Redstone v. O'Connor
| Decision Date | 16 October 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 06-P-496.,06-P-496. |
| Citation | 874 N.E.2d 1118,70 Mass. App. Ct. 493 |
| Parties | Edward S. REDSTONE & another<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> v. Thomas N. O'CONNOR & another,<SMALL><SUP>2</SUP></SMALL> trustees,<SMALL><SUP>3</SUP></SMALL> & others.<SMALL><SUP>4</SUP></SMALL>,<SMALL><SUP>5</SUP></SMALL> |
| Court | Appeals Court of Massachusetts |
Wendy H. Sibbison for Edward S. Redstone.
Daniel V. Bakinowski for Thomas N. O'Connor & another.
Thomas N. O'Connor, Boston, for the intervener.
Present: PERRETTA, BROWN, & CYPHER, JJ.
These cross appeals arise out of an action brought by Edward S. Redstone against the trustees of three inter vivos trusts and the executors of his mother's estate claiming that a gift made under one of the trusts had lapsed for lack of a beneficiary, and that it must revert back to his mother's estate, of which he is a residual legatee. He claimed further that he was entitled to reimbursement from all three trusts for the support he provided to the trust beneficiaries as well as for administrative services provided. Edward's son Michael Redstone intervened in the action, asserting that he was an intended beneficiary of the trust in issue and opposing Edward's claim for reimbursement for support and administrative services. Based upon her reading of the trust instrument, the judge concluded that Michael was an intended beneficiary of the trust and granted his motion for summary judgment. She also denied Edward's claims for reimbursement from all three trusts. We conclude that the trust instrument does not support the determination that Michael was an intended beneficiary, and leave intact the ruling that the trustees were not entitled to attorney's fees. We affirm the dismissal of Edward's claims for reimbursement from the trusts, and remand the matter to the Probate and Family Court for entry of a judgment consistent with this opinion.
1. The facts.6 Edward is the son of Mickey and Belle Redstone and the father of Ruth Ann and Michael. In 1959, Belle established the 1959 Belle Redstone Trust, the trust in issue (referred to throughout this opinion as the 1959 trust), for the benefit of her granddaughter, Ruth Ann.7
Under the terms of the 1959 trust, one-half of the trust principal and accumulated income was to be distributed to Ruth Ann upon her attainment of thirty years of age, with the remainder to be distributed to her at age thirty-five, whereupon the trust would terminate.8
Sections II(E) and II(F) of the 1959 trust respectively provide for the disposition of trust income and principal in the event that Ruth Ann died before full distribution of the trust property, either with or without issue. Should Ruth Ann leave issue, § II(E) provides:
(Emphasis added.)
The terms of § II(F) are:
(Emphasis added.)
Like the 1959 trust, the trust established simultaneously by Belle for Michael provided for discretionary payments from net income until he attained the age of thirty years and then for the distribution of the corpus of the trust to him at ages thirty and thirty-five. In the event he died before full distribution without leaving issue, the balance of that trust property was, in the first instance, to be added to the 1959 trust.9
As it happened, Ruth Ann died intestate in 1987 at age thirty-three, leaving one son, Gabriel Adam Redstone (Adam), then three years of age.10 Following Ruth Ann's death, Edward raised his grandchild, Adam. About fifteen years later, in November, 2002, Edward and his then wife, Madeline, adopted Adam,11 who died intestate and without issue in May, 2004, that is, before the time (twenty years) set by § II(E) of the 1959 trust for the distribution of trust assets to Ruth Ann's issue.
Ruth Ann and Adam were also the beneficiaries of the Ruth Ann Redstone Trust which was settled by Edward on June 30, 1972 (1972 trust). The trustees of the 1968 Mickey Redstone Trust (1968 trust) and 1972 trust had discretionary authority to make expenditures from trust principal and income for what we shall generally refer to as Adam's support.12
About two months after Adam's death, Edward brought this action, alleging that the 1959 trust lapsed with Adam's death, and the corpus of the trust reverted to Belle's estate, of which he, Edward, is a residuary legatee. Edward also sought reimbursement from the 1959, 1968, 1972 trusts for expenses incurred in raising Ruth Ann and Adam as well as for administrative services rendered to the trusts. Michael intervened in the suit individually and as next friend of his children. He and the defendant trustees also sought attorney's fees.
2. Edward's appeal. a. The 1959 trust. None of the contingencies expressed in § II(E) or § II(F) of the 1959 trust occurred. Rather, Ruth Ann died prior to the full distribution of the trust assets while leaving issue, her son Adam, who died subsequent to Ruth Ann but prior to a full distribution of the 1959 truth assets. This circumstance brings us to Edward and Michael's competing arguments on the question whether the gift lapsed for lack of a beneficiary, as Edward claims, or whether Belle intended to make a gift to Michael. Edward contends that the judge erred when she impermissibly "read in[to]" the 1959 trust instrument executed by Belle an intended gift to Michael in the circumstances presented.13
While acknowledging that "the [1959 t]rust does not expressly provide for the circumstances here [presented]," Michael contends that a literal interpretation of the language of the 1959 trust would frustrate Belle's intention as indicated by the clear language of § II(F), that is, to pass to him the assets of the trust in the event that Ruth Ann's rights under the trust failed.
The judge deemed Edward's reading of the 1959 trust "too narrow." She reasoned that §§ II(E) and II(F), read together with the trust as a whole, demonstrated Belle's intention that the trust corpus remain with both Ruth Ann and Michael or their issue and that the corpus pass to Belle's heirs at law only in the event that neither Ruth Ann nor Michael nor their issue survived. From that reading, the judge concluded, as matter of law, that Michael was entitled to receive Ruth Ann's, and later Adam's share, of the 1959 trust.
Our analysis of the competing claims before us begins with the determination that there is no ambiguity in the terms of the 1959 trust. Cf. Flannery v. McNamara, 432 Mass. 665, 669, 738 N.E.2d 739 (2000) (). Neither Edward nor Michael contends otherwise.14 Moreover, it appears from the judge's memorandum of decision that her analysis proceeded on the same basis, that the trust instrument was unambiguous.
Notwithstanding the absence of ambiguity in the terms of the 1959 trust, neither we nor the trial judge are bound to adhere to the language in that instrument when we are convinced that a reading of the instrument as a whole would frustrate the settlor's intent.15 See Sanger v. Bourke, 209 Mass. 481, 486, 95 N.E. 894 (1911), quoting from Metcalf v. First Parish in Framingham, 128 Mass 370, 374 (1880); Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Schmitt, 349 Mass. 669, 672, 212 N.E.2d 202 (1965). As stated in Schroeder v. Danielson, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 450, 453, 640 N.E.2d 495 (1994):
We do not agree with Michael's contention that § II(F)'s proviso that the gift to Ruth Ann should inure to his benefit in the event that she die without issue bespeaks a more general intent on Belle's part, more specifically, that if the gift intended for Ruth Ann and her issue should fail, then it should pass to him. We think Michael's argument is not dissimilar to that advanced by the disappointed legatees but rejected by the court in Wright v. Benttinen, 352 Mass. 495, 496, 226 N.E.2d 194 (1967).
In Wright, the testator bequeathed the residue of his estate to his wife. He...
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