Reed v. State

Decision Date20 September 1972
Docket NumberNo. 39932,39932
Citation267 So.2d 70
PartiesCraig Vernon REED, and Gene Roger Reed, Appellants, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Michael H. Gora, Asst. Public Defender, for Craig Vernon Reed and Tobias Simon, Miami, for Gene Roger Reed, appellants.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Raymond L. Marky, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

ERVIN, Justice.

We have for review in this direct appeal the convictions of Craig Vernon Reed and Gene Roger Reed of first degree murder without recommendation of mercy.

The Appellants, as well as one Joseph St. Ana, were indicted by the Broward County Grand Jury in 1970. St. Ana was granted immunity by the State in return for his testimony at the Appellants' trial. According to St. Ana, two pistols, a .32 caliber and a .38 caliber, were used by the Reeds to murder their victim. During the course of their trial, .32 and .38 caliber firearms were placed in evidence over the objection of counsel. The .32 caliber pistol was found in a shoe box in a duct in a dwelling house occasionally occupied by Craig Vernon Reed. The owner of the searched premises, Irene Tavares, was present at the time of the search and consented to it. The .38 caliber revolver was obtained from Gene Reed's home. This house was searched after the police obtained a search warrant based upon affidavits from an investigator, John Hovey, and two of the Reeds' friends, Joyce Johnson and Irene Tavares. The jury found defendants guilty of first degree murder and did not recommend mercy.

On appeal, Appellants raise four issues:

1. Whether the indictments upon which they were tried were illegal because the Broward County Grand Jury which issued and presented the said indictments is illegal.

2. Whether the trial court's failure to permit the jury to separately consider the issues of guilt/innocence and mercy/death and to provide standards for each of these determinations requires a cancellation of the death sentence.

3. Whether the imposition of the death penalty should be reversed as cruel and unusual punishment.

4. Whether the trial court erred in denying their motions to suppress and exclude the evidence obtained under the search warrant.

Issues two and three have been rendered moot by the decision of Supreme Court of the United States in Furman v. Georgia, 1972, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346, invalidating capital punishment statutes, and the decision of this Court in Donaldson v. Sack, 265 So.2d 499, filed July 17, 1972, setting forth the effect Furman will have on Florida criminal trials. Because of these decisions, Appellants' sentences must be changed from death to life imprisonment. With this cancellation of their death sentences, the bifurcated trial issue becomes moot.

We have carefully considered Appellants' remaining two issues and find nothing therein to justify a new trial.

It is Appellants' contention that the grand jury which indicted them was illegal because the Florida Constitution, 1968 Revision, eliminated Section 10 of the Declaration of Rights of the Constitution of 1885 which specifically provided for grand juries. This argument previously has been considered by this Court, and we have held it to be without merit

'because (1) our Florida grand jury system is derived from the common law, except as otherwise modified, and (2) the 1968 constitutional revision did not invalidate the grand jury system. See Fla.Stat. § 2.01, F.S.A.; Cotton v. State, 85 Fla. 197, 95 So. 668 (1923); Re Report of Grand Jury, 152 Fla. 154, 11 So.2d 316 (1943); Jones v. State, 18 Fla. 889 (1882). In fact, Article I, Section 15, Florida Constitution 1968, recites '(a) no person shall be tried for capital crime without presentment or indictment by a grand jury. . . . '' Portee v. State, Fla.1971, 253 So.2d 866, 867.

As their last point Appellants contend the affidavits used as the basis for the issuance of the search warrant for the premises of Gene Reed were based upon hearsay and were insufficient under the guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Aguilar v. Texas, 1964, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723. The Aguilar affidavit provided in pertinent part:

'Affiants have received reliable information from a credible person and do believe that heroin, marijuana, barbiturates and other narcotics and narcotic paraphernalia are being kept at the above described premises for the purpose of sale and use contrary to the provisions of the law.'

In holding a search warrant issued on the basis of that affidavit improper, the Court said:

'Here the 'mere conclusion' that petitioner possessed narcotics was not even that of the affiant himself; it was that of an unidentified informant. The affidavit here not only 'contains no affirmative allegation that the affiant spoke with personal knowledge of the matters contained therein,' it does not even contain an 'affirmative allegation' that the affiant's unidentified source 'spoke with personal knowledge.' For all that appears, the source here merely suspected, believed or concluded that there were narcotics in petitioner's possession. The magistrate here certainly could not 'judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on * * * to show probable cause.' He necessarily accepted 'without question' the informant's 'suspicion,' 'belief' or 'mere conclusion.'

'Although an affidavit may be based on hearsay information and need not reflect the direct personal observations of the affiant, Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, the magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need not be disclosed, see Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 84 S.Ct. 825, (11 L.Ed.2d 887,) was 'credible' or his information 'reliable.' Otherwise, ...

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6 cases
  • Terrell v. State, 82-89
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • April 12, 1983
    ...reliable source. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969) (White, J., concurring); Reed v. State, 267 So.2d 70 (Fla.1972). From all that appears, the informant here merely suspected, believed or concluded that there were narcotics in Terrell's possess......
  • Hoberman v. State
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • April 30, 1981
    ...in the event of a re-trial, we note that appellant's challenge to the composition of the grand jury was laid to rest in Reed v. State, 267 So.2d 70 (Fla. 1972), and Portee v. State, 253 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1971). Appellant's vagueness challenge fails because sections 838.015(1) and 838.016(1) c......
  • Girardeau v. State, AF-151
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • August 31, 1981
    ...F.S.A., has no effect upon the existence or validity of the grand jury system. Portee v. State, 253 So.2d 866 (Fla.1971); and Reed v. State, 267 So.2d 70 (Fla.1972). See, additionally, Section 2.01, Florida Statutes, declaring the common and statute laws of England as of July 4, 1776, as th......
  • Lebowitz v. State
    • United States
    • Florida District Court of Appeals
    • May 27, 1975
    ...of a search warrant. See, State v. Wolff, Fla.1975, 310 So.2d 729 (1975); Andersen v. State, Fla.1973, 274 So.2d 228; Reed v. State, Fla.1972, 267 So.2d 70. Therefore, for the reasons stated and upon the authorities cited and discussed, the judgment and sentence appealed are Affirmed. ...
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