Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin

• Citation: 689 S.W.2d 404
• Decision Date: 10 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. C-3591,C-3591
• Parties: REED TOOL COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Judy A. COPELIN, Respondent.
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Page 404

689 S.W.2d 404

REED TOOL COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Judy A. COPELIN, Respondent.

No. C-3591.

Supreme Court of Texas.

April 10, 1985.

Rehearing Denied May 8, 1985.

Fulbright and Jaworski, Patricia J. Kerrigan, Winstol D. Carter, Jr. and Charles W. Hurd, III, Houston, for petitioner.

R.D. McPherson, Houston, for respondent.

SPEARS, Justice.

The question presented is whether an employer who intentionally maintains an unsafe workplace in which an employee is injured may be held to have intentionally injured the employee. Mrs. Judy Copelin sued Reed Tool Company for loss of consortium resulting from on-the-job injuries sustained by her husband. The trial court granted summary judgment for Reed Tool Company on the ground that Mrs. Copelin's action was derivative and could not be maintained because her husband's suit was barred by the Workers' Compensation Act. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. arts. 8306-8309i (Vernon 1967 and Supp.1985). This court has held that if Mrs. Copelin could establish an intentional impairment of consortium, her claim would not be barred by either the act or her husband's acceptance of workers' compensation benefits. Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736 (Tex.1980) affirming 596 S.W.2d 302 (Tex.Civ.App.1980). On remand Reed Tool again moved for summary judgment, asserting that there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning intentional injury. The trial court granted summary judgment. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the cause for trial. 679 S.W.2d 605. We reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and affirm the trial court judgment.

George Copelin, a machine operator for Reed Tool, was injured in the course of his employment when a chain tong from the lathe he was operating hit him in the head. He suffered severe brain damage and was left in a coma. Mrs. Copelin alleged that Reed Tool intentionally caused her husband's injury by intentionally requiring him to work a machine that Reed Tool knew was unsafe, did not meet minimal safety standards, and was defective because of a modification made by Reed. She further alleged that Reed Tool knew her husband was inadequately trained and that they required him to work "such long hours as violated minimum requirements of law."

Reed Tool moved for summary judgment asserting there was no question of material fact. Mrs. Copelin failed to file a response, and summary judgment was granted. The court of appeals held that the intentional maintenance of an unsafe workplace would supply the intent necessary to hold the employer liable for an intentional injury, and that since the depositions did not disprove an intent to maintain an unsafe workplace, Reed Tool had not established there were no questions of material fact.

The Texas Workers' Compensation Act is the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries with the exception of intentional injury. Castleberry v. Goolsby Bldg. Corp., 617 S.W.2d 665, 666 (Tex.1981); Middleton v. Texas Power & Light, 108 Tex. 96, 185 S.W. 556, 560 (1916). "An injury caused by willful negligence or willful gross negligence is not an intentional injury necessary to avoid the effect of the Workers' Compensation Act." Castleberry, 617 S.W.2d at 666. Falling within the intentional injury exception are direct assaults by an employer on an employee. See Richardson v. The Fair, Inc., 124 S.W.2d 885 (Tex.Civ.App.--Beaumont 1939, writ dism'd, judgmt cor.). The fundamental difference between negligent injury, or even grossly negligent injury, and intentional injury is the specific intent to inflict injury. The Restatement Second of Torts defines intent to mean that "the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A (1965).

Some courts have applied the Restatement definition to the worker's compensation intentional injury exception. In construing the Louisiana Worker's Compensation Statutes, the Louisiana Supreme Court held "[t]he meaning of intent in this context is that the defendant either desired to bring about the physical results of his act or believed they were substantially certain to follow from what he did." Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So.2d 475, 482 (La.1981). Moreover, "[t]o establish intentional conduct, more than the knowledge and appreciation of risk is necessary; the known danger must cease to become only a foreseeable risk which an ordinary, reasonable, prudent person would avoid (ordinary negligence), and become a substantial certainty." VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Products, 334 N.W.2d 874, 876 (S.D.1983). See Schreder v. Cities Service Co., 336 N.W.2d 641, 644 (N.D.1983).

The overwhelming weight of authority from other jurisdictions is that the common law liability of the employer cannot be stretched to include accidental injuries caused by the gross, wanton, willful, deliberate, intentional, reckless, culpable, or malicious negligence, breach of statute, or other misconduct of the employer short of genuine intentional injury. 2A A. Larson, The Law of Worker's Compensation § 68.13 (1983). This view is endorsed by Larson who states:

Even if the alleged conduct goes beyond aggravated negligence and includes such elements as knowingly permitting a hazardous work condition to exist, knowingly ordering claimant to perform an extremely dangerous job, wilfully failing to furnish a safe place to work, or even wilfully unlawfully violating a safety statute, this still falls short of the kind of actual intention to injure that robs the injury of its accidental character.

Several courts have held that the intentional failure to provide a safe workplace does not constitute an intentional injury in order for the claimant to escape worker's compensation limits. Griffin v. George's, Inc., 267 Ark. 91, 589 S.W.2d 24 (1979); Johns-Manville Products Corp. v. Contra Costa Superior Court, 27 Cal.3d 465, 165 Cal.Rptr. 858, 612 P.2d 948 (1980); Kofron v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 441 A.2d 226 (Del.1982); Southern Wire & Iron Inc. v. Fowler, 217 Ga. 727, 124 S.E.2d 738 (1962); Great Western Sugar Co. v. District Court, 610 P.2d 717 (Mont.1980); Jacobsen v. Southeast Distributors, Inc., 413 So.2d 995 (La.App.1982). See McCoy v. Liberty Foundry Co., 635 S.W.2d 60 (Mo.App.1982); Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Reyes, 75 Nev. 212, 337 P.2d 624 (1959); Cooper v. Queen, 586 S.W.2d 830 (Tenn.App.1979, writ denied). Moreover, the intentional modification or removal of safety controls or guards is not the equivalent of an intentional injury. Rosales v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 41 Ill.App.3d 787, 354 N.E.2d 553 (1976); McAdams v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., Inc., 395 So.2d 411 (La.App.1981); Santiago v. Brill Monfort Co., 10 N.Y.2d 718, 176 N.E.2d 835 (1961), Duk Hwan Chung v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 276 Or. 809 556 P.2d 683 (1976); Foster v. Allsop Automatic, Inc., 86 Wash.2d 579, 547 P.2d 856 (1976). The intentional violation of a safety regulation does not authorize recovery beyond that provided by workers' compensation statutes. Williams v. International Paper Co., 129 Cal.App.3d 810, 181 Cal.Rptr. 342 (1982); Duncan v. Perry Packing Co., 162 Kan. 79, 174 P.2d 78 (1946); Cortez v. Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corp., 402 So.2d 249 (La.App.1981); Roberts v. Barclay, 369 P.2d 808 (Okla.1962); Evans v. Allentown Portland Cement Co., 433 Pa. 595, 252 A.2d 646 (1969). Even the intentional failure to train an employee to perform a dangerous task does not constitute an intentional injury. Law v. Dartt, 109 Cal.App.2d 508, 240 P.2d 1013 (1952). See Kittell v. Vermont Weather Board, Inc., 138 Vt. 439, 417 A.2d 926 (1980). Requiring an employee to work long hours is not tantamount to an intentional injury. Lemaire v. Younger Transp., Inc. of Tex., 443 So.2d 662 (La.App.1983); Shores v. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of New York, 413 So.2d 315 (La.App.1982).

While these results may seem harsh, as Larson points out, it is not the gravity or depravity of the employer's conduct but rather the narrow issue of intentional versus accidental...