Reardon v. State

• Decision Date: 07 June 2022
• Docket Number: 2020-CP-01259-COA
• Citation: 341 So.3d 1004
• Parties: Matthew Oliver REARDON a/k/a Matthew Reardon, Appellant v. STATE of Mississippi, Appellee
• Court: Mississippi Court of Appeals

341 So.3d 1004

Matthew Oliver REARDON a/k/a Matthew Reardon, Appellant

v.STATE of Mississippi, Appellee

NO. 2020-CP-01259-COA

Court of Appeals of Mississippi.

June 7, 2022

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: MATTHEW OLIVER REARDON (PRO SE)

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: BARBARA WAKELAND BYRD, Jackson

BEFORE CARLTON, P.J., LAWRENCE AND EMFINGER, JJ.

CARLTON, P.J., FOR THE COURT:

¶1. Matthew Reardon, who waived his right to an indictment and pleaded guilty to aggravated stalking, filed a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR), asserting that he received ineffective assistance of counsel; that the State violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights when he entered his guilty plea; and that he involuntarily entered his plea upon denial of his right to due process. The Circuit Court of Lafayette County dismissed Reardon's PCR motion and denied or found moot Reardon's subsequently filed motions for post-dismissal relief.

¶2. On appeal, Reardon asserts that the circuit court erred in denying him relief, primarily basing his assignments of error on new issues not presented to the circuit court. For the reasons detailed below, we affirm the circuit court's dismissal of Reardon's PCR motion, the circuit court's denial of Reardon's motions for rehearing and for recusal, and find no error in the circuit court's determination that Reardon's motion to compel evidence was therefore moot.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3. On July 6, 2017, Reardon waived his right to an indictment and entered a petition to plead guilty by a bill of information to the crime of aggravated stalking pursuant to Mississippi Code Annotated section 97-3-107(2) (Rev. 2014). After conducting Reardon's plea hearing, the circuit court accepted his guilty plea. Details of Reardon's guilty plea petition and the plea colloquy are discussed below. In accord with his plea bargain, Reardon was sentenced to serve five years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections, with credit for time served and the remaining time suspended to be served on post-release supervision (PRS). As a special condition of his PRS, Reardon was "banished from Lafayette County" during his PRS, but he was allowed entry for certain chancery court proceedings or upon request under certain conditions.

¶4. Three years later, Reardon filed a PCR motion, generally asserting that the State violated his First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment constitutional rights when he entered his guilty plea and that he had involuntarily entered his plea upon denial of his right to due process. Reardon further asserted that he "received inadequate representation by his legal counsel on record, in which adequate coun[sel] representation likely would have resulted in an outright dismissal of the State's charge," and "[t]hat the state has refused to comply with a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request for information regarding the phone call received on May 24, 2017[, regarding the "stalking/harassment complaint" against Reardon]." Reardon attached three exhibits to his PCR motion: the bill of information of the aggravated stalking crime; the notice of criminal disposition setting forth Reardon's sentence entered after his guilty plea; and the "Reporting Officer's Narrative" about the "stalking/harassment complaint" received on May 24, 2017, including the officer's follow-up activities. The PCR motion contained no other details or argument.

¶5. The circuit court dismissed Reardon's PCR motion, finding that "it plainly appears from the face of the motion and prior proceedings that the Petitioner is not entitled to any relief. The Court finds the transcript of the plea and sentencing hearing in Petitioner's criminal cause for aggravated stalking (LKl 7-295) belies Petitioner's claims for relief." In accordance with Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c), the record contains Reardon's PCR motion and exhibits, and the files, record, transcripts, and correspondence the circuit court relied upon in making its determination.

¶6. After the order denying relief was entered, Reardon filed a motion for rehearing before another circuit court judge, a motion for recusal, and a motion to "compel evidence." The circuit court denied the motion for rehearing and, as a consequence, found Reardon's motion to compel evidence to be moot, and the court denied Reardon's motion for recusal. The circuit court's order provided:

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner's motions titled "Motion for Rehearing Under Mississippi Rule 59 Before the Honorable Judge Kent Smith," "Motion for Recusal," and "Motion to Compel Evidence."

The Petitioner requests this Court reconsider its Order entered July 30, 2020, in which the Court, under Mississippi Code Annotated [section] 99-39-11(2), summarily denied Petitioner's request for post-conviction collateral relief. The Court finds the motion for reconsideration is not well taken and is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Court finds Petitioner's Motion to Compel Evidence to be MOOT.

Additionally, the Petitioner alleges the undersigned judge should recuse himself from this post-conviction matter. The Court finds the Petitioner's request for recusal to be without merit and hereby DENIED.

¶7. Reardon appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8. "In reviewing a circuit court's decision to dismiss a PCR motion, ‘this Court will not disturb th[e] [circuit] court's factual findings unless they are found to be clearly erroneous.’ " Bates v. State , 319 So. 3d 508, 510-11 (¶6) (Miss. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Morales v. State , 291 So. 3d 363, 366 (¶10) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) ). We review questions of law de novo. Id. at 511 (¶6). "The burden is on the PCR movant to show he or she is entitled to relief by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. (quoting Smith v. State , 129 So. 3d 243, 245 (¶5) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) ). "We affirm dismissals or denials of PCR motions when the movant fails to demonstrate ‘a claim procedurally alive substantially showing the denial of a state or federal right.’ " Id.¹

DISCUSSION

¶9. Reardon asserts a number of issues on appeal, restated as follows: (1) he received ineffective or "malfeasant" assistance of counsel when he was "coerced by his legal counsel" to plead guilty; (2) "banishment" from Lafayette County during his PRS and his execution of a civil liability covenant not to sue certain individuals and governmental entities were in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights;² (3) he was denied due process because of a delayed initial appearance and the denial of his right to a preliminary hearing; (4) his bail amount was excessive; and (5) the circuit court erred in failing to allow an evidentiary hearing in light of exculpatory evidence entitling Reardon to relief.

¶10. Reardon presents these issues for the first time on appeal. Although Reardon generally asserted in his PCR motion that the State "was in direct violation of [his] 1st, 8th, and 14th constitutional rights at the time [his guilty] plea was given" and that his "guilty plea was involuntary due to a denial of his due process rights," he offered no other detail or argument in support of these broad claims and certainly no argument or evidence encompassing the new issues Reardon now raises.

¶11. Similarly, with respect to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, in contrast to the "coercion" claim he now primarily makes on appeal, Reardon asserted in his PCR motion that he "received inadequate representation by his legal counsel on record, in which adequate coun[sel] representation likely would have resulted in an outright dismissal of the State's charge[;]" and he "only met with his legal coun[sel] one time and no discovery motion was ever requested by [his] legal coun[sel]."

I. Procedural Bar

¶12. The new arguments Reardon asserts on appeal are procedurally barred. Boyd v. State , 190 So. 3d 865, 869 (¶16) (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) ("A movant who fails to raise an issue in his motion for post-conviction relief before the trial court may not raise that issue for the first time on appeal." (quoting Stamps v. State , 151 So. 3d 248, 255 (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2014) )). Procedural bar notwithstanding, we also find Reardon's new claims without merit for the reasons addressed below.

II. Dismissal of Reardon's PCR Motion

¶13. As an initial matter, even if some of these new claims were encompassed within the general claims Reardon asserted in his PCR motion, we find that the circuit court correctly concluded that the claims Reardon raised in his PCR motion were unsupported and contradicted by the record.

¶14. With respect to Reardon's ineffective-assistance claim before the circuit court, we recognize that "[a] defendant's declarations during the plea colloquy that he was satisfied with the services of his lawyer are presumptively true. Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity." Singleton v. State , 213 So. 3d 521, 524 (¶8) (Miss. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Pierce v. State , 115 So. 3d 869, 873 (¶12) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) ). Like the defendant in Singleton , Reardon acknowledged "under oath at his plea hearing that he had no complaints about his lawyer and was satisfied with his advice and assistance." Id.

¶15. Additionally, "our Supreme Court has held that if the movant in a PCR proceeding ‘offers only his affidavit, then his ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit.’ " Id. (quoting Lindsay v. State , 720 So. 2d 182, 184 (¶6) (Miss. 1998) ). The record reflects that Reardon's ineffective-assistance claim is based entirely on his own allegations—and even these allegations are not supported by Reardon's affidavit, as required by Mississippi Code Annotated section 99-39-9(1)(d)-(e) (Rev. 2015). For these reasons, we find no error in the circuit court's finding that Reardon's ineffective-assistance claim was without merit.

¶16. Regarding Reardon's involuntary-guilty-plea claims before the circuit court, we recognize that "[i]n order to...