Reddy v. Coombe

• Decision Date: 08 February 1990
• Docket Number: No. 85 Civ. 0572.,85 Civ. 0572.
• Citation: 730 F. Supp. 556
• Parties: Timothy REDDY, Petitioner, v. Phillip COOMBE, Superintendent, of Eastern Correctional Facility and Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New York, Respondents.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

730 F. Supp. 556

Timothy REDDY, Petitioner, v. Phillip COOMBE, Superintendent, of Eastern Correctional Facility and Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New York, Respondents.

No. 85 Civ. 0572.

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

February 8, 1990.

Henriette D. Hoffman, The Legal Aid Society, Federal Defender Services Unit, New York City, for petitioner.

Paul Harnisch and Norman Barclay, Asst. Dist. Attys., New York City, for respondents.

OPINION AND ORDER

STANTON, District Judge.

The Court of Appeals reversed this court's decision granting Timothy Reddy's petition for the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support his state court conviction for felony murder. Reddy v. Coombe, 846 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.1988). In its opinion, familiarity with which is assumed, the court remanded "for consideration of whether application of Bruton principles requires that Reddy be granted a new trial." Id. at 870.

On remand, Reddy claims that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when extrajudicial statements given by his codefendant, who did not take the stand, were admitted into evidence at their joint trial. For the reasons stated below, the petition is granted.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner and Cheryl Christenson were arrested for the murder of Ivan Zapata Enau on April 4, 1978. Because the homicide was allegedly committed in the course of an attempted robbery, the defendants were charged with second degree, or felony, murder under New York Penal Law (N.Y.P.L) § 125.253¹ (McKinney's 1987). Christenson made three extrajudicial statements concerning her involvement in the crime, and Reddy made one extrajudicial statement concerning his involvement in the crime.

Reddy made a pre-trial motion for severance under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), because the State intended to introduce Christenson's statements which would inculpate him.² The court denied the motion, stating:

Reddy and his co-defendant have each made almost

identical confessions detailing their acts and implicating each other. Under such circumstances, the Court of Appeals has held that the "logic" of Bruton is inapplicable (People v. McNeil, 24 N.Y.2d 550 301 N.Y.S.2d 503, 249 N.E.2d 383).³ Moreover, until there has been a determination as to whether both confessions are admissible at trial, the motion for a severance is denied. The motion may be renewed after such a determination if there has been an order granting suppression of one statement.

Reddy then moved to suppress his statement on the grounds that it was coerced and obtained through deception, resulted from an illegal arrest, and was taken in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The court denied Reddy's suppression motion, finding that his statement was voluntarily made, the police had probable cause to arrest him, and he had knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Christenson's pre-trial motion to suppress her statements was also denied. Accordingly, the two were tried together in New York State Supreme Court.

The trial took place in 1979. The State introduced both defendants' statements. The jury was instructed to consider each statement only against the defendant who had made it.⁴ Reddy did not have the opportunity to attack Christenson's statements by cross examination because she did not testify.⁵ After the jury retired to deliberate, it asked to hear Christenson's and Reddy's statements. A few hours later, it again requested and heard Christenson's second and third statements. The jury ultimately convicted both Reddy and Christenson. They were both sentenced to indeterminate prison terms of 18 years to life.⁶

Reddy filed this habeas corpus petition claiming that his statement should have been suppressed because it was the product of an illegal arrest, and that the evidence of his intent to rob Enau was insufficient to sustain his conviction.⁷ This court agreed with the latter claim, and granted his petition. Reddy v. Coombe, 85 Civ. 0572 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1987). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding "we view Reddy's own description of the events of April 4, taken in the light most favorable to the State, as sufficient to support the inference that he intended to assist in robbing Enau." Reddy, 846 F.2d at 869. The Court of Appeals remanded for determination of whether Reddy's rights under the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment⁸ were violated by the admission of Christenson's statements at their trial.

On remand, Reddy claims that the admission of Christenson's statements violated his Sixth Amendment rights under Bruton and Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979),⁹ because their statements did not interlock with respect to their intent to rob Enau.¹⁰ He also claims his Sixth Amendment rights were violated under Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987), which he states should be applied retroactively to his 1979 trial.¹¹

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated under Bruton and Parker. A review of both petitioner's and Christenson's statements shows that they differed in three respects with regard to their intent to rob Enau. Nonetheless, the statements were sufficiently interlocking to support their admission under Bruton and Parker.

However, Cruz applies retroactively to Reddy's collateral attack on his conviction. Under Cruz, the admission of Christenson's statements violated Reddy's Sixth Amendment rights. Because the error was not harmless, Reddy's petition is granted.

DISCUSSION

A. The events according to Reddy's statement

Reddy gave his statement in response to questioning by Assistant District Attorney ("ADA") Carol Remer-Smith on April 5, 1978, the transcript of which was read to the jury.

According to Reddy:

On the afternoon of April 4, 1978, Christenson called Reddy and asked him to meet her at the Blarney Stone, a bar located on Eighth Avenue between 48th and 49th Streets in Manhattan. When petitioner arrived at the Blarney Stone, Christenson told him "that we were going to go down to rip off this guy John," a man Christenson had been dating. The defendants left the bar to meet Donald Webb, a friend of Christenson's, who provided them with a gun. The plan of action was for Christenson "to go in first because she knows him. She was going to ask to let me use the bathroom then we were going to come out and scare him. Then tie him up, take the money."

When the defendants arrived at John's apartment building, located at 531 West 48th Street, Christenson rang John's buzzer, but there was no answer. The two then proceeded to John's apartment, which was on the fifth floor, and knocked on his door, but again there was no answer.

While on their way down, the defendants saw Enau coming out of his second-floor apartment. Christenson (who had previously lived in the building) approached Enau and spoke briefly with him. Without communicating with Reddy, Christenson accompanied Enau out of the building and to a corner grocery store. Reddy followed them, waiting in the middle of the block while they were in the store. Christenson and Enau left the store, and returned to Enau's apartment. Reddy again followed, waiting first on the stoop of the building, and then near the stairs on the second floor landing.

The ADA asked Reddy if he knew what Christenson was intending to do with Enau:

Q Did you have any idea what Cheryl intended to do with this Hispanic man when she went into his apartment after they came from the deli?

A No, not really.

Q Did you think she was going to turn a trick?

A She probably would have tried.

Q Do you think she was going to rip him off?

A Probably.

Reddy denied that he and Christenson had talked about robbing anyone other than John, the intended first victim:

Q When you talked about ripping off John did you talk about if you couldn't find him maybe seeing if there was another mark?

A No, we didn't talk about it. This other guy just came out of his apartment.

Q Did you ever walk along the streets looking for somebody who might have a lot of money, that would be easy to take that from?

A You mean last night?

Q Yes.

A No.

According to Reddy's statement, after Christenson had been in Enau's apartment for about ten minutes the door opened, and Reddy saw Enau attempting to push Christenson out of the apartment and close the door. Christenson was caught in the door. Reddy pushed the door open, punched Enau, and wrestled him to the ground. Enau got up, grabbed a large knife, and moved toward Christenson, who was holding a gun. She told Enau to stop, but he continued moving in her direction. Reddy then "grabbed Enau around the neck and ... threw him on the floor." As Enau was getting up, Christenson shot him in the face, killing him. Reddy then left the building, and Christenson soon followed.

Reddy denied taking anything from Enau's apartment.

B. The events according to Christenson's statements

Christenson made three different statements: the first an oral statement given to Detective Virgilio Dalsass, which he transcribed and had her sign, and the second and third in response to questioning by ADA Smith. All three statements were read to the jury.

Christenson gave the first statement in the early morning of April 5, 1978. This statement did not incriminate Reddy. She stated that Reddy was at the Blarney Stone, but that she left the bar alone. She allegedly met Enau on West 48th Street, and went with him to the grocery store, and then his apartment. Once in the apartment, Christenson placed her open pocketbook on the sink counter. When Enau saw a gun in her pocketbook, he grabbed a knife and walked towards her. She shot him.

Christenson made her second statement later that morning. This statement incriminated Reddy in the attempted robbery. She explained that Reddy had accompanied her to the building, and...