific Railway Co., 118 Wash. 121, 203 P. 10, is cited in support of the contention that Mrs. Reamer was not entitled to recover, even though a guest. That case, however, is different from this. There the driver of the automobile did not see the approach of the railway train, while the guest did. Here, under the evidence, the driver of the...