Reaves v. State

• Decision Date: 31 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. 1D07-1205.,1D07-1205.
• Citation: 979 So.2d 1066
• Parties: Daniel Allen REAVES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

979 So.2d 1066

Daniel Allen REAVES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D07-1205.

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 31, 2008.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Glen P. Gifford, Assistant Public Defender, Tallahassee, for Appellant.

Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Joshua R. Heller, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from Appellant's convictions for racing on a highway, in violation of section 316.191(2)(a), Florida Statutes (2005), and vehicular homicide, in violation of section 782.071(1), Florida Statutes (2005). The convictions were entered below based upon Appellant's guilty plea. Appellant now argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to vehicular homicide. He claims this charge lacked a factual basis on the element of causation. Also, Appellant contends section 316.191 is facially unconstitutional as void for vagueness. We find Appellant's arguments unpersuasive and affirm his convictions.

I

Appellant was involved in an incident described in a probable cause affidavit. According to the affidavit, on May 29, 2005 at approximately 12:50 a.m., Appellant and Benjamin Street began to drag race at a high rate of speed. Street had a passenger in his vehicle, Brandy Byer. When Street attempted to pass Appellant in a "no passing zone," Appellant increased his speed, causing the two cars to come side by side as they approached a median. Immediately before the median, Street increased his speed in an attempt to cut in front of Appellant's vehicle. However, Street's car struck the median and spun out of control, striking two trees in quick succession before flipping through the air. The impact with the second tree was on the passenger side, where Byer was riding, and she died as a result of the crash. Appellant, realizing the accident had occurred, immediately left the scene.

Appellant was subsequently charged by information with one count of racing on a highway, and one count of vehicular homicide and leaving the scene of an accident. He pled guilty to racing and vehicular homicide, without the aggravating factor of leaving the scene. The trial court found the plea supported by an adequate factual basis.

Appellant then moved to withdraw his plea to the vehicular homicide charge, claiming Street alone was the proximate cause of Byer's death as he recklessly drove the vehicle in which she was a passenger. Appellant concluded that without causation, there was an insufficient factual basis for his plea and it should be set aside.

Following a hearing, the trial court denied Appellant's motion, emphasizing that Appellant had admitted to participating in the unlawful race, Byer was not a direct participant in the race, and past caselaw held all drivers in an unlawful race responsible for the deaths of innocent bystanders. Appellant was sentenced as a youthful offender to four years imprisonment, followed by two years of probation, for the vehicular homicide charge, and time served on the racing charge. This appeal followed.

II

Appellant argues the trial court should have granted his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to vehicular homicide as the charge was not supported by the element of causation. Appellant claims he was not the cause of Byer's death, proposing two alternate theories of causation. First, Appellant implies that since Byer was a voluntary participant in the race, she was in effect the cause of her own death. Second, Appellant claims that Street alone should be found the cause because he refused to slow down and merge as his car approached the median. These claims are unpersuasive.

Appellate courts review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse of discretion standard. See Wright v. State, 961 So.2d 1036, 1040 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007); Cabrera v. State, 915 So.2d 727, 728 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005). Upon a showing of good cause, a trial court may permit a guilty plea to be withdrawn before sentencing. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.170(f). Since it is fundamental error to accept a plea that is not factually supported, a good cause for withdrawal is insufficient factual support. See Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.170(k)(1) (2007); Allen v. State, 876 So.2d 737, 739-740 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004).

Vehicular homicide "is the killing of a human being ... caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another." § 782.071, Fla. Stat. (2005). Proximate causation, or a causal connection between the defendant's reckless driving and the victim's death, is an essential element of vehicular homicide. See Armenia v. State, 479 So.2d 260, 262 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).

Turning to Appellant's claim that Byer effectively caused her own death, we have found that a "decedent's conduct may only be asserted as a defense to vehicular homicide when that conduct could be viewed as the sole proximate cause of the accident which resulted in the death." Union v. State, 642 So.2d 91, 94 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (emphasis added); see also Michel v. State, 752 So.2d 6, 12 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000); Nunez v. State, 721 So.2d 346, 347 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1998). Cases where the decedent is held responsible involve circumstances where the deceased's conduct alone led to his or her death.

For instance, in J.A.C. v. State, 374 So.2d 606, 607 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1979), a passenger in a car being driven in a drag race was found to be the proximate cause of her own death. However, the accident resulting in the death occurred "only because the decedent, while attempting to operate the gear shift, instead grabbed the steering wheel and caused the vehicle to go out of control." Id. (emphasis added).

Similarly, in Velazquez v. State, 561 So.2d 347, 353 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1990), the decedent was found responsible after inexplicably driving his car through a guardrail following a drag race with the defendant. Since the decedent volitionally drove his car off the embankment after the race had ended, it was found "unjust to hold the defendant criminally responsible for the deceased's unexpected and near-suicidal conduct." Id.; see also Union, 642 So.2d at 94.¹

Here, there is no evidence Byer attempted to grab the steering wheel or was in control of the car when it struck the median. Similarly, there is no evidence she played an active role in the race, or that she even acquiesced to Street's decision to participate in the race. However, there is evidence that Appellant was at least partially responsible for Byer's death as he refused to let Street's car merge as they approached the median. Since there is no evidence that Byer's conduct was the sole cause of the accident, she cannot be considered the proximate cause of her own death.

Similarly unpersuasive is Appellant's argument that Street was the sole cause of Byer's death. When a party creates a condition of peril by his wrongful conduct, his actions can be found the proximate cause of the resulting injury, even if later events combined to cause such injury, so long as the later acts reasonably followed in the natural sequence of events. See State v. Gensler, 929 So.2d 27, 31 (Fla. 3rd DCA 2006); M.C.J. v. State, 444 So.2d 1001, 1005 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) (stating an intervening cause cannot be foreseeable).

Here, Street's refusal to slow his vehicle and merge as the cars approached the median does not excuse Appellant's liability in Byer's death. It was natural, and thus foreseeable, for Street to increase his speed and attempt to pass Appellant as they were engaged in a high speed race. Arguably, Appellant alone created the condition of peril by increasing his speed to match that of Street's car, instead of allowing Street to safely pass by. Regardless, since Street's actions were a foreseeable response to Appellant's conduct, both Appellant and Street may be held liable for Byer's death. See Jacobs v. State, 184 So.2d 711, 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966) (finding "[t]he deaths which proximately resulted from the activities of the three persons engaged in the unlawful activity of drag racing made each of the active participants equally guilty of the criminal act which caused the death of the innocent party").

Given the foregoing, the charge of vehicular homicide had adequate factual support and the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea.

III

Regarding the facial validity of section 316.191, Appellant claims the statute should be found unconstitutionally vague pursuant to State v. Wells, 965 So.2d 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007). However, as discussed below, we find that the statute can be interpreted in such a way as to survive a facial constitutional challenge.

A statute cannot be declared unconstitutional unless it is determined to be invalid beyond a reasonable doubt. See Lakeland Reg'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. State, Agency for Healthcare Admin., et al., 917 So.2d 1024, 1030 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006). When reasonably possible and consistent with constitutional rights, all doubts concerning a statute should be resolved in favor of its validity. See State v. Brake, 796 So.2d 522, 527 (Fla.2001). However, any doubts raised in a vagueness challenge should be resolved in the citizen's favor and against the State. Id.

Applying these principles, we conclude that section 316.191 can survive a facial challenge, contrary to the Fourth District's finding in Wells. Section 316.191, Florida Statutes (2005), states, in pertinent part:

(1) As used in this section, the term:

(b) "Drag race" means the operation of two or more motor vehicles from a point side by side at accelerating speeds in a competitive attempt to outdistance each other, or the operation of one or more motor vehicles over a common selected course, from the same point to the same point, for the purpose of comparing the relative speeds or power of acceleration of such motor vehicle or motor...