Reddick v. State
| Decision Date | 09 December 1914 |
| Docket Number | 5938. |
| Citation | 83 S.E. 675,15 Ga.App. 437 |
| Parties | REDDICK v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court.
Where one count in an indictment charges the defendant with selling intoxicating liquor to a person named, and another count charges him with keeping such liquor on hand at his place of business, evidence tending to establish his guilt under one count may be considered by the jury, though entirely irrelevant to the other count.
Where an indictment charged the defendant with keeping on hand intoxicating liquor at his place of business, and in another count with the sale of such liquor to a person named, proof that on the day alleged in the indictment, and in the vicinity of his place of business, he offered to sell intoxicating liquor to a person other than the one named in the indictment, was admissible in support of the charge of keeping intoxicating liquor on hand at his place of business since it was a circumstance tending to show that he had such liquor in his possession, and tended to corroborate a witness who testified that the defendant kept intoxicating liquor on hand at his place of business, though, in the absence of evidence connecting the offer, or the person to whom it was made, with a sale of liquor by the defendant to the person named in the indictment, proof of the offer would not be admissible for the purpose of establishing the alleged sale.
Error from Superior Court, Baldwin County; J. B. Park, Judge.
G. W Reddick was convicted of unlawfully selling and keeping on hand intoxicating liquors. From the overruling of certiorari by the judge of the superior court, he brings error. Affirmed.
Reddick was tried in the county court on an indictment charging that on October 31, 1913, he "did sell and barter, for a valuable consideration, alcoholic, spirituous, malt and intoxicating liquors and other drinks which, if drank to excess, will produce intoxication, to one Will Hazel, and did keep on hand said liquors at his place of business, to wit his store in the city of Milledgeville, Ga., contrary to the laws of said state," etc. The jury returned a verdict of guilty and he sued out certiorari. The certiorari was overruled by the judge of the superior court and he excepted.
On the trial Will Hazel testified, for the state, that he came to Milledgeville in October, 1913, to work for the city as a detective "to run down blind tigers," and that on the evening of October 31st he went to the grocery store of the defendant in Milledgeville to buy whisky, accompanied by his employer, Vickers, who remained outside while he entered the store; that with money given to him by Vickers he bought a half pint of whisky, which he brought back and delivered to Vickers; that when he entered the store he asked the defendant to let him have some whisky, and the defendant reached under the counter and got a bottle of whisky and delivered it to him; that the defendant was at the circus all day, and came back to the store about night, when the purchase was made. Vickers testified that he went with the witness Hazel to the defendant's store on October 31st but that he remained outside of the store, in the dark; that he gave Hazel money to go in and buy the whisky, and that after Hazel entered the store he could see him through the window; that he saw the defendant hand something to Hazel over the counter, which Hazel brought to him (Vickers), and which proved to be a half pint of whisky. This witness further testified that the defendant offered to sell him a pint of whisky during the morning of the same day, at the circus grounds, and this testimony was objected to by the defendant, as irrelevant, because it tended to establish another crime, distinct entirely from the particular crime of selling liquor to Hazel, with which the defendant was charged, and because it did not appear that the attempt to sell was made at the place of business of the defendant.
The petition for certiorari assigns error on the ground that the court erred in admitting this testimony, and also on the ground that the verdict was contrary to law and evidence and without evidence to support it.
Edward R. Hines, of Milledgeville, for plaintiff in error.
Jos. E Pottle, Sol. Gen., of Milledgeville, for the State.
WADE, J. (after stating the facts as above).
Under the general rules of criminal evidence, proof of a distinct independent offense is inadmissible on the trial of one accused of crime. Various exceptions have, however, been recognized, as, for instance, to show motive, by establishing a common scheme, plan, or system, to show intent, where intent is not only an essential ingredient of the offense, but is of its very essence, and to rebut special defenses, such as insanity, good character, accident, or mistake. Intent being an essential element of the crime of obtaining goods under false pretenses, evidence of other offenses of a like nature may be introduced, in order to establish the wrongful intent. In Lee v. State, 8 Ga.App. 413, 69 S.E. 310, this court held that, on the trial of one charged with a violation of the act regulating the sale of narcotic drugs by a sale to a particular person, evidence of other sales to other persons was admissible, not for the reason that this proof showed the defendant to be a frequent or habitual lawbreaker, but because it tended to show the purpose or intent which actuated him at the time he furnished the person named with a prescription for cocaine, and the fact that he was daily issuing a large number of these prescriptions, indiscriminately and apparently to all who applied therefor, tended to establish his intent and purpose in so doing, and to determine whether he furnished the drug in good faith and because he deemed it necessary for the treatment of the particular person, or merely in evasion of the law and for pecuniary profit. Also, in Ray v. State, 4 Ga.App. 67, 60 S.E. 816, this court held that while, as a general rule, in the prosecution of a particular crime, evidence tending to show that the defendant has committed other offenses is not admissible, yet, where the testimony offered has a distinct relevancy to the case on trial, it is not inadmissible merely because it also tends to show the defendant's connection with some other criminal transaction. The facts in that case were considered sufficient to justify the exception to the rule there stated, as there appeared to be a general system or plan by which the defendant was engaged in carrying out a series of peculations from the same warehouse, and by the identical means employed in the instance where he was detected, and for which he was prosecuted. So, also, a majority of this court held, where one was charged with the larceny of certain harness, and the state relied for a conviction upon the inference of guilt arising from the recent possession by the accused of stolen property, that it was proper to admit proof of the theft of several other sets of harness found in his possession, since the fact that at the same time and place he was in possession of other stolen property of the same kind tended strongly to show guilty possession of the property described in the indictment, and to rebut the inference that he could be in possession of so much stolen property without guilty knowledge. His possession of 22 stolen sets of harness, besides the set he was charged with stealing, tended to show either that he stole the particular set of harness described in the indictment, or that he received that set knowing it had been stolen. In other words, the evidence tended to establish the intent and knowledge with which he had acquired the stolen property, and whether such intent was innocent or guilty. Martin v. State, 10 Ga.App. 798, 74 S.E. 306. As stated in 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, § 31, while proof of collateral offenses is generally not admissible, yet such proof is sometimes admissible as part of the res gestæ, to prove identity of person or crime, or guilty knowledge, intent, motive, system, malice, or to rebut special defenses, and is relevant in prosecutions for...
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Phillips v. State
... ... within two years the officers had searched a place where ... defendant was then living, "three or four doors ... below-that has now been torn down, where he stayed before, ... and found 27 gallons of liquor in the edge of his yard." ... Judge Wade, in Reddick v. State, 15 Ga.App. 437, ... 441, 83 S.E. 675, 676, held that where an indictment charges ... a specific sale to a named individual at a specific time, ... evidence as to a sale to another person and at another time ... is inadmissible, for "where the indictment charges a ... sale to a ... ...
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Phillips v. State
...now been torn down, where he stayed before, and found 27 gallons of liquor in the edge of his yard." Judge Wade, in Reddick v. State, 15 Ga. App. 437, 441, 83 S. E. 675, 676, held that where an indictment charges a specific sale to a named individual at a specific time, evidence as to a sal......
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Ealey v. State, (No. 20159.)
...485, 48 S. E. 156; Lee v. State, 8 Ga. App. 413(3), 69 S. E. 310; Holland v. State, 9 Ga. App. 831, 835, 72 S. E. 290; Reddick v. State, 15 Ga. App. 437(2), 83 S. E. 675; Littleton v. State, 20 Ga. App. 746(3), 93 S. E. 230." Jones v. State, 32 Ga. App. 7(1), 122 S. E. 738. The accusation i......
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Quinn v. State
... ... defendant and come away with whisky," on the ground that ... this was a conclusion of the witness. This evidence was not a ... conclusion, but the statement of a fact, which was clearly ... admissible as a circumstance corroborative of other evidence ... in the case. Reddick v. State, 15 Ga.App. 437 (2), ... 442, 443, 83 S.E. 675; Gary v. State, 7 Ga.App. 502, ... 67 S.E. 207 (3); Bonner v. State, 2 Ga.App. 711, 58 ... S.E. 1123 (1); Cole v. State, 120 Ga. 485, 48 S.E ... There ... is no merit in the ground of the motion for a new trial that ... ...