Reddix v. State

• Decision Date: 11 February 1924
• Docket Number: 23570
• Citation: 98 So. 850,134 Miss. 393
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: REDDIX v. STATE

98 So. 850

134 Miss. 393

REDDIX v. STATE

No. 23570

Supreme Court of Mississippi

February 11, 1924

Division B

APPEAL from circuit court of Panola county, HON. GREEK L. RICE Judge.

Will Reddix was convicted of murder and he appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Judgment reversed.

Montgomery & McClure, for appellant.

The court tells the jury that in order for the defendant to justify his plea of self-defense, it is incumbent on him to show danger, etc., clearly imposing a burden on the defendant in the trial of the case. The burden of proof, even beyond every reasonable doubt, is always charged in a murder case to the state. Cumberland v. State, 110 Miss. 521; Garland v. State, 94 So. 210.

This instruction is analogous to the instructions which are condemned by this court on the question of presumption of malice. Cumberland v. State, supra; Lamar v. State, 63 Miss. 265. This instruction is erroneous because it fails to tell the jury that they must acquit the defendant if they have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, arising from the evidence or lack of evidence against him. Cumberland v. State, 110 Miss. 521; Garland v State, 94 So. 210; Guice v. State, 60 Miss 714; Lamar v. State, 63 Miss. 714.

The instruction also leaves the character of danger to the defendant, which will justify a plea of self-defense, in confusion. The danger is described only as "imminent," thus limiting the right of the defendant to justify a plea of self-defense on actual danger alone, and thereby cutting off the right of the defendant to act upon appearances, or apparent danger. The instruction makes no attempt to tell the jury that the danger may be apparent or actually present, but says it must be imminent, and fails to give the defendant the benefit of apparent danger. Jackson v. State, 79 Miss. 42; Blalack v. State, 79 Miss. 520; Ellis v. State, 66 Miss. 44; Hale v. State, 63 So. 670; Boykin v. State, 86 Miss. 481; Mathews v. State, 108 Miss. 72.

We cannot help but anticipate, at this time, the much over-indulged contention on the part of the state that the defendant is estopped to set up the error which has appeared in the state's instructions because of the fact, that the defendant correctly asked for several instructions which stated the law in his behalf.

Our court has held even in civil cases where the defendant asks instructions which correctly state the law, and the plaintiff asks erroneous instructions in regard to the law in the case, that however clear and correct the charge is for the defendant, that it cannot be assumed that it neutralized the vice found in the instructions for the plaintiff. Louisville N. O. and T. Ry. Company v. Phillips, 12 So. 825; Hines v. McCullers, 121 Miss. 666; McNeil v. Bank, 100 Miss. 271.

If our court will reverse a civil case on confusing instructions to the jury, certainly in a criminal case, one of the magnitude of murder, where the law is strictly followed, and where the defendant ought to have the benefit of every safeguard that the law can give him, the court will reverse this case where the instructions to the jury by the state are in conflict with those given for the defendant.

S. C. Broom, Assistant Attorney-General, for the state.

If these instructions were taken alone, without modification or explanation, they might be subject to the criticism directed against them by counsel for appellant. But whether or not they are erroneous, as alleged, it will not be necessary to determine, because such error as is complained of was cured by the giving of subsequent instructions on the subject involved, thereby completing the statement of law with reference to the law of self-defense, reasonable doubt.

Nine instructions were requested for the state, all of which were given; sixteen instructions were requested for the defendant, all of which were given. If the contention of counsel for appellant was correct with reference to these instructions, then it would be necessary to state all of the law applicable to a case both for the state and for the defendant in the instructions given for the state, in which event it would be unnecessary to give any instructions for the defendant. But the rule is otherwise. The rule is that instructions shall be construed as a whole, and if after construing them as a whole they fairly state the law, then there shall be no reversal. Skeen v. State, 16 So. 495; Riley v. State, 18, So. 117, not officially reported; Barr v. State, 21 So. 131, not officially reported; Rodgers v. State, 21 So. 130, not officially reported; Harper v. State, 83 Miss. 402, 35 So. 572; Smith v. State, 107 Miss. 574, 65 So. 498; Long v. State, 103 Miss. 698, 60 So. 730.

The instruction for the state that is most seriously questioned, and most viciously attacked, is the one which tells the jury that in order to justify the killing of the deceased it was incumbent on the defendant to show that at the time of the homicide he was in imminent danger at the hands of deceased of his own life, or of great bodily harm.

The self-defense theory was to prove that the killing was lawful. The facts were fairly presented to the jury; the law is clearly and completely stated in the instructions given both for the state and for the defendant. If the court had refused the instructions requested by the defendant with reference to self-defense then indeed it would have been error. Gerdin v. State, 64 Miss. 798, 2 So. 313. But in this case all of the instructions were given as requested. Mosely v. State, 11 So. 105.

It is well settled that instructions are to be considered as a whole and...