Rebecca A. Kocinski v. Nathaniel Reynolds
| Decision Date | 11 August 2000 |
| Docket Number | 00-LW-3554,L-99-1318 |
| Parties | Rebecca A. Kocinski, et al., Appellants v. Nathaniel Reynolds, Appellee Court of Appeals |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
Jan H Stamm, for appellants.
Kevin A. Pituch and Michael A. Bruno, for appellee.
This is an appeal from the judgment of the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion for summary judgment filed by appellee, Nathaniel Reynolds, and denying the motion for summary judgment filed by appellants, Rebecca A. Kocinski and Frank Kocinski.[1] For the following reasons, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
This matter arose out of an automobile collision between appellee and appellant, which occurred on August 3, 1996. Appellant's minor daughter, Shelby Kocinski, was also present in her mother's vehicle at the time of the accident. On August 3, 1998, "Rebecca A. Kocinski, on behalf of Shelby Kocinski, a minor," filed a small claims petition in the Maumee Municipal Court against Nathaniel Reynolds for payment of Shelby's medical bills. On the same date, appellants filed the present action against appellee in the Lucas County Court of Common Pleas, seeking recovery of damages for appellant's injuries and for Frank's loss of consortium.
In the municipal court case, appellant moved for summary judgment with respect to Shelby's medical bills. In his response to summary judgment, appellee stated that summary judgment should be denied on the basis that a judgment in favor of appellant in the municipal court case "may operate as res judicata regarding her action brought in the Lucas County Common Pleas Court." On February 3 1999, the municipal court granted summary judgment in favor of appellant and awarded her $684.25 for Shelby's medical bills. This judgment was satisfied on May 6, 1999.
Thereafter, on May 11, 1999, appellee filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the basis of res judicata. On August 25, 1999, the common pleas court awarded summary judgment and found that appellant's personal injury action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata because she "had a full and fair opportunity to present her claim for negligence in the initial proceedings." On September 13, 1999, the trial court filed a judgment entry nunc pro tunc to include in the original judgment that there was no just reason for delay, as provided in Civ.R. 54(B). Accordingly, the common pleas court also denied appellants' motion for summary judgment, which was filed on June 29, 1999.
Appellants appealed and raise the following assignments of error:
This court notes at the outset that in reviewing a motion for summary judgment, we must apply the same standard as the trial court. Lorain Natl. Bank v. Saratoga Apts. (1989), 61 Ohio App.3d 127, 129. Summary judgment will be granted when there remains no genuine issue of material fact and, when construing the evidence most strongly in favor of the non-moving party, reasonable minds can only conclude that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Civ.R. 56(C).
Res judicata is not limited to barring only those subsequent actions that involve the same legal theory of recovery as a previous action. Grava v. Parkman Twp. (1995), 73 Ohio St.3d 379, 382. Rather, "It has long been the law of Ohio that 'an existing final judgment or decree between the parties to litigation is conclusive as to all claims which were or might have been litigated in the first lawsuit'". Natl. Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 60, 62, citing Rogers v. Whitehall (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 67, 69. For purposes of this appeal, it is significant to note that the Ohio Supreme Court stated in a footnote that the phrase "claims which might have been litigated" in the first lawsuit has possible misleading connotations and, therefore, noted that courts instead "prefer to refer instead to 'claims which should have been litigated' in the first lawsuit." Holzemer v. Urbanski (1999), 86 Ohio St.3d 129, 133, fn. 2, citing Wilkins v. Jakeway (S.D.Ohio 1998), 993 F.Supp. 635, 645.
In Grava, an expanded view of claim preclusion was adopted:
Grava at syllabus.
"Transaction" is defined as a "'common nucleus of operative facts.'" Grava at 382, citing 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Judgments (1982), Section 24, Comment (b), at 198-99. Grava further quoted the Restatement as follows:
"
In this case, appellants argue that "[t]he essential operative facts to be proven in Rebecca Kocinski's personal injury action, are different from those in the derivative proceeding in the Maumee Municipal Court, and these factual distinctions are such that res judicata cannot apply." We disagree.
First it is important to note that although appellant brought the action in municipal court "on behalf" of her daughter, the claim upon which summary judgment was granted was actually a claim belonging to appellant, not Shelby. See Grindell v. Huber (1971), 28 Ohio St.2d 71, paragraph one of the syllabus, See, also, Blakeman v. Condorodis (1991), 75 Ohio App.3d 393; Auchmuty v. Ward (Aug. 6, 1998), Putnam App. No. 12-98-4, unreported. Furthermore, a parent's cause of action for medical expenses of a minor child, although derivative, is solely that of the parents. Whitehead, 20 OhioSt.2d at 115. A minor could be liable in contract for his or her medical bills; however, "this liability is secondary to that of the parents who are charged with the duty to support their minor child, in accordance with R.C. 3103.03(A) and (D)." Auchmuty, supra, citing Children's Hospital v. Johnson (1980), 68 Ohio App.2d 17, 19-20; and Blakeman, 75 Ohio App.3d at 397. See, also, Univ. of Cincinnati Hosp. v. Cohen (1989), 57 Ohio App.3d 30, 31-32.
Accordingly, although different evidence had to be offered in order to establish her claim for Shelby's medical expenses, appellant's claim was only one that she had available to her as a result of the collision with appellee. Grava clearly required appellant to litigate all her claims in one action, or be forever barred from asserting those claims.
We are troubled by the fact that Rebecca's prayer of $50,000 for her personal injury claim exceeded the jurisdictional limits of the municipal court. See R.C. 1901.17. This suggests to us that her personal injury claim could not have been litigated in the first lawsuit. Nevertheless, as noted by the Ohio Supreme Court in Holzemer, courts have interpreted the phrase "claims which were or might have been litigated" in the first lawsuit to mean "claims which should have been litigated" in the first lawsuit. Holzemer 86 Ohio St.3d at 133, fn. 2.
Accordingly, we find that appellant should have litigated all of her claims arising out of the collision with appellee in one action.
Hence, because a valid, final judgment was rendered upon the merits in the municipal court and because appellant's personal injury claim arose out of a single occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action in the municipal court, we find that res judicata bars her negligence action brought in the trial court. See Grava, 73 Ohio St.3d at syllabus. It is unfortunate that appellant's more substantial claim in the trial court is barred; however, appellant was imprudent to separate her claims arising out of a single occurrence and raise one in the municipal court.
Appellants argue that appellee waived his right to assert res judicata as a defense and acquiesced to the simultaneous suits because he failed to plead it as an affirmative defense in his answers in either court, failed to raise it in a timely manner, and failed to seek consolidation of the two cases. Appellants also argue that they would be prejudiced by the trial court permitting appellee to raise res judicata as a defense for the first time in his motion for summary judgment.
Generally, a party can waive the defense of res judicata if it was not properly pled as an affirmative defense. It is undisputed that appellee failed to plead res judicata as an affirmative defense. We find, however, that appellee could not have properly pled res judicata as an affirmative defense in his...
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