Reaume v. Twp. of Spring Lake

Decision Date21 May 2019
Docket NumberNo. 341654,341654
Citation328 Mich.App. 321,937 N.W.2d 734
Parties Susan REAUME, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWNSHIP OF SPRING LAKE, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtCourt of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Mill Point Legal Services (by Edward A. Grafton, Spring Lake, and Jennifer L. Lynn) for plaintiff.

McGraw Morris PC, Troy (by Craig R. Noland and Amanda M. Zdarsky ) for defendant.

Before: Gleicher, P.J., and Ronayne Krause and O'Brien, JJ.

Ronayne Krause, J. Plaintiff, Susan Reaume, appeals by leave granted1 the trial court’s order affirming the denial by defendant, the township of Spring Lake (the Township), of plaintiff’s application for a short-term rental license. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

In 2003, plaintiff purchased a home (the property) located in the Township. The property has at all relevant times been located within the "R-1 Low Density Residential" zoning district. Plaintiff used the property as her full-time residence until 2014. In 2015, plaintiff retained a property-management company, and an agent of that company made a telephone inquiry to the Township regarding restrictions on short-term rentals for the property. According to the agent (manager Barbara Hass), Township employee Connie Meiste "said that Spring Lake Township had no restrictions on short term or long term rentals." Plaintiff made substantial improvements to the property, and in 2015 and 2016, she rented it out seasonally as a short-term vacation rental. As will be discussed further, Hass averred and plaintiff contends that Lukas Hill, the Township’s zoning administrator,2 "expressly affirmed [plaintiff’s] right to lawfully use [the property] as a short-term rental." Plaintiff’s neighbors, however, objected to the use of the property for short-term rentals and lodged complaints with the Township.

In December 2016, the Township amended the Spring Lake Township Code of Ordinances by adopting Ordinance No. 255; the amendment prohibited short-term rentals in the R-1 zoning district. However, the ordinance allowed long-term rentals of more than 28 days. The ordinance provided that all short-term rentals had to be registered and licensed with the community development director before rental activity could occur. In 2017, the Township also adopted Ordinance No. 257, amending the Spring Lake Township Zoning Ordinance to allow "short-term rentals" and "limited short-term rentals," which had independent definitions, in certain zoning districts. Ordinance No. 257 permitted "limited short-term rentals," but not "short-term rentals," in R-1 zones. The amendment defined "limited short-term rentals" as "[t]he rental of any Dwelling for any one or two rental periods of up to 14 days, not to exceed 14 days total in a calendar year."

Plaintiff applied for a short-term rental license; the Township denied the application. She appealed that decision to the Township’s Zoning Board of Appeals (the ZBA), which denied her appeal. Plaintiff then appealed that decision in the trial court. Following a hearing, the trial court affirmed the Township’s decision in a written opinion and order. We granted plaintiff’s application for leave to appeal.

II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review the interpretation of ordinances de novo. Soupal v. Shady View, Inc. , 469 Mich. 458, 462, 672 N.W.2d 171 (2003). Ordinances are interpreted in the same manner as statutes: we must apply clear and unambiguous language as written, and any rules of construction are applied "in order to give effect to the legislative body’s intent."

Brandon Charter Twp. v. Tippett , 241 Mich. App. 417, 422, 616 N.W.2d 243 (2000). We also review de novo the application of legal and equitable doctrines. Estes v. Titus , 481 Mich. 573, 578-579, 751 N.W.2d 493 (2008) ; Sylvan Twp. v. City of Chelsea , 313 Mich. App. 305, 315-316, 882 N.W.2d 545 (2015). It is well established that courts will consider the substance of pleadings and look beyond the names or labels applied by the parties. Hartford v. Holmes , 3 Mich. 460, 463 (1855); Norris v. Lincoln Park Police Officers , 292 Mich. App. 574, 582, 808 N.W.2d 578 (2011).

"In general, we review de novo a circuit court’s decision in an appeal from a ZBA decision." Hughes v. Almena Twp. , 284 Mich. App. 50, 60, 771 N.W.2d 453 (2009). However, there is no single standard of review applicable to the appeal itself because zoning cases typically entail questions of both fact and law. Macenas v. Michiana , 433 Mich. 380, 394-395, 446 N.W.2d 102 (1989). Courts must defer to a ZBA’s factual findings to the extent they are "supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence on the record[.]" Id. at 395, 446 N.W.2d 102. We, in turn, review the circuit court’s factual findings for clear error to determine whether the circuit court properly applied the substantial-evidence test. Hughes , 284 Mich. App. at 60, 771 N.W.2d 453. The ZBA’s decisions on the basis of its factual findings are also given deference "provided they are procedurally proper ... and are a reasonable exercise of the board’s discretion[.]" Macenas , 433 Mich. at 395, 446 N.W.2d 102. The ZBA’s determinations of law are afforded no deference. Id. at 395-396, 446 N.W.2d 102.

III. ESTOPPEL

We observe, initially, that much of plaintiff’s argument is, in substance and effect, an equitable-estoppel argument. Equitable estoppel may preclude the enforcement of a zoning ordinance if a party reasonably relies to its prejudice on a representation made by the municipality. Lyon Charter Twp. v. Petty , 317 Mich. App. 482, 490, 896 N.W.2d 477 (2016), vacated in part on other grounds 500 Mich. 1010, 896 N.W.2d 11 (2017). Generally, plaintiff contends that before the Township’s adoption of Ordinance Nos. 255 and 257, it had formally determined and communicated to plaintiff that her use of the property for short-term rentals was lawful. Plaintiff therefore concludes that her use of the property is necessarily "grandfathered" and that the Township may not deny her permission to continue using the property for short-term rentals. Plaintiff argues that she expended considerable sums of money on renovations and modifications to the property in reliance on the Township’s alleged assurances that short-term rentals were lawful in the R-1 zoning district. However, plaintiff’s argument turns on making untenable extrapolations from statements made by individuals who had no authority to bind the Township.

"[A] historical failure to enforce a particular zoning ordinance, standing alone, is insufficient to preclude enforcement in the present." Lyon , 317 Mich. App. at 489, 896 N.W.2d 477. A municipality may, in some cases, be estopped from enforcing zoning ordinances "because of the positive acts of municipal officials which induced plaintiff to act in a certain manner, and where plaintiff relied upon the official’s actions by incurring a change of position or making expenditures in reliance upon the officials’ actions." Parker v. West Bloomfield Twp. , 60 Mich. App. 583, 591, 231 N.W.2d 424 (1975) ; see also Lyon , 317 Mich. App. at 490, 896 N.W.2d 477. The general rule is against estopping municipalities from enforcing zoning ordinances in the absence of "exceptional circumstances," which must be viewed as a whole, and "no factor is in itself decisive." Pittsfield Twp. v. Malcolm , 375 Mich. 135, 147-148, 134 N.W.2d 166 (1965). However, a municipality cannot be estopped from enforcing zoning ordinances by the unauthorized or illegal conduct of its officers. Parker , 60 Mich. App. at 594-595, 231 N.W.2d 424 ; see also Blackman Twp. v. Koller , 357 Mich. 186, 189, 98 N.W.2d 538 (1959). "Casual private advice offered by township officials does not constitute exceptional circumstances." Howard Twp. Bd. of Trustees v. Waldo , 168 Mich. App. 565, 576, 425 N.W.2d 180 (1988), citing White Lake Twp. v. Amos , 371 Mich. 693, 698-699, 124 N.W.2d 803 (1963).

Plaintiff’s only argument of serious concern pertains to the conversation that Barbara Hass, the manager of the property-management company, had "with Connie Meiste at the Spring Lake Township offices via telephone[.]" According to Hass’s affidavit, she was told "that Spring Lake Township had no restrictions on short term or long term rentals." It is reasonable to expect municipal employees to provide accurate information upon request. However, this record does not disclose enough detail about the conversation to draw any conclusions. For example, at the time of Hass’s inquiry, it appears that the Township did not, in fact, have any formal regulations that specifically addressed the rental of property. Nevertheless, that is not necessarily equivalent to a statement that any kind of rental was explicitly authorized. We also do not know precisely what questions Hass asked. It is unclear whether Hass’s affidavit repeats a direct quotation from Meiste’s answer or whether the affidavit sets forth Hass’s understanding of the gravamen of Meiste’s answer. Importantly, the record provides no support for the proposition that Meiste had any authority to bind the Township. Because plaintiff has the burden of proof, we are unimpressed with plaintiff’s protestations to the effect that the Township has not disproved Meiste’s authority or anything about the nature of her statement to Hass.

Plaintiff argues that the Township’s zoning administrator, Lukas Hill, explicitly approved plaintiff’s revised rental listing after obtaining clarification that the property was not being improperly held out as a multifamily dwelling. Again, there is nothing in the record to show that Hill had individual authority to bind the Township to a zoning determination.3 Furthermore, the record indicates that the Township’s enforcement protocol has historically been to address violations as they are reported in the forms of complaints, rather than to affirmatively look for violations. The record does not reflect whether the Township had received any complaints at the time of the original rental listing...

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